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Abstract 
This study examines the film industry in Tanzania from the 1960s to 2010 and assesses 
how government policies, legislation, and cultural institutions have impacted filmmaking in 
Tanzania. By employing a critical political economy theoretical framework, the study explores 
succeeding administrations, from President Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1961–1985) to President 
Mrisho Jakaya Kikwete (2005–present), and reveals cultural mechanisms governments use in 
controlling the film industry. Through the use of archival information, interviews, and participant 
observation, the study reveals that despite the social, cultural, economic, political, and 
ideological shifts that Tanzania has experienced in moving from socialism to capitalism, each 
administration, using different mechanisms, has retained a strong hold on the film industry. 
These administrations in advancing their power and legitimacy established cultural institutions 
and film policies that saw to it that only government-sanctioned images and cultural values were 
projected to its citizenry. This study reveals that government institutions such as the Government 
Film Unit (GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), the Audio Visual Institute (AVI), the 
National Film Censorship Board (NFCB), the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976, the Cultural 
Policy, the Cultural Trust Fund, the Copyright Law of 1999, the Copyright Society of Tanzania 
(COSOTA), and the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) were established as mechanisms 
to control local cultural products as well as the intrusion of foreign cultural products. The 
policies, legislation, and cultural institutions gave the government the power to influence the 
opinion of its citizens by dictating what cultural images and identities were permissible.  
By examining how policies, institutions, and legislation impacted the film industry, an 
understanding of how governments manipulate and control the cultural/film sector is critically 
highlighted and addressed in the hope that an alternative, more diversified perspective will 
emerge. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
This study explores the film industry in Tanzania from the 1960s to 2010 and assesses 
how government policies, legislation, and cultural institutions have been used as mechanism of 
cultural control and thus shaped and impacted filmmaking in Tanzania. An examination of how 
different administrations, from President Julius Kambarage Nyerere in 1961 to President Mrisho 
Jakaya Kikwete in 2010, have perceived film production and thus the film industry as a 
challenge to the neo-liberal narrative of globalization that sees governments as obsolete is made 
and a critical political economy analytical framework is employed for examining the tools 
governments use and continue to use in establishing and sustaining their dominance and 
relevance in the cultural sector. This study examines the social, economic, political, and cultural 
transformation of Tanzania and discusses how those different paradigms interpenetrate and 
influence the Tanzanian film industry and further assesses to what extent and with what 
mechanisms the government controls the film industry. 
The study reveals complex, antagonistic, and sometime contradictory relations existing 
between the government and its filmmaking citizens and how that relationship has ushered in 
alternative modes of film production and exhibition.  
The Social, Economic, and Political Landscape of Tanzania 
Like many of Africa’s developing nations, Tanzania attained its political independence in 
1961, and like many of the newly formed Third World countries it struggled to form a unified 
nation. In the endeavor to construct this nation, the newly elected Tanganyika African National 
Unity (TANU) government under the leadership of President Nyerere established the Ministry of 
National Culture and Youth in 1962. In his inaugural speech to the parliament on December 10, 
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1962, the president laid out the mission of the ministry: “Culture is the essence and spirit of any 
nation. . . . Of the crimes of colonialism there is no worse than the attempt to make us believe we 
had no indigenous culture of our own. . . . So I have set up this new Ministry to help us regain 
our pride in our culture, I want to seek out the best of the traditions and customs of all our tribes 
and make them part of our national culture (Nyerere, 1962: 4).  
In the endeavor to realize a national culture and identity, President Nyerere suppressed all 
political parties, civil societies, trade unions, and ethnic associations under the pretense that 
indulging in diverse and multiple organizations would “introduce elements of disunity and retard 
development” (Shivji, 2006: 37). To further and officially flush out dissidents in 1963, Nyerere 
announced that Tanganyika would become a one-party state (Coulson 1986: 137); in 1964 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the United Republic of Tanzania; and in 1965 the 
TANU party declared itself the de facto party, officially making Tanzania a single-party state. In 
1967, the government further cemented its authority by officially announcing a socialist 
manifesto entitled “Socialism and Self-Reliance,” otherwise known as Ujamaa in Kiswahili, 
which declared socialism as the state ideology and highlighted the steps the nation would take to 
implement its social, economic, and political development programs. With the socialist ideology 
thus established, the government became the sole guarantor of the citizen’s general well-being. 
The government thus had the power to construct and control the thinking pattern of its citizen. 
According to Jeffery Klaeh, a government gains its power through “ideological conditions that 
encourage people to believe in their legitimacy and acquiesce to their authority” (2010: 12). The 
power to narrate and block other narratives from emerging became the preoccupation of the 
TANU government, and this was cemented through the adoption of the socialism and self-
reliance manifesto.  
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Ngumbele-Mwiru notes that the building of socialism can only be ensured when the 
peasants and workers, by the instruments of their government and cooperatives, control the 
major means of production and distribution (quoted in Cliffe, 1973: 53). In short, the Tanzanian 
state, to legitimize its power and interests, put its citizens and their means of survival under its 
control. This kind of thinking was also prevalent among other African states such as Zambia and 
Ghana. Claude Ake has noted that in a lot of the African countries an increasing range of 
economic activities was brought under the control of the state, notably by nationalization, “to 
facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power” (1983: 37). Applying socialist 
ideology, the Tanzanian government nationalized and controlled all major means of production, 
including film production. But this was challenged in the social-cultural, economic, and political 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s by intellectuals, political parties, and the general public. The 
introduction to Third World states of the structural adjustment program, trade liberalization, free 
market economy, and multiparty democracy, and the intensification of global connectivity 
brought unforeseen changes, forcing the government to transfer control of major means of 
production from its hands to the private. This neo-liberal trend in economic policies pointed 
away from welfare state economies and toward free trade policies, the privatization of state 
enterprises, and the commercialization of all spheres of life, including the arts (Falicov, 1999: 
15). The change of hands from the government to the private, from socialism to capitalism, 
brought about an emergence of the commercial video film and diasporic filmmaking, as well as 
multiplexes and the demise of cinema halls. The emergence of video filmmaking and diasporic 
cinema in Tanzania solicits a scrutiny of the global interconnectivity that fosters resistance, 
negotiation, interpretation, and invasion of new modes of expressions and practices.  
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In 1997 the Tanzanian Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Revolutionary Party) government, 
under the leadership of President Benjamin Mkapa, for the first time in thirty-four years of 
independence established a national cultural policy document (Cultural Policy Document, 1997). 
Less than a year later, the government established the Cultural Trust Fund, an organization that 
grants financial assistance to artists who aim to promote Tanzanian culture. The same year, on 
the island of Zanzibar, the government established the Zanzibar Film Festival (ZIFF) to 
showcase and promote Tanzania’s cultural heritage. In 1999, the Copyright Law Act and the 
Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) were inaugurated and administered under the 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing for the purpose of promoting, protecting, collecting, 
and distributing royalties to artists (Copyright Act, 1999: 731). All through the first decade of the 
2000s the government held meetings, conferences, and workshops to discuss the need to review 
or strengthen the Film Act Policy of 1976 and the cultural policy (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009).  
The transformation above reveals that the government sought to reinvent itself in the way 
it perceived culture and cultural activities such as film. But it also raises questions such as what 
prompted these kinds of investment in the cultural and film industries, especially after more than 
thirty-four years of self-rule? Why has the government found it imperative to establish a cultural 
policy and cultural institutions? What impact do these organizations and policies have on cultural 
industry such as film? Through a critical political economy framework, this study explores to 
what extent the established policies or lack there of influenced the types of films made in a 
particular administrative era and how economic and politics interplayed in the shaping of film 
legislation, how the adoption of socialism and self-reliance and the subsequent reforms impacted 
the film industry during the Nyerere administration, and how the implementation of the neo-
liberal policies with their structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the political-economic shift 
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from socialism to postsocialism changed the way the government perceived and approached the 
film industry during the Mwinyi, Mkapa, and Kikwete administrations.  
Methods and Literature Review 
In a country like Tanzania where government control has and continues to have influence 
on all modes of cultural production, including films, a theoretical approach that interrogates this 
power relation is needed in order to unveil mechanisms governments use in solidifying their 
control. This study probes the institutional forces such as the ideological shift from socialism to 
an open market economy and how the emerging of cultural institutions have contributed to the 
commercialization of film and thus the development of the video film industry, and how 
different government administrations have controlled, negotiated, and created policies, 
institutions, and legislation and how this has impacted the kinds of film produced.  
The social, economic, technological, and political changes that emerged globally in the 
1980s have called for the reevaluation of the way states function in today’s world. The 
permeability of nation states and the rise, acceleration, and expansion of market economies has 
caused some scholars to predict, prematurely, that the nation state is obsolete. This has been an 
exaggeration, for as Robert Gilpin notes “the nation state [still] plays the central role in guiding 
economic development and has to lead rather than follow the market” (2001: 319). This is true of 
the Tanzanian government. Although it has embraced neo-liberal economic and political policies 
that call for less government intervention in modes of production, the Tanzanian government 
continues to control and intervene in economic, social, and cultural affairs. Gilpin argues that 
national governments still make the primary decisions regarding economic matters, they continue 
to set the rules within which other actors function, and they use their considerable power to 
influence economic outcomes (18). Although external actors (Hollywood, corporate international 
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agencies, and governments) exert strong pressure, the state remains an important agent in 
shaping the structure of media markets. As Jeffery Klaeh notes, governments “have the authority 
to regulate-coerce the media to carry or not, certain kinds of program content, to license or not, 
and generally to ensure certain public policies are realized and protected” (2010: 18). 
Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord explore the role of the state in communication and 
cultural policymaking in a globalized world. They note that the growing prominence of 
international agreements has not eclipsed the most tangible power available to states: lawmaking 
(2001: X). States hold the power to pass legislation that affects domestic media industries; they 
create rules and regulate national media, and therefore effectively construct the environment 
within which national media operate. This means then that, especially in Tanzania the media has 
become the ideological branch of the government, manufacturing and controlling what Klaeh 
calls public’s “thinkable thoughts” in a way that serves the state’s interest.  
Therefore, a critical political economy approach that puts the state at the center will 
illustrate the mechanisms the government utilizes in its continuing endeavor to control and 
influence an aspect of production such as film and how such attempts can promote or hinder the 
film industry. James Caporaso and David Levine (1992), and Robert Gilpin (2002) define a state 
centric approach to political economy as the ability of the state to define and pursue an agenda 
not defined solely by private societal interest. Gilpin favors this state centric approach because, 
as he says, “The nation state remains the dominant actor in both domestic and international 
economic affairs” and thus states continue to use their power to implement policies that channel 
economic forces in ways favorable to the national interest and the interest of the citizenry (21). 
And I would argue to their own interest too.  
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In the current global system, where powerful governments and international corporations 
and agencies put pressure on weaker nations, I argue that this pressure is filtered through the 
prism of national political, economic, and cultural institutions. In a country like Tanzania, with a 
history of government control, a critical political economy is fundamental in scrutinizing the 
state and its institutional apparatus. As Yuri Popov notes political economy studies do not ignore 
the nature of political power, the class content of the state, the influence of state policy on the 
economy, and the mutual influence of various socio-economic systems existing in the modern 
world (1984: 49). 
In this study, this state-centered approach is explored in order to demonstrate the 
mechanism the state employs and how that hinders or promotes the film industry. The study 
argues that although the state has succumbed to the neo-liberal policies of open market and 
global capitalism, a socialist authoritarian mentality and its policies continue to inform 
economic, political, and cultural decisions and legislation, especially when it is in the interest of 
and serves the state. 
Overview and Debates on Critical Political Economy in Communication (Media) 
Critical political economy of communication—or media, as it is sometimes referred to—
unlike neoclassical economics is holistic, historical, and goes beyond issues of efficiency to 
engage with moral questions of justice, equity, and public good (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 33). 
According to Hesmondhalgh, a critical political economy approach to communication developed 
in the late 1960s among academic sociologists and political scientists concerned by the 
increasing role of private business in cultural production (33). Other scholars (Mosco, 1996; 
Babe, 2009; Guback, 1969; and Wasko, 2005) credit the development of the approach to Adorno 
and Horkheimer from the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Horkheimer investigated the 
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consequence of mass producing culture for profit through their idea of the culture industry. Most 
of their works addressed mass media and their effect in society. Mosco asserts critical political 
economy emerged in connecting mass marketing to wider economic and social processes and 
critiquing them from a range of humanistic values (176). Richard Babe (2009) in his examination 
of the genealogy of political economy and cultural studies credits Theodore Adorno as the 
founder of the political economy study of media as well as the critical cultural studies. 
In scholarly debates about the political economy of communication, there has been a 
tendency to divide its development into three geographical settings: North America, Europe, and 
the Third World.  
North America: Media Ownership Concentration 
Vincent Mosco in his comprehensive study The Political Economy of Communication, 
Richard Babe in Cultural Studies and Political Economy, and to some extent Hesmondhalgh in 
his book Cultural Industries have conducted detailed analyses of the development of the political 
economy of communication. Mosco, Hesmondhalgh, and Babe note three individuals, Dallas 
Smythe, Herbert Schiller, and Harold Adams Innis, as the discipline’s most influential figures in 
North America. Their work centered on how the communication industry has become part of the 
corporate order and is thus exploitative and unjust. The major objective of these scholars is to 
interrogate the relationship between the center of political power and the center of media power. 
In doing so, they hope to advance public interest and to create an alternative, democratic 
communication industry. Other scholars (Chomsky, McChesney, Mosco, Babe, and Schiller) 
have emphasized the relationship between government and corporate powers. McChesney, 
Herman, and Chomsky in their analysis of U.S.. media have come to conclude that the U.S.. 
mass media, through its five filters—ownership, advertising, government information, flack, and 
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anticommunism—actively frame issues and promote news stories that serve the needs and 
concerns of the elite (1989: 32). 
Thus critical political economy in North America concerns itself with ownership 
concentration, how media are structured and controlled, and how they operate. In this perspective 
North American scholars’ major concern has been with the capitalist economic system and how 
it has nourished inequalities of power, thus creating oppression, manipulation, and control 
through media. Although it is true that the capitalist system nourishes inequality of power, I 
argue and this study shows that this inequality and control prevails even under a socialist 
economic system. Therefore, critical political economy of communication must concern itself 
with the ownership, whether it be in the hands of the private or state sector, and control of media 
industries. 
Europe: Integration and Resistance to Institutional Authorities 
In Europe, the political economy approach to research has been associated with scholars 
such as Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, James Halloran, Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, 
Kaarle Nordenstreng, Armand Mattelart, Nicholas Grahams, Bernard Miege, Marie Gillespie, 
and Cees Hamelink. Unlike their North American counterparts, most European scholars eschew 
identification with a political economy approach, preferring to situate themselves in cultural 
studies, critical sociology, or social psychology. Mosco notes, “What appears to be an 
institutionalized program of research is actively a collection of individuals . . . whose setting is 
more congenial to critical social research, but not one that gave particular attention to political 
economy” (1996: 99). Scholars such as Cees Hamelink, Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Armand 
Mattelart have occupied themselves with issues of the presence of foreign media and its threat to 
developing nations’ cultural autonomy. These scholars have played leading roles in the 
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development of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in the 1970s 
and 1980s, a policy initiated by the Non-Aligned Movement that was concerned with the unequal 
cultural trading relations between Western capitalist countries and the Third World. Hamelink 
asserts that foreign cultural flows bring about cultural synchronization whereby local 
characteristics and cultures are threatened. He explores and analyzes how the cultural autonomy 
of Third World countries is threatened and what initiatives have been taken to resist 
synchronization. He calls for dissociation with the West and a move toward more regional 
cooperation. European scholars are primarily interested in documenting the integration of and 
resistance to communication institutions and authorities. 
The Third World: Dependency and Cultural Imperialism 
The Third World critical political economy approach, which is the central concern of this 
study and which has not received extensive coverage in Western academy, emerged out of the 
social, political, and economic struggle during and after the liberation period of the 1960s and 
1970s. Third World political economy research centers on presenting a framework for 
understanding the social, political, and economic realities and their connection to the global 
political economy environment. Dependency theory, propounded by Third World scholars, is 
born out of these realities. This theory emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a critique of the 
West’s modernization theory and as a remedy to Third World social and economic problems. 
Mosco notes that in order to win and secure the Third World within capitalism modernization 
theory, the “West mounted an unprecedented global military, economic and ideological 
campaign” (121). For this they used the mass media, which became a tool in the campaign to 
change the people’s social structure and the introduction of a market economy. The dependency 
theory advocated by Third World scholars critiqued modernization by showing how little it did 
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to improve socio-economic conditions and how it worked to benefit the West and its corporate 
machineries. Cultural industries scholars in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Schiller, Mattelart, 
Janus, Boafo, Rugumamu, Munyae) have shown how Western media companies have profited at 
the expense of local programs and how this has impacted domestic media production. They have 
critiqued the Western media’s structure and practices, have called for the need to develop 
popular forms of local media, and more importantly have called for an intervention in media 
policy, creating policies that center on the interests of the public.  
Cultural Imperialism Debate and the Third Word 
Herbert Schiller termed the domination of Western media products in developing nations 
cultural imperialism. Schiller formally defined cultural imperialism as the sum of the process by 
which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is 
attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes even bribed into shaping social institutions to 
correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system 
(1976: 9). As this definition makes clear, the motivation of cultural domination is not only profit 
making, but more importantly to persuade and influence people’s hearts and minds. Some 
scholars have called this form of domination, especially American cultural domination, “soft 
power.” According to Matthew Frazer soft power is based on value and how it seduces and 
persuades. He explores how soft power has accelerated the expansion of the American empire 
and argues that “America’s global domination has been achieved largely through non-military 
means—in short, through the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. . . . American 
soft power (movies, pop music, television, fast food) spreads, validates, and reinforces common 
norms, values, beliefs, and life styles” (Quoted in Bernd Hamm, 2005: 6). 
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Cultural imperialism as a theory focuses on the cultural imbalances between the Western 
world and the Third World. Emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, the theory critiques the impact 
and imposition of Western cultural products and their homogenizing effects. Advocates of the 
theory claim that the spread of cultural products from the West to the Third World is largely one-
way and thus destroys Third World cultures. With the emergence of new technological 
developments in the late 1980s and 1990s, the acceleration and expansion of cultural flows, and 
the interdependency and permeability of nation states, criticism of cultural imperialism arose. 
Culturally oriented globalization theorists challenged the culture imperialism thesis, arguing that 
the West and non-West paradigm is more complex than cultural imperialism theorists envisioned 
and that cultural flows induce neither homogenization nor synchronization. Cultural imperialism 
theorists have been blindsided by the complexity that takes place within the negotiation of, 
resistance to, and transformation of the global to the local. Their view suggests that Third World 
nations cannot resist Western cultural products but simply succumb to them. Edward Said notes 
that because of Empire, “all cultures are involved in one another, none is single and pure, all are 
hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic” (1994: xxv). John 
Tomlinson critiques the theory, noting that global culture as it is now can no longer be said to 
emanate from the West and be imposed upon the non-West. What actually takes place is not 
cultural imperialism but rather a process of cultural loss, and instead of cultural synchronization, 
a hybrid culture emerges, one that takes foreign cultural flows and localizes them. Tomlinson’s 
concepts of cultural loss and hybridity do not presuppose the existence or use of a coercive 
power relation to describe the process of cultural change; thus they neglect the questions of 
power and inequality. Annabelle Sreberny notes that the cultural imperialism model has helped 
in recognizing the global dynamics and relationships taking place and the links between foreign 
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policy interests, capitalist expansion, and media infrastructure, but “fails to recognize the 
historical cultural contact of nations and through its hypodermic needle assumption fails to see 
that audiences are not passive or cultural dupes, they bring their own meaning to the text” (2000: 
216). Sreberny advocates a need to adopt a different perspective that recognizes the dynamic 
tension between the global and the local and the shifting terrains that they encompass. She 
borrows Trinh T. Minh-ha’s notion of the global in the local and the local in the global to explore 
the contradictions and tension between the two poles. 
The same social, economic, technological, and political conditions that gave birth to the 
critique of cultural imperialism have also brought about a reemergence of the cultural 
imperialism theory. The intensification and spread of neo-liberal policies, the influence of 
American export cultural industries, and the shifting nature of global politics have brought about 
a renewed interest in the theory of cultural imperialism (Hamm and Smadych, 2005). Pierre 
Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant argue that cultural imperialism “rests on the power to universalize 
particularisms linked to a singular historical tradition by causing them to be misrecognized as 
such” (1999: 41). Bourdieu and Wacquant explore how American cultural values have been de-
historicized and imposed upon the whole world under the notion of globalization, which 
submerges imperialism and cultural ecumenism’s effect and makes transnational relationships of 
power appear as a neutral necessity. The renewed cultural imperialism thesis concerns itself with 
how global economics and politics affect culture. Cultural imperialism, as Bernd Hamm notes, is 
a byproduct—sometimes intended, sometimes unintended, but always inevitable—of political 
and economic imperialism (2005: 24). This study, therefore, explores how neo-liberal policies of 
open market, privatization, and liberalization impact domestic cultures in a globalized world. 
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One of the major critiques leveled by cultural globalization scholars against Third World 
political economy scholars, with their dependency and cultural imperialism theses, is their 
concentration on how external factors impact the social, cultural, and economic development of 
Third World nations. Third World media political economy scholars are critiqued for paying less 
attention to how internal factors and contradictions impact local development. This study intends 
to bridge this gap by making an internal analysis of how local—in this case governmental—
policies and institutions play a substantial role in the development and production of cultural 
products such as film and how, in combating external cultural domination, Third World 
governments such as Tanzania’s create, adopt, negotiate, and put forward mechanisms that 
impact national cultural products.  
Political Economy and Film 
Numerous scholars (Guback, 1969; Wasko, 2005; Pendakur, 1990) have analyzed films 
as commodities produced and distributed within a capitalist industrial structure. Thomas Guback 
has analyzed the relationship between the American and European film industries and how 
American film companies and films (Hollywood) have entered the European market and changed 
the structure and policies of both American and European film production, content, and 
marketing. He documents how the U.S. domination of European film industries intensified in 
1945 with assistance from the U.S. government. Janet Wasko has written numerous articles and 
book chapters that examine the changing relationship between the film industry and the financial 
institutions that provide the capital. She has given an overview of political economy and how it 
has been applied in film; she acknowledges that the approach has not received much recognition 
within cinema studies, but points out that with the increased attention to Hollywood as a 
business, the political economy of film becomes important in assessing the political and 
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ideological implications of these economic arrangements. Wasko notes film must be placed 
within an entire social, economic, and political context and critiqued in terms of the contribution 
to maintaining and reproducing structure of power (11). The political economy of film must 
critique the uneven distribution of power, the role of the state, and alternatives to commercial 
film. To echo Mosco, Wasko advocates that the political economy of film must “involve not only 
a description of the industry but also a theoretical understanding of these developments, situating 
them within a wider capitalist totality encompassing class and other social relations offering a 
sustained critique from a moral evaluative position” (11). Wasko and other critical political 
economists believe that the political economy of film must challenge the industry rather than 
accept the status quo, it must investigate how Hollywood came to dominate the international film 
market, what mechanisms are in place to see that Hollywood remains on top, how the state 
becomes involved, and what impact this has on film industries in other countries.  
Manjunath Pendakur in his study of the Canadian film industry examines how the 
American (Hollywood) film industry has dominated and controlled Canada’s distribution and 
exhibition circuit. “Whereas 97% of theater screen time in Canada is filled by imported films, 
most of which are marketed by U.S. based media transnational corporations . . . most films 
produced by Canadians languish in cans” (29). The reason for this situation, Pendakur states, is 
the competing forces in the industry among Canadian workers, Canadian capitalists, and the 
American majors. He investigates these forces by assessing the structure and policies of the 
Canadian feature film industry so as to understand why Canada has been unable to develop its 
own indigenous film industry. 
The above studies have examined the film industry, especially Hollywood, as a capitalist 
industrial structure and the role of the (U.S.) government in the expansion of Hollywood films 
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across the world. Although Tamara Falicov (2007) and Mathias Diawara (1993) have dealt with 
how Hollywood (Western) films and governments have influenced film production, distribution, 
and exhibition in Latin America and Africa respectively, they have paid closer attention to how 
internal factors influence, to a great extent, the kinds of film and national identity produced. 
Falicov in her study of the Argentine film industry assesses how different administrations from 
the 1940s to 2006 have conceptualized culture and cultural policy and how that has shaped 
national culture/identity in film.  
Falicov outlines two typologies of how Argentine people have tended to perceive national 
identity and how that has affected the kind of films produced. The first is the European influence, 
whereby films are made for elite audiences at home and abroad; and then there is a local 
perspective, where film reflects the social reality of the Argentinean people and culture. 
Falicov’s study thus looks at the impact of the state cultural policy toward cinema as well as the 
impact of economic policy, politics, and cultural mores in shaping Argentine film legislation. 
Manthia Diawara in his study of African cinema traces the development of film in Africa; 
how Western governments and their social, economic, and political policies have affected the 
kinds of films produced, distributed, and exhibited in Africa; and how African governments have 
responded to such a phenomenon. For example, he demonstrates how the French government in 
its “effort” to help its former African colonies with film production was actually helping France 
and French filmmakers. He elaborates on how the French government in establishing the 
Conrtium Audiovisual International (CAI) in Paris to help with the finance and production of 
African films, in reality was imposing a certain point of view of African and by extension 
helping French filmmakers and the French film industry by contractually insisting on hiring 
French film crew members and conducting postproduction in Paris. Femi Shaka, an African film 
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scholar, verifies this: “It is naïve to expect that the former colonial powers in Africa would help 
to develop the film industry in Africa, when the reality rather suggests that they need the African 
market” (2004: 75). Diawara also shows how African governments were reluctant to support the 
film industry and even nationalized some parts of it. 
Falicov’s and Diawara’s studies demonstrate the difficulties developing nations 
encountered in their effort to develop viable domestic film/cultural industries. They show how 
external and internal political and economic forces influenced the type of films produced. 
Although this present study acknowledges the pressures and strength of external forces upon 
domestic film production, it is also aware that these pressures and forces are filtered through the 
prism of domestic politics and economics. This study, therefore, examines these domestic 
dynamics by assessing how social, economic, and political realities; government institutions; and 
cultural and film policies have impacted filmmaking in Tanzania.  
This study also recognizes the scarcity of scholarship on individual national film 
industries, let alone on how each country’s policies and institutions impact its film industry. 
African scholars, like their counterparts in the West, have investigated African cinema as a pure, 
homogenous entity and have defended this by noting that the nations of Africa, especially those 
of sub-Saharan Africa, “share a unified structure of belief-system and world-outlook whose form 
is discernible in black Africa’s social practice” (Shaka, 2004: 36). This form of justification, that 
sees African cinema as a homogeneous entity, denies and erases the diversity of African nations 
and their film industry. This study departs from this view and evaluates the Tanzanian film 
industry and examines to what extend the government and its policies and legislation influence 
that industry. 
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Historical Background to Film and Film Policy in Tanzania 
Film policy in colonial Tanzania (Tanganyika) 
The history of Tanzanian film exhibition can be traced back to the 1920s, when the first 
commercial cinema hall was established by Hassanali Adamali Jariwalla, a Tanzanian of Indian 
descent (Brennan, 2005). Film production originated in the 1930s when the British colonial 
government set up the first film production unit in sub-Saharan Africa at Vigiri village in the 
northern part of Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania), under the leadership of colonels Notcutt and 
Latham (1937). In their book The African and the Cinema, Notcutt and Latham document the 
experiment and their experience in establishing and operating the 1935 Bantu Experimental 
Cinema Experience (BECE). The book methodically elaborates how the films were produced 
and processed in Vigiri village using 16-mm film equipment; the kinds of themes tackled, 
ranging from how to save and store money in The Post Office Savings Banks (1935), the need to 
pay taxes in The Tax (1935), and the use of modern medicine in The Chief (1936); and how films 
were distributed and exhibited in the British African colonial empire of present-day Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, present-day Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The experiment was conducted 
from 1935 to 1937, and during that time more than thirty-five short documentaries and feature 
films were produced and exhibited to introduce and persuade Africans to adopt British social, 
economic, and cultural values. Ironically, although the films were produced specifically for an 
African audience, during exhibition, Africans were relegated to the back of the viewing venue. 
The films Notcutt and Latham produced clearly facilitated the advancement of the British 
political and economic imperatives and the creation and continuation of a segregated film 
audience. Films were used by the British Empire as part of the relationship between culture and 
empire; they were important in the “formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences” 
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(Said, 1994: XII). The racist and segregative seating arrangement reflected the British Empire’s 
film policy. The colonial film experience was further supported by the type of film policy that 
the British Empire advocated. The British Empire advocated a film policy that excluded Africans 
from the production as well as from commercial film viewing. 
Cultural studies scholar Andrew Ivaska (2003) and African studies historian James 
Brennan (2005) have both assessed the issue of colonial film and film policy in Tanzania. Ivaska 
explores the politics surrounding the debates over culture in colonial and early postcolonial 
Tanzania (1922–1970). He examines how state power and popular culture, including film, 
influenced the daily life of people in the capital city of Dar es Salaam. In his analysis of colonial 
films and film policy Ivaska notes how cultural apparatus such as a film policy were used as 
intervention tools by both the colonial and postcolonial states. Ivaska goes on to elaborate how 
cinema and censorship were utilized from the 1930s up to the early 1970s. He does not, however, 
question the underlying reason for censorship or the type of films that were produced and 
exhibited for Africans. The fact that films were used to facilitate colonial, social, economic, and 
political expansion is nowhere alluded to in the study. By omitting this important information, 
Ivaska seems to whitewash the atrocities of colonialism and its cultural effect upon the people of 
Tanzania. To study the intersection between colonial policy and the African film experience 
without critiquing the moral injustice of the system legitimizes colonial rationality and 
encourages the perpetuation of a colonial discourse. By employing a critical political economy 
approach to the film industry and its policy, a more holistic and moral interrogation of the 
colonial system and its film policy would have brought to the fore the colonial power relation 
and its subsequent outcome.  
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On the other hand, Brennan, an African studies scholar specializing in Tanzanian history, 
interrogates the injustice by examining the political and institutional struggle over cinema in 
colonial and postcolonial Tanzania. Through an in-depth study of the colonial film policy and 
administration, TANU, and archival reports of the National Film Censorship Board, Brennan 
reveals how Africans were excluded from viewership of commercial films and from being 
members of the film censorship board committee, and how through their struggle for social, 
cultural, economic, and political autonomy Africans were able to change the film policy by 
insisting and getting the first African Tanzanian, H.M.T Kayamba, to become a member of the 
film censorship board (2005: 495). Brennan’s study, however, does not investigate to what extent 
those changes in any way influenced the type of films exhibited in Tanzania. Did the inclusion of 
an African member on the board change the fundamental objective of the policy?  
This study shows how the inclusion of Africans on the film censorship board from the 
1960s to 2010 did not fundamentally change or transform the policy. The policy basically 
remained as it has always been, a controlling organ of the state, whether a colonial or 
postcolonial one. The study reveals that the state’s need to control film or any visual 
representations stems from its desire to control the socio-economic, political, and cultural 
formation of the society and thus safely keep itself in power.  
Media and film policy in independent Tanzania 
It was not until Tanzania attained its political independence in 1961 that Tanzanians, 
through their government, were able to fully control the production, distribution, and exhibition 
of films. But this control was not democratic; it was the newly formed government that 
controlled film production. John Mpongonliana (1982), a government filmmaker; Mark Leveri 
(1984), a managing director of the Tanzanian Film Company; Kaarle Nordenstreng (1986), a 
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cultural and political economist; Mike Ssali (1988); and Seithy Chachaghe (1997), a sociologist, 
have all documented the Tanzanian film/communication industry in the hands of the 
government. Mponguliana (1982) traces the development of the Tanzanian film industry from 
1961 to 1982 by examining such government film institutions as the Government Film Unit 
(GFU), established in 1963; the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), established in 1968; and the 
Audio Visual Institute (AVI), established in 1974. He describes how those institutions produced, 
distributed, and exhibited films and acknowledges how the government propagated its socialist 
ideology and policies through its film institutions. Mponguliana does not, however, critically 
question the power relation of the state and its citizens. Why did the government insist on 
controlling the film industry and to whose benefit? His lack of critical assessment can be 
attributed to his ideological training and involvement with the government. As a government-
trained filmmaker working within the system at the Audio Visual Institute and compelled to 
prize and not criticize the party and its government, Mponguliana’s assessment explicitly reveals 
the government’s power and control over its filmmakers. Mark Leveri, on the other hand, 
critically analyzes the AVI, an institute assigned to produce and distribute documentary and 
newsreel films for the government. As a government employee with an economic background, 
Leveri assesses the allocation of resources to the institute and asks to what extent the government 
was interested in developing a viable film industry in Tanzania. He acknowledges that Tanzanian 
political leaders have looked at cinema as a potential propaganda tool and as a catalyzing force 
for the realization of national culture and social development (1984: 21), but in terms of its 
resource allocation and political economic benefit, Leveri concludes that the government did not 
care about the development of the film industry: “Little investment was put forward and what 
money the government made from film exhibitors, through taxes, was never reinvested back into 
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the domestic film industry” (105). Oliver Barlet, an African film scholar, notes why many 
African governments put little investment in film and at the same time tried to control it: 
“African leaders are apprehensive about supporting the motion picture industry because they are 
afraid that cinema would be used by filmmakers to manipulate political situations” (1996: 59). 
The state’s full control of production and distribution of films in Tanzania was no accident. The 
Tanzanian government made a deliberate effort to keep a firm hand on film production and 
distribution, lest it fall in the wrong hands. It never saw or envisioned film as a profitable 
industry, but rather as an ideological propagandistic tool that was there to serve the state. 
Leveri’s study highlights how the government allocated funding and how that shaped and 
impacted the film industry. What he does not delve into is a systematic analysis of the structure 
and mechanisms governments put in place in an effort to control film production. As a 
government employee working within the socialist structure, Leveri accepts governmental 
control of the film industry as natural. He fails to realize that he, like other filmmakers working 
with and within the government structure, was himself a tool and mechanism by which the 
government controlled the production and distribution of film: Filmmakers functioned as agents 
of control.  
In his informative article “Tanzania and the New Information Order: A Case of African’s 
Second Struggle,” Kaarle Nordenstreng assesses the role of information (media) in Tanzania 
from the 1960s to the early 1980s and notes how through nationalization and control of the 
communication media, the mass media were forced to broadcast socialist ideals. He shows how, 
during conferences and meetings, the ruling party and government categorically stated that the 
purpose of the media was to support the socialist ideology of Tanzania as defined in the Arusha 
Declaration (179). Film and cultural media were singled out as important vehicles for promoting 
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a political consciousness and mobilizing the masses for development. Nordenstreng also notes 
how through numerous meetings the government called for the banning of books and films that 
conflicted with the Ujamaa party policies, and how in the mid-1980s the government considered 
the idea of establishing and ensuring the implementation of a national media policy. 
Nordenstreng clearly elaborates how through charters, memorandums, and meetings the 
government expressed the viability and potential danger the media might cause.  
Although the government started early on to think of establishing a media/cultural 
national policy, it was not until the late 1990s that a national cultural policy was put into place. 
What prolonged the establishment of such a policy and how did this impact cultural and media 
development? Sociologist Seithy Chachaghe takes a historical look at the media industry, 
specifically Tanzania’s print media, and shows how the press expanded despite the existence of 
draconian laws against it. Although the press expanded quickly, Chachaghe acknowledges that 
print media did not enjoy much freedom even with the opening of the democratic space. The 
government, rather than allowing a free flow of information, made attempts to curb it 
(1997:186). Studies by Nordenstreng (1986) and Chachaghe (1997) have shown how the 
Tanzanian government continues to consolidate and strengthen its media power regardless of 
socio-economic and political transformations.  
Kanganga Mwangaza’s study (2006), on the other hand, moves away from the broader 
examination of the media to specifically looking at the film industry when Tanzania decided to 
reinvent itself as a capitalist multiparty democratic state. Mwangaza traces the emergence of the 
video filmmaking phenomenon and sheds some light on filmmakers and the production process 
of these video films. Her study reveals a seismic shift from a pedagogical/propagandistic 
filmmaking phenomenon to commercial filmmaking, from the public to the private sector. The 
24 
major preoccupation of the local commercial filmmakers and businesspeople who have ventured 
into the industry is commercial interest and not so much the creation of “quality” cinema (2006). 
The film industry has transformed from being a propaganda instrument for the reinforcement of 
state ideologies, into an economic activity. Culture is now separated from ideology and is turned 
into capital. Why was there such a sea change? What Mwangaza’s and four other dissertation on 
film in Tanzania, fails to assess is how and why the shift occurred, and more importantly, how 
the government handled this transformation.  In his book Let the People Speak, Shivji speculates 
as to why the Tanzanian government may have changed its perspective: “They are those who see 
that change is coming. It is inevitable and irresistible. They would not therefore oppose change. 
They would like to co-opt it, . . . manipulate ‘change’ in the interest of the status quo, they would 
like the boat to move but move under their directional supervision and if possible even make a 
gain from the change by curving out a new niche for themselves in the change system” (2006: 
62).  
Shivji’s analysis sheds some light on why the influx of foreign cultural products via the 
free market economy can safeguard government power and ensure that it remains in power. The 
government created the Cultural Trust Fund, the National Film Censorship Board, and the 
cultural policy to supervise the kinds of local and foreign cultural products that were permissible 
for viewing by the Tanzanian public. This study thus interrogates how the government co-opts, 
manipulates, and supervises the film industry in Tanzania. 
By interviewing government cultural officials, executive secretaries, and directors of 
cultural institutions such as the National Film Censorship Board, the National Arts Council, the 
Cultural Trust Fund, the Zanzibar International Film Festival, and the Copyright Society of 
Tanzania, some who have been in government positions since the early 1960s and 70s, an 
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understanding has been gained of how policies influence decision making regarding cultural 
products and how the government through its institutional mechanisms controls film production. 
Some of these individuals were also primary historical document in of themselves. They were 
invested in representing history in a certain way, they had a vested interest in the politics that 
was going on and supported the regimes they worked for and believed that the government 
should control the cultural sector. Thus they too need to be subject to some kind of scrutiny.  
This study has utilized archival documents, interviews, as well as observing the day-to-
day activities of two film production crews. Interview as a research method has been extensively 
employed. This was necessitated by the dismal state of film documentation. Because of the 
liquidation of the Tanzanian Film Company and the merger of the Audio Visual Institute with 
the Tanzania Broadcast Company, most of the films and files have been destroyed or neglected 
and left to ruin. I was given a tour of the National television station and shown where most of the 
ruin films of the 1960s, 70s and 80s were dumped with very little regards to the value of those 
films. The lack of tangible films and important documents made interview as a method of 
research very important in this study. Filmmakers who worked during the colonial and 
postcolonial period provided in-depth narratives of the working of the film industry that could 
not be found in any of the archival documents. Although the video film industry has captured the 
imagination of the public, very little documentation, academic or otherwise, can be found on the 
phenomenon. Interviews with video filmmakers, producers, and distributors filled the gap and 
provided a picture of the challenges and complexities that filmmakers face and overcome.  
It is hoped that this study will provide some understanding on the influence of 
government policy on the Tanzanian film industry and therefore point to what ought to be done 
in creating a democratic, multiple-identity film industry and aesthetic. By shedding light on a 
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marginal discipline such as African cinema, and Tanzanian cinema specifically, the study seeks 
to expand the film studies discipline to see African cinema not as a homogeneous entity but as 
cinema of individual countries, each with its own distinct film industry.  
Organization 
What follows is a brief outline of this study. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction  
Chapter One offers a historical account and a theoretical framework of the study, in an 
attempt to reconfigure the relationship between the government and its mechanism of control. 
The chapter lays out a critical perspective of Tanzania and its film industry. 
Chapter Two: The New Nation: Consolidation, Nation Building, and Film  
This chapter investigates the Nyerere administration (1961–1985), exploring the 
administration’s vision of Tanzania and how that vision is articulated in its film policy. The 
chapter explores the social, economic, and political path that Tanzania chose to follow and 
evaluates how that impacted filmmaking and consumption. It explores how the Nyerere 
administration structured the film industry, the kind of cultural policy and film policy it 
advocated, and for what purpose and for whose benefit. The chapter shows how through the 
government’s advocacy of socialism; its ban of political parties and ethnic and civic associations; 
the installation of a one-party state; and the establishment of a the film censorship board, the 
administration solidified its ideological rule by controlling and constructing a national 
culture/identity that did not allow room for alternative diversified identities and how that 
assumption of national culture and film policy emerged out of the colonial state. Two films, 
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Fimbo ya Mnyonge (1974) and Yomba Yomba (1985), are explored to exemplify the 
government’s control of the film industry.  
Chapter Three: Rukhsa: Everything Goes? Transition to Neo-Liberal Policy and Film 
This chapter investigates President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s administration (1985–1995) and 
how its adoption of the structural adjustment program (SAP) and the neo-liberal policies of trade 
liberalization and privatization in the mid-1980s and early 1990s affected filmmaking in 
Tanzania, focusing on how through the policies of liberalization and privatization, which called 
for less government intervention in the economy, the state slashed or reduced funding to the film 
industry, and how this influenced the emergence of co-productions and non-governmental 
organization backing for films as ideal methods of remedying the industry. A critical 
examination of the economic and political policies that transformed Tanzania from a socialist 
nation state to a postsocialist state is conducted to reveal its impact on the film industry and how 
the introduction of multiparty democracy and the emergence of non-governmental organizations 
slowly started to question government authority. An analysis of the films Harusi ya Mariamu 
(The Marriage of Mariam,1985), by Ron Mulvihill and Nangayoma Ngope, and Mama Tumaini 
(Women of Hope, 1987), by Martin Mhando, reveals the film industry’s changing milieu.  
Chapter Four:Uwazi na Ukweli? (Transparency and Truth): Accelerated Neo-liberalism 
and the Emergence of Diasporic and Video Films  
This chapter focuses on President Benjamin Mkapa’s administration (1995–2005) and its 
vigorous implementation of neo-liberal policies and how the government tried to slow down the 
process by establishing institutions and policies that continued to put the government at the 
center as the gatekeeper of national culture, value, and identity. The chapter evaluates the 
creation of institutions and policies such as the Cultural Trust Fund, the Tanzanian Art Council, 
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the National Film Censorship Board, the Zanzibar Film Festival, the Copyright Law, the Film 
Act, and the cultural policy to reveal how these institutions worked to control and promote a 
state-sanctioned national culture. Through an in-depth analysis of the censorship board and its 
objectives and duties, it is revealed how, in this era of cultural flows and influences, the state 
apparatus continues to control the perception of what is a Tanzanian identity/culture and how this 
perception is challenged by contemporary video filmmakers. The chapter explores the emergence 
of video films and diasporic films and their production, finance, and circulation, and how these 
films and their filmmakers are opposed to state-sanctioned identity. Interviews with government 
officials and video filmmakers are used to extrapolate the antagonistic relationship existing 
between the government and filmmakers. Martin Mhando’s film Maangamizi: The Ancient One 
(2001) and George Otieno’s Dilema (2004) are evaluated to reveal this contested view of 
national identity. An in-depth analysis of governmental cultural and film policy is conducted to 
discover its impact on the film industry.  
Chapter Five: Firming Up Neo-liberalism: Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya and the 
Transregional/Transnational Video Film Industry  
This chapter focuses on the present status of filmmaking in Tanzania and how the fourth-
phase administration of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (2005–present) and his reforms have 
impacted the structure, production, marketing, and circulation of video films. The chapter 
assesses how film subtitling has created a diasporic viewership that has expanded to include not 
only neighboring African countries but also diasporic communities living in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States. This chapter explores the expansion of video films from national to 
regional and transnational and how filmmakers have utilized, interpreted, and explored cultural 
and film policies and have created a regional and transnational video film industry. 
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Conclusion  
The conclusion summarizes major findings of the study, situates it within a larger 
political economy debate, and points to further areas of research. 
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Chapter Two 
The New Nation: Consolidation, Nation Building and Film 
Julius Nyerere’s administration and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) 
party came to power on December 9, 1961, as Tanganyika gained its independence from British 
colonial rule. The handing-over ceremony and celebration was captured in a film, Tanganyika 
Triumphant (1962), by Bernard W. Kunicki. The film shows the arrival of Prince Philip and his 
British dignitaries at the airport, and the subsequent arrival of Julius Nyerere in a motorcade at 
the National Stadium, where crowds cheered as he waved. The whole atmosphere was filled with 
people dancing traditional dances and ululating as the British flag was lowered and the 
Tanganyikan flag was raised. As a symbol of national pride, this film is shown on television 
every year to commemorate the day Tanganyika became a new, independent nation. Just as it 
was used in the establishment of the new nation, film played a large role in the nation-building 
process that was to follow. How does a nation come to be imagined? Who does the imagining?  
Charismatic, intelligent, and shrewd, Julius Kambarage Nyerere dominated and defined 
what Tanganyika, soon to merge with Zanzibar to form the nation of Tanzania, was and how it 
was to be imagined. In describing the economic and political development of Tanzania from the 
1960s to the 1980s Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul note that “most of the development charted 
have [has] been the evolution of President Nyerere’s own thinking” (1972: 3). Nyerere’s social 
policies of unification, such as the language policy that formulated Kiswahili as the national 
language and the sole political lingua franca; weakening of ethnic social bonds by banning ethnic 
associations; and the promotion of social communal services such as education, health, and 
water, earned him accolades, and he consequently became for Western countries the poster child 
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for African development. Tanzania under Nyerere had the highest rate of literacy in Africa, and 
his rural economic development plan earned more development funds than any other country in 
Africa (Askew, 2002). Even with these achievements, scholars view the Nyerere administration 
as less than democratic. Kiondo refers to it as a “statist regime” that centralized government 
control of social, economic, and political activities while diminishing venues of people’s 
participation (1995: 72). Mkandala refers to the administration as “domination through the 
ideology of Ujamaa and self-reliance,” thus assuring organizational hegemony (1995: 53). Issa 
Shivji and Ngoyoro have both referred to the regime style of ruling as “ideological hegemony” 
and “soft authoritarian” (Shivji, 1991: 67; Ngoyoro, 2006:10). How did the Nyerere 
administration create this statist, dominating, hegemonic, and authoritarian power structure in 
order to establish a new nation with a very successful social safety net? According to Mkandala, 
the power structure has been heavily influenced by concerns of statecraft, including the 
monopoly and defense of the state (1997: 36). 
In 1961 the biggest task that faced the new government was nation building. What kind 
of a nation was Tanzania to become? What social, economic, political, and cultural path was it to 
take? How was the government to construct, invent, and re-invent a nation out of 120 ethnic 
groups? In building this new nation, the Nyerere administration in its first years embarked on 
legitimizing and solidifying its political power in the eyes of the public. One of the major steps in 
solidifying this power occurred in 1965 when the TANU administration revised the country’s 
constitution to convert from a multiparty system into a one-party state. 
As early as 1962, Nyerere had envisioned turning the country into a socialist nation. 
Nyerere stated, “TANU has pledged itself to make socialism the basis of its policy in every field. 
The people of Tanganyika have given us their mandate to carry out that policy by electing a 
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TANU government to lead them” (1968: 9). Nyerere claimed that the mandate came from the 
people. On February 5, 1967, the Arusha Declaration, otherwise known as Ujamaa, or socialism 
and self-reliance, was endorsed by the TANU party, and socialism officially became the state 
ideology. Ujamaa was opposed to capitalism and ensured economic, cultural, and political 
development that was more communally centered. Nyerere envisioned Ujamaa as part of his 
focus on a nation as communal, not limited by family unit or tribe. In his book Essay on 
Socialism, Nyerere argues that “Ujamaa . . . draws on traditional heritage, and recognizes the 
society as an extension of the basic family unit, but it can no longer continue the idea of the 
social family with the limits of the tribes” (1968: 12). Ujamaa, just as African socialism in other 
countries, was based on the re-invention of an idealized African past, and its primary vehicle was 
communal living and the nationalization of major industries.  
Through the instruments of cohesion, installation of a single-party system, and the 
ideology of Ujamaa, the Nyerere administration was able to eliminate all political and ethnic 
opposition. These constitutional changes gave TANU the authority to govern all social, political, 
economic, and cultural matters. Through its National Executive Committee (NEC) and the 
president’s executive power, TANU became the decisive organ in setting policies and running 
the country. Parliament was no longer viable as a law-making institution. The president and the 
TANU party had the sole decision-making power, setting policies, which the parliament then 
implemented. It was forcefully argued through the one-party ideology that since the party 
represented the people and the government was made up by the party, the government was the 
people. As Mkandala states, “The sole political party had overall control of the state, the 
government and every other public organization was part of or answerable to the party. . . . 
Centralized hierarchical control by the party-state of civil society was almost total” (1995: 56.). 
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Not only were political activities but also all economic activities of public institutions under the 
control of the party, including filmmaking.  
The administration created policies that expanded the government’s control of economic 
activities. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 both defined the economic policy of the state and 
called for the nationalization of all major means of production. In order to ensure economic 
justice, the declaration argued, the state must have effective control over the principal means of 
production (Nyerere, 1967). The government then proceeded to nationalize and control all banks, 
insurance companies, cigarette companies, sisal plantations, processing industries, and—of 
interest to this study—the film industry. This centralization of the economy created and 
increased the state’s control over the Tanzanian people’s participation, expression, and depiction.  
To consolidate Nyerere’s ideology of nation building through socialism, only one voice 
and one point of view were permitted and heard. Issa Shivji, a professor of law, notes that nation 
building called for national unity, which in practice was referred to as “national unanimity” 
(2006: 66). Nyerere argued that it was necessary that there be no differences in the period of 
nation building because differences delayed progress. But what this meant in actual fact was that 
this was a period of strengthening and legitimizing the party. The TANU party, with its 
charismatic leader Nyerere, guided the government in its plans for political, economic, and 
cultural actions. The era of domination of the party over the state, state hegemony over society, 
and concentration of executive power in the party leadership and the president became known as 
party supremacy (chama kushika hatamu), during which challenges to the legitimacy of the state 
were not permitted. Despite hegemony over society, or because of it, a considerable degree of 
popular acceptance and support was shown by the Tanzanian people. The people, majority of 
whom worked and lived in the rural areas were recipients of social services such as hospitals, 
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schools and water, and thus gave the president and his administration popular support. Nyerere 
became an iconic figure and the father of the Tanzanian nation because of his vision and deeds. 
However, within this political, economic, and cultural background, the administration set out to 
create a nation in its own image. The administration inscribed its own personal stories in the 
guise of national stories and through various other means enforced conformity of thought upon 
the people. Members of the ruling party, led by the president, allocated themselves the power to 
define the national character and in the process legitimized their power over their citizenry.  
In defining national character, the ruling party used the film industry to encode and 
transmit nationalist ideologies. Cinema became a propaganda tool for the newly formed 
government of Tanzania. Used by the colonial regime to persuade Tanzanians to adapt to 
Western values and lifestyles, films were again used to persuade the people to adapt to the 
party’s perception of a national culture. What was not being depicted, though, was that this 
culture was not to be of the people but rather of the ruling party, TANU. Official cultural 
interventions were therefore closely linked to the state ideology and policies. 
The Question of National Culture and Cultural Policy 
In order to create a unified nation out of the 120 ethnic groups residing in Tanzania, the 
administration saw culture as one of the major social formations that countries like Tanzania 
could rally behind and use as a unifying device. On December 10, 1962, President Nyerere 
inaugurated the Ministry of Culture and Youth and emphasized the importance of culture as a 
unifying agent, stating, “A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of 
people without the spirit which makes them a nation” (1981: 3). To create this nation President 
Nyerere laid out the major objective of the new ministry, “to help us regain our pride in our 
culture” and thereby to “seek and collect the best of the traditions and customs and make them 
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part of our national culture.” The ministry, through its cultural officers, was mandated to travel 
all over the country and choose what the officers perceived as the best traditions and thereafter to 
create mechanisms for imparting and making those chosen traditions part of a national culture. 
As the party document on culture proclaims, “The Party has a specific position in culture, it gives 
suggestions and directives of culture. The goals of the Ministry are to reconstruct, preserve and 
promote nationally sanctioned traditions of Tanzania which reflects the politics of the country” 
(Cultural revolution document, 1981). Thus, cultural traditions that fit the socialist or collective 
ideology were valorized. Traditions that did not fit the constructed vision of Tanzania were 
vilified and even banned. For example, in 1967 a campaign to impose sanctions on Masai 
traditional tribal wear was carried out, and those who did not comply with the order to modernize 
their dress to shirts and pants were harassed and humiliated (Ivaska, 2003). Raymond Williams 
reminds us that “tradition . . . is not just a tradition but a selective tradition; an intentionally 
selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present  which is then powerfully operative 
in the process of social and cultural definition and identification” (2009: 115). Rose Sayore, a 
filmmaker and government cultural employee, captures the challenges and contradictions the 
administration faced:  
After independence the first thing that Nyerere did that was really pronounced and 
cemented us as a nation was the establishment of the ministry responsible for 
culture. . . . Nyerere as a single person couldn’t have done it by himself; he 
needed people who were ready to internalize the concept. But the people Nyerere 
was dealing with are the people who had washed out their culture, looked at it as 
something foreign, as something dirty. These are the people who all of their lives 
had learned to emulate foreign culture, and now they were in strategic positions in 
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the government, they were supposed to implement these policies: how could they? 
(Interview, 2009) 
This construction of a national culture was thus to be carried out by bureaucrats and party 
members who, as Rose Sayore has noted, had lost their traditions. Culture was not only to be 
chosen and imposed from above, but it was constructed by people who were far removed from it. 
This form of top-down directive created a national culture in which only the ruling class’s view 
of culture was promoted. The party created a hierarchal, formal structure in which order flowed 
downward and obedience upward (Mkandala, 1995). In this regard a national culture, manifested 
through different cultural forms, showed a tendency toward pleasing, praising, and legitimizing 
the ruling party, never criticizing or analyzing societal issues. Penina Mlama, a cultural 
anthropologist, concludes that culture in Tanzania was never integrated into the socialist 
construction that the government propagated, but in fact there was a lack of effort in directing 
culture toward a socialist development (1984: 12). She opines that in 1962 the government of 
President Nyerere was very clear in terms of what the role of culture was, but the government 
cultural policy did not go beyond that proclamation: “When it came to actually coming up with 
the cultural policy to move up that feeling into a very concrete step, the government lost it” 
(Interview, July 2009). Mlama bases her claims on the fact that no unified cultural policy was 
created. Cultural undertakings have been based on statements and speeches made sporadically by 
politicians and which were mistakenly taken for official cultural policy. Although Nyerere had 
said the Ministry of National Culture and Youth was to be his administration’s most important 
ministry, the migration of the ministry from one ministry to another and its shift from a full-
fledged ministry to a directorate showed the lack of seriousness and determination of the 
administration to truly build a national culture, let alone a “people’s” socialist culture. 
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Cinema and the Government  
In cementing its domination and control of national culture, the administration employed 
cinema as a propaganda tool. At independence, Tanzania inherited two types of film industries: a 
government instructional cinema and a private commercial-film industry. The newly formed 
government asserted control over both forms of the industry. It did this by establishing 
institutions such as the Government Film Unit (GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), and 
the Audio Visual Institute; amended and utilized the Cinematographic Ordinance (film policy) of 
1932 and the National Film Censorship Board (NFCB); trained filmmakers; and regulated the 
importation and distribution of private commercial film as a means to control and construct a 
sanctioned vision of Tanzania. The following will detail each film organization under the 
Nyerere administration. 
The Government Film Unit and Its Newsreels 
In 1961 the Government Film Unit was established under the Ministry of Community 
Development as an information wing responsible for producing newsreel and government 
information films, and in some cases documentaries. The main preoccupation of the GFU was to 
document all events and travels of President Nyerere and the implementation of his party’s 
policies. Whenever the president made a visit to a foreign country, a region, or a village, the unit 
was called in to document the event. The GFU became part of the president’s entourage. Rose 
Sayore notes that “most of the time newsreels were about the president and his events, so when 
he would go to England, Yugoslavia, or Zimbabwe we would tag along.” (Interview, 2009). The 
objective was to show what the government, and especially the president, were doing. The 
38 
newsreels and documentaries produced were politically oriented and semi-propagandistic. The 
newsreels were ten-to-fifteen minute films that dealt with the political arena.  
Dickson Saileni, a cinematographer who worked at the GFU, remembers, “When foreign 
officials visited the country, we would cover the whole trip and all their activities while in 
Tanzania, but we also covered almost all the important speeches that were made by the then-
president Nyerere. The objective of the GFU and the TANU party was to make the president and 
the administration’s policies known to the public” (Interview, 2009). Two considerations drove 
the choice of newsreels over documentaries or feature films. First, the government’s agenda was 
to make itself visible to the public through its activities. The newsreel was a viable tool for 
capturing the immediacy of the event. Second, the length of a newsreel made it possible to 
produce it in a very short period; it took on an average one month to produce one. Siril Kaunga, 
one of the first filmmakers of the film unit, notes that since they did not fulfill the definition of 
news, instead of calling the films newsreels, they were called a “cinema magazine,” because “if 
you wanted news, it must be shot and shown on the same day or the day after, but this was 
impossible within the unit” (Interview, 2009). Another difficulty pointed out by John 
Mponguliana, another GFU filmmaker, was “the shortage of film experts; as documentaries 
entailed a lot of processes and steps, thus newsreel was ideal for that moment. We tried to make 
documentaries, but it was hard” (Interview, 2009). 
The difficulty of making documentaries was due not only to a shortage of film experts, 
but most importantly it was precipitated by the lack of film-developing facilities in Tanzania at 
the time. This meant that all of the films made by the film unit had to be sent to Europe. Dickson 
Saileni recalls that they had to shoot the film in Tanzania and then send it to England, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, or Sweden, where the rushes would be produced, to be edited in Tanzania 
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and then sent back for optical printing (Interview, 2009). Although this was a costly endeavor, 
the government knew the importance of film in helping persuade people to adapt to the new 
government policies. 
Exhibition of GFU’s Films 
In order for government films to reach the intended audience, two distributing and 
exhibition channels were employed by the government: mobile cinema vans and cinema halls. 
The use of mobile cinema vans in Tanzania can be traced back to the Bantu Educational Kinema 
Experiment (BEKE) in the 1930s and the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) in the 1950s, which the 
colonial British government used to distribute instructional films to its East Africa Empire. In 
1964, the Tanzanian government, with assistance from the Canadian government, acquired 
twenty-one Land Rover vehicles, one for each region, to be used as mobile cinema vans for the 
distribution and exhibition of government films in the rural areas of Tanzania. Eighty percent of 
the population lived in rural areas and were farmers, and the Nyerere administration had declared 
agriculture to be the backbone of Tanzanian economy and thus targeted this audience. This was 
in line with the Ujamaa policy, which emphasized rural development. Films such as Habari ya 
Tanzania (Tanzanian News, 1964), Road Ahead (1962), Land of Promise (1963), Kilimo Bora 
Cha Mahindi (Modern Method of Farming, 1968), and Panda Pamba: Mkoa Wa Mashariki 
(Grow Cotton: Eastern Region, 1968) were shown to the rural population to show them what the 
government was doing “on their behalf,” in hopes of persuading them to adhere to the 
government’s agricultural policy calling for the production of more cash crops. The films Kilimo 
Bora Cha Mahindi and Panda Pamba: Mkoa Wa Mashariki both illustrate better ways of 
cultivating corn and cotton.  
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Most of the government films were shown at about 7:00 p.m. This was a convenient time 
for many of the village people because the daylight hours were dedicated to working on their 
farms or tending to household chores and husbandry. After a film screening, a government 
official or a party leader would be present to introduce and reinforce government agendas. For 
example, if film dealt with farming, an agricultural expert, who was also a party member, would 
be there to elaborate on and emphasize the importance of applying the right methods of farming 
so as to have an increase in agricultural output. As Horace Campbell sums it up, “Regional visits 
by party leaders became part of the political culture as the state consciously used radio [film] and 
language as a tool of legitimacy” (1991: 129). Moreover, government hierarchical structure 
predominated; Mkandala observes that “orders flowed downward and obedience upward” (131).  
Another venue where government films were screened was in private cinema halls. After 
an optical print was brought back from abroad, copies were sent to different cinema halls in the 
country for viewing. Before the main feature film was shown, the national anthem was played 
and then a government newsreel was screened. The exhibitors were obligated to show 
government films. Although no official law existed that made it compulsory to screen a 
government film, Martin Mhando bluntly states, “Where would they get any films? Distribution 
in Tanzania was in the hands of the government. . . . Otherwise, they would not get films” 
(Interview, 2009). John Mponguliana, a government filmmaker, calls this a “silent policy” 
between the exhibitors and the government. By controlling distribution, the government was able 
to supervise the type of films Tanzanians were exposed to, thus insuring its agendas and policies 
reached the people. The production, distribution, and exhibition of newsreels helped the 
government spread its agendas in the hope of persuading the people to abide by government 
policies.  
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Filmmakers and the Government 
Another way of controlling the image and identity of Tanzania and its developmental 
path was through filmmaking and, by extension, through the filmmakers themselves. Filmmakers 
were perceived as civil servants; they were called information officers and had to be members of 
the TANU party, later renamed the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or CCM (Revolutionary Party). 
Without membership there was no employment. This firm control of filmmakers is unique to 
Tanzania in two ways. Although it is known that other governments in African, Latin American, 
Eastern Europe, Russia, and China employed cinema and used it to further their socio-political 
agendas, in Tanzania the hold was firmer. Tanzanian filmmakers were not allowed room for self-
expression, criticism, or work outside the state. A slogan such as “Inside the revolution 
everything, outside the revolution nothing,” proclaimed by Fidel Castro in his famous 1961 
“Words to the Intellectuals” speech (National Cultural Council 1961:32), allowed constructive 
criticism of the state in cinema as long as it furthered the revolution. In Tanzania, the opposite 
was true; no criticism, constructive or otherwise, was allowed; the filmmaker had to toe the party 
line.  
This kind of control of the filmmakers by the state created what Eberhard Chambulikazi, 
a former production manager of the Tanzania Film Company, calls a “positive image of the 
government for public consumption” (1995: 5). Roseleem Smythe, an anthropologist, notes that 
what is missing in Tanzania are “films which are strong essays in social criticism” (1989: 395). 
In other countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Cameroon, filmmakers played the role of outsider 
and presented films with social criticism. This is not to say that those countries did not practice 
censorship or control over the film industry, but at least in those countries some filmmakers, 
such as Sembene Ousmane (Senegal), Souleymane Cisse (Mali), and Jean Marie Teno 
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(Cameroon), were independent of the state and created films that questioned, critiqued, and 
challenged the state. These filmmakers were free to choose their own subject matter for their 
films. In Tanzania this was not the case, as no independent filmmaker existed outside the state. 
In countries like Ghana and Nigeria, where nationalization of the film industry was carried out, 
independent filmmakers still existed and were allowed to use state-owned production facilities. 
In Tanzania (as in other African states), the government feared filmmakers. If left alone, the 
government thought, filmmakers would use film to manipulate the political scene. Oliver Barlet 
notes, “African leaders are apprehensive about supporting the motion picture industry because 
they are afraid that cinema would be used by filmmakers to manipulate political situations” 
(1996:59). Hence, to safeguard their interests the Nyerere administration controlled filmmakers. 
Ideological education was another way filmmakers were molded into conformity with the 
party line. The introduction and indoctrination of Ujamaa sustained the structure of domination 
and legitimized the party’s rule. This was accomplished in two ways: training filmmakers abroad 
in socialist countries, and training them at home with a heavy dose of political and party 
propaganda. Because at the time of independence the country had no film training institutes, 
filmmakers initially were sent abroad for training. Siril Kaunga, one of the first filmmakers of 
the GFU, was trained in England for one year (1960–1961) and later received training in India 
for three years (1967–1969), where he studied basic techniques of filmmaking and then 
specialized in directing and screenwriting. Saileni Dickson, another addition to the GFU, trained 
as a cinematographer at the state university of cinema in Moscow for six years (1965–1971). 
John Mponguliana, after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam with a theater arts 
degree, joined the GFU and was an apprentice to Sirl Kaunga and Dickson Saileni. He later went 
to Yugoslavia, England, and Sweden to study filmmaking. Rose Sayore, the only female at the 
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GFU, also joined the GFU after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam with a theater 
arts degree, and later went to Canada for four years to pursue a Master of Fine Arts degree in 
filmmaking, specializing in negative cutting. As can be extrapolated, most of the training came 
from socialist nations, or socialist-friendly nations. This was no accident, as the government in 
its creation of a socialist state ensured that filmmakers, along with attaining filmic knowledge 
from these states, would be inculcated with socialist ideological knowledge. These filmmakers 
were the socialist pioneers and established what and how a Tanzanian filmmaker was—in 
essence, a propagator of government policies and ideology.  
Although in full control of film production in Tanzania, the Nyerere administration did 
not have control over the importation, distribution, and exhibition of commercial foreign films. 
This industry was in the hands of local private business individuals. This lack of control of the 
private commercial sector troubled the government, and it thus sought means to supervise, if not 
control, the commercial film industry. The government accomplished this through the 
strengthening of the existing colonial film policy, the Cinematographic Ordinance, which was 
implemented through the National Film Censorship Board and through the establishment of the 
Tanzania Film Company.  
The Cinematographic Ordinance and the National Film Censorship Board 
Many national cinema industries have protected their film industry through establishment 
of a restrictive or a supportive film policy. A restrictive film policy is design to protect the local 
film industry from foreign film domination. This is implemented through quotas and tariffs. A 
supportive film policy provides state support to filmmakers or the film industry by providing 
bank loans, grants, and training (Moran, 1996). Film policies throughout the world have been 
devised to provide protective as well as supportive mechanisms for individual nations’ film 
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industries. In countries like France, a film policy has been created to safeguard domestic 
production by controlling the importation of films, especially Hollywood films. China only 
allows twenty foreign films a year to be screened there (Wang, 2003). Most of the world’s film 
policies have been established protective measures against foreign films, and mostly American 
Hollywood films. At the same time, Hollywood films have functioned as the standard other 
national cinemas imitate, adopt, or revolt against. 
Latin America has geared its film policies toward protecting and promoting the local 
market by mandating screen quotas of national cinema. Exhibitors are forced to screen short 
national films in each program of foreign film. Although the quotas and tariffs have not 
guaranteed audiences, since most audiences are conditioned by Hollywood, and exhibitors do not 
want to risk their business on untested film aesthetics, Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba have continued to use protective as well as supportive 
measures in the promotion of their local film industry. Randal Johnson notes, “Latin American 
cinema is in many ways dependent on or shaped by the state and its policies” (1996: 134).  
The film policy in Tanzania, to the contrary, is rooted in the colonial Cinematographic 
Ordinance of 1922, whose aim was not only to restrict which films could be shown, but also 
which groups of people could view and make films. Through the Cinematographic Ordinance, 
the colonial government set out to regulate who was allowed and not allowed to make or even 
see films. The film policy instituted the distinction between native and non-native populace and 
stipulated that natives were excluded from film viewership. In terms of film production, the 
colonial governor of Tanzania was invested with the authority to grant or deny a film permit to 
an applicant. The policy states, “No person shall direct, or take part, or assist in a making of the 
film for a cinematograph picture . . . unless a cinematographic permit in respect of the making of 
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such film shall have been first granted by the governor” (Cinematographic Ordinance, 1935). 
And if a governor did grant a permit, an officer authorized by the governor was to be present at 
the making of the picture and had the right to stop the production of the picture if in his opinion 
he found it “objectionable.”  
The Nyerere administration inherited this policy and modified it in its endeavor to control 
film production. After independence, political authority was transferred from the colonial 
governor to the minister of national culture and youth, James Naghwanda. Naghwanda had the 
sole power of granting or denying an applicant permission to shoot or exhibit a film. If a 
filmmaker or exhibitor was unsatisfied with the ruling of the minister, they could appeal, not in 
court, but back to the minister. Unlike in other countries such as India or Singapore, where a 
filmmaker can take the matter to court, in Tanzania, this was not and continues not to be the 
case; the ruling of the minister, most of the time if not always, is final. For example, the minister, 
in his budget speech to the parliament in 1976, noted that in terms of Tanzanian film exhibition, 
533 out of 555 films were allowed to be shown, while 22 films were denied exhibition. Out of 
the 22 denied, 7 had appealed and were again denied (Ministry of Culture budget document, 
1976). Out of the 533 films screened in Tanzania, 390 were U.S., 121 were Indian, and 22 were 
from Arab nations. Since film production in Tanzania was in the hands of the government, and 
the government mostly made newsreels and documentaries, most, if not all, of the films 
exhibited in cinema halls were imported, with the majority being U.S. feature films. 
In 1976, in the same parliament meeting, the minister presented a Kiswahili version of 
the colonial Cinematographic Ordinance called the Film and Stage Play Act No. 4. The new law 
was no different, with the exception of language, from the colonial law. It still called for 
government control of the film industry, but this time it was reinforced by using the language 
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that most of the people of Tanzania could understand, Kiswahili. The law was passed on March 
1976 and the same year was distributed to all cultural officers in the country. This was a vital 
move by the Nyerere government. As the country was struggling with its implementation of 
socialist development plans, especially the 1975 “villagilization” project, foreign films—
particularly those promoting individualism and capitalism—were seen as inimical to the state, 
distractions that kept the Tanzanian people from fully embracing socialism and participating in 
building it. To combat this, the government was vigilant in making sure no foreign film went 
unsupervised. 
The new film law covered theater licenses, film permits, and exhibition permits. Films 
that were exempted from acquiring a permit were those either made by amateurs or intended for 
a private viewing by family and friends, and films produced by the government itself. One could 
not exhibit a film or advertise materials such as posters without the government’s approval. The 
government had the right to grant, revoke, or ban production and exhibition of a film, and it did. 
Films that promoted individualism and those that portrayed “our socialist” friends in a bad light 
were the main targets.  
One other aspect of the film law that was implemented aggressively by the government 
was the National Film Censorship Board. This board received its power and legitimacy from the 
Cinematographic Ordinance of 1935, which states, “For the granting of film permits it shall be 
lawful for the Governor to appoint a Censorship Board consisting of a chairman and such 
numbers as the Governor may deem expedient,” as well as the 1958 version, which states, “The 
Governor shall appoint a Territorial censor” and the Film Policy of 1976, which states, “The 
minister shall appoint a National Film Censorship Board and shall announce the appointees in 
the government newspaper.” The task of the board has always been to review all applications for 
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film permits, to view and censor films for exhibition, and to grant or deny theater licenses. The 
censor board’s major preoccupation was ensuring that film produced or exhibited in Tanzania 
adhered to the socialist ideals that the government wished to inculcate in the populace. To be in 
compliance, a film or exhibition permit applicant had to supply, together with the application and 
fourteen days prior to the shooting date, a synopsis of the film. Once a permit was granted and a 
film made, the applicant was required to submit the final film for inspection.  
Not only were these films subject to final inspection, but also during shooting a 
filmmaker from the Audio Visual Institute or the Tanzania Film Company would accompany the 
film crew. This double control ensured that films made in Tanzania by foreign individuals did 
not distort matters or portray Tanzania in a negative light. The government controlled not only 
what images Tanzanians were allowed to see, thus presenting a construction of their national 
identity, but also what images of Tanzania foreigners were allowed to present. Dick Kaombwe, 
an Audio Visual Institute filmmaker, remembers that on countless occasions he accompanied 
foreign film crews to make sure Tanzanian culture and values were not misrepresented 
(Interview, 2009).  
The Tanzanian National Film Censorship Board, with the power invested in it by the 
minister, had the power to permit, revoke, and or ban any film that was exhibited or produced in 
Tanzania. The composition of the board included TANU party members, government officials, 
and sometimes the wives of political leaders. This composition clearly reflected that only 
government-sanctioned socialist values were promoted, and retribution rendered to those who 
did not conform. The film policy and the censorship board promoted a particular social order 
through their selective cultural, political, and economic interests. Eberhard Chamblikazi, a 
former production manager of the Tanzania Film Company, states that censorship in Tanzania is 
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tied to values the ruling party upholds, and therefore, the board has never acted in the basic 
interests of the people, but rather has been a tool of domination by the government (1995: 17).  
The appointment of the National Film Censorship Board by the minister was politically 
and ideologically motivated. For example, Rashid Kawawa, a TANU member, former trade 
union chair, and former prime minister, was appointed as the first chairperson of the NFCB. 
Ironically, Mr. Kawawa, in the 1950s, was an actor and had appeared in the colonial government 
film Mhogo Mchungu (Bitter Cassava, 1951). Mhogo Mchungu is a comic film about Juma, a 
plantation worker who after receiving his salary decides to venture for the first time into the city. 
He boards a truck, which takes him into town, where he is swindled out of his money and is 
beaten up by a man whose wife Juma has been admiring. In the end Juma returns to his village, 
swearing never to set foot in town again. The film’s underlying message was to persuade the 
youth to remain in the rural area and work in the field of agriculture. It is said the film was later 
destroyed by the government because it depicted a government official in a disrespectful manner. 
Government films were supposed to educate, not entertain, and even more to the point, they were 
supposed to show government officials in a positive light. Kawawa and his successors worked to 
control and curb the importation of foreign films by taking measures to make sure that those 
films did not distract from Tanzanian social values and experiences. The January 13, 1962, issue 
of the party newspaper, Uhuru (Freedom), wrote that “foreign films destroyed African culture 
and history by teaching the youth to become thieves,” and the editor called for Tanzania to 
establish its own local film production system.  
Foreign films were perceived by the government as detractors to the process of socialist 
nation building. Foreign films, especially American ones, were seen as the antithesis to the 
socialist ideas that the government was trying to foment in the country. To curb the infiltration of 
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American (perceived as capitalist), individualistic (as opposed to socialistic) values, the 
censorship board critically reviewed all films and censored all “subversive” materials. It was 
hailed that Tanzania was a socialist state, and the censorship board thus had to make sure that the 
films brought to Tanzania did not distort the true values of socialism. Another argument that was 
brought forth by some of the members of the board for its stringent assessment of foreign films 
was that Tanzania was a non-aligned country; thus in this period of cold war Tanzania did not 
want to be used as a political playground for the superpowers. Rashid Masimbi, once a member 
of the censor board, notes, “You know these films are sometimes produced deliberately to 
disgrace one nation and their way of life and promote another; thus we say no to that” (Interview, 
2009). A TANU guideline document states that Tanzania is a “non-aligned nation and is ready to 
co-operate in a friendly manner with any country that wishes us well, be it from the East or 
West” (TANU Guideline, 1971). But in an analysis of how censorship was conducted, it is found 
that only American films were censored in this manner. For example, the James Bond film From 
Russia with Love (1963) was censored and the title changed to From 007 with Love so as “not to 
offend our friends.” Likewise, other films that degraded another nation were banned from being 
shown in the country. It is clear that although Tanzania was strategically a non-aligned nation, it 
knew who its friends and enemies were. Its friends were those nations that leaned or were 
sympathetic to socialist ideals, such as Russia, China, the Scandinavian countries, India, and 
Canada. No reasons for censoring films beyond their unsuitability for the national interest were 
given. In 1969 TANU’s national executive committee declared that the “roguish” effects of 
international cinema were ruining African culture and that the remedy to this was to produce 
local films that would entertain and educate the people on the policy of local culture (Stumer, 
1998). 
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Production of local entertainment feature films was to occur in 1973, but before that was 
to happen, the National Development Corporation (NDC) demanded, in late 1967, that 
distributors of foreign films in Tanzania contribute 10 percent of their revenues towards the 
promotion of domestic production. Distributors refused to adhere to this demand, and the NDC 
responded by announcing the creation of a national film distribution company that was to take 
over distribution of all commercial films in the country (Leveri, 1983). 20th Century Fox, the 
major distributor of American films in East Africa, responded by withdrawing their supplies 
from Tanzania. In 1968 the Tanzania Film Company was created as a subsidiary of the National 
Development Corporation, for the importation and distribution of foreign films.  
The nationalization of the importation and distribution circuits proved challenging for the 
government. Not only did it require a lot of financial resources to operate, but more importantly, 
the importation and distribution companies did not relent. The United States, Anglo-American, 
and Pan-African film distributors with their subsidiaries abroad networked together and blocked 
the government from acquiring films abroad. After a period a compromise was reached in 1975; 
Tanzania Film Company was made the sole distributor of foreign films in Tanzania, but without 
a monopoly over their importation (Smythe, 393). The Motion Picture Association of America 
Export (MPAAE), finding the compromise unprofitable, stopped importing films to Tanzania. 
The MPAAE opposed the idea of governmental control over the distribution of films. Because 
payment of foreign currency was also controlled by the government, their money would have 
been held back in the bank for whatever duration the government wished. Clearly, as Mhando 
notes, there were “political elements about it” (Interview, 2009). The relationship between the 
MPAAE and the Tanzanian government is reflective of a larger political and ideological 
relationship that existed between Tanzania and the United States.  
51 
Tanzania was an aspiring socialist state, and its government was in the process of waging 
an offensive against any capitalist tendency that existed. Any film distribution and exhibition 
comprised of American films and distributors seemed the best target. In his 1974 budget speech 
to the parliament, the minister of culture and youth S. Chiwanga noted that, out of 708 films 
exhibited in Tanzania, 489 were American, 201 were Indian, and 18 were from Arab countries. 
In 1975 the MPAAE did not conduct direct business with Tanzania, but as Mhando notes, as a 
consequence, B class films were sent over through other importers. Local private film exhibition 
thus remained separate and distanced from the cultural nationalist project. The goal of the 
government to control cinematic exhibition and distribution encompassed the creation of a local 
film production industry that would serve its needs. 
The Government and Local Film Production 
The Tanzania Film Company served as the sole distributor of films in Tanzania; 
importers had to take their films to the TFC, and the TFC would plan for their censorship and 
their distribution. For this, the TFC received 40 percent of the gate collection (Mhando, 
interview, 2009). In its Five-Year Plan (1969–1974) document, the Nyerere government seemed 
to want not only to control the distribution channels of the film industry but also to establish a 
“processing plant” that would enable the government to produce, develop, and process the films 
locally (Leveri, 1983). To fulfill this, the Tanzanian government wrote a letter to UNESCO 
requesting assistance. UNESCO agreed to support Tanzania, and to do so requested the 
assistance of the Danish government and in 1969 assigned Mr. A. W. Acland to do a feasibility 
study and assess the viability of such an undertaking. In his report submitted in early 1970, 
Acland, recommended that an institute be established to take the following measures: (1) make 
films that would motivate communities by influencing attitudes, (2) produce films on “how to do 
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it,” and (3) supply state-run schools, universities, and vocational training centers with 16-mm 
and 8-mm educational films and visual aids produced by Tanzanian filmmakers. In 1970 a 
Danish-Tanzanian agreement was signed and construction of a film processing laboratory was 
begun. The lab was to be called the Audio Visual Institute (AVI). The institute was to produce 
documentaries and educational films for national development. In 1971 the Danish government 
helped the Tanzania Film Company to establish a production wing of the company. The 
production wing was to carry out the production of local commercial films. In 1973, a Danish 
film expert who had also trained TFC employees in the art of filmmaking assisted the TFC in 
producing feature films.  
The assistance of foreign governments in Tanzania—the Danish government in this 
instance—was prevalent during this time period. Social democratic countries such as Norway, 
Sweden, Netherlands, and Canada, and communist countries such China, Cuba, and Russia 
embraced Nyerere’s vision and philosophy of African socialism or Ujamaa and eagerly 
supported them as a possible noncapitalist path in Africa. Tanzania became a poster child for 
development and became the most-funded country in Africa (Askew, 2002). These foreign 
countries and their organizations were impressed with the social direction that the Nyerere 
government was taking in regards to its development process.  
Foreign involvement was consciously noninterventionist in philosophy. There was a 
declared ambition to avoid interference in domestic political issues. The countries were there to 
assist Tanzania reach its development goals. One of the development plans that the Nyerere 
administration had had since it came to power was the creation of “Ujamaa villages.” Ujamaa 
villages involved encouraging people to relocate and form organized communal villages where it 
would be easier for the government to provide such social services as education, health, good 
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roads, and water. Nyerere, in his writings on Ujamaa and communal villages, as early as 1962 
had pointed out that the creation of Ujamaa villages would help the government in bringing 
social services to the people. This process of creating Ujamaa villages was called for by the 
Villagization Act. It involved the replacement of the traditional rural settlements with larger and 
more viable villages. In 1974, 60 percent of the rural population was relocated (Askew, 2002). 
To accompany the villagization process, the government with the assistance of the Danish 
government and filmmakers produced Tanzania’s first feature film, Fimbo ya Mnyonge (A Poor 
Man’s Salvation, 1973). It had been argued on numerous occasions by politicians and 
government officials that Tanzania, to rid itself of foreign film influence, should produce its own 
local commercial films. The production of Fimbo Ya Mnyonge was hailed as a step in that 
direction. In 1974, the minister of culture reiterated in his speech to the parliament that foreign 
films distorted Tanzanian culture and values, and that producing national films would make it 
easy to educate the society politically, economically, and culturally (Budget speech, 1974). He 
hailed the TFC for adhering to “the cries of the nation” by producing Fimbo ya Mnyonge. 
Fimbo ya Mnyonge is about a man named Yomba Yomba, a farmer who, after a poor 
harvest, leaves his wife behind and goes to the city to seek employment. While in the city, 
Yomba Yomba embarks on petty businesses selling foods and utensils, only to find himself 
robbed, tricked, and almost jailed. As he is about to give up in desperation and return home, he 
visits a TANU party office where he is informed of the communal villages and the benefits of 
living and working there. The film ends as Yomba Yomba decides to return home to spread the 
good news about communal living.  
The film is a reminiscent of the colonial films Mhogo Mchungu and Charo Amerudi (The 
Return of Charles, 1951), which depict the same rural-to-urban migration phenomenon. The only 
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difference here is that instead of returning to an agricultural plantation, Yomba Yomba returns to 
create an Ujamaa village. Smythe notes, “Films that have been produced in independent 
Tanzania shows that the inherited British tradition of cinema with social purpose is still strong” 
(1989: 395). Fimbo ya Mnyonge is an excellent example of how political agendas are manifested 
in films.  
The Nyerere administration considered agriculture to be the backbone of the Tanzanian 
economy, and through the creation of Ujamaa villages it hoped to increase agricultural output 
and thus raise the standard of living of the rural population. The government hoped that 
Tanzanian cinema would assist in spreading the word about the benefits of living in these 
villages. Fimbo ya Mnyonge, just like other government films, only praised government 
initiatives; it did not question or critically look at the validity of moving people from their fertile 
ancestral land to sometimes barren, dry land. The film made it seem like communal living would 
eradicate poverty and bring about social and economic development. On the contrary, Ujamaa as 
a program of communal villagization was by all accounts a failure. Individuals were forcefully 
removed by the military from their homes and herded like animals onto trucks to relocate. 
Although the president had on numerous occasions and in many of his speeches reiterated that 
viable socialist communities were only to be established with willing members and that the task 
of leadership and government was not implemented by force but through explanation, 
encouragement, and participation, the government turned to force in the implementation of the 
villagization policy.  
Fimbo ya Mnyonge may have been seen by people, but this did not transform them into 
willing members of Ujamaa villages. Kelly Askew calls this policy “an abysmal failure” (2002: 
47). The relocation of 60 percent of the rural population not only crippled the Tanzanian 
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economy but also earned Tanzania the title of the “second-poorest nation in the world” by the 
World Bank.  
It was to take the TFC more than ten years before another feature film was produced. 
Surprisingly, though, the film that was produced was a sequel to Fimbo ya Mnyonge simply 
called Yomba Yomba. From the above scenario it is evident that the TFC was not able to curb 
Tanzania’s dependence on foreign films. To keep itself afloat, TFC made documentaries for 
national or international organizations that sought its services.  
The Audio Visual Institute: Documentaries and Educational Films 
As pointed out earlier, to curb its foreign currency expenditure, the government had 
enlisted the help of the Danish government to establish a government institute to develop films 
locally. The Audio Visual Institute was officially established in 1974, and a parliament act of 
1974 states the objectives of AVI as to provide facilities for training in all aspects of film 
production, including film laboratory processes; to provide for the government facilities for the 
establishment and maintenance of a national film library; to construct and maintain workshops 
and associated facilities; to undertake the repair, maintenance, and servicing of film projectors 
and other visual aid equipment; and finally, to produce educational films and other audio visual 
aids for national development.  
The Audio Visual Institute produced documentaries and educational films and distributed 
them throughout the country on a noncommercial basis. The creation of the AVI was a step 
towards a viable government film industry. Not only was AVI to produce films that the 
Government Film Unit did not, it was to process them locally. Films were no longer to be sent 
abroad for development; now everything was to be produced in Tanzania. “The shooting, 
developing, and editing was all done here” (Kaumbwa, Interview, 2009). The institute had six 
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separate departments: camera, sound, editing, directing, script writing, and technician. With the 
support from Denmark the institute acquired Westrex sound machines, a Steenbeck editing bay, 
Bauer projectors, Arriflex cameras, Nagra tape recorders, and a Bell and Howell processor. The 
institute was able to produce 16-mm black-and-white films, which were later blown up to 35 mm 
for cinema halls. The only facility the institute was missing was an optical printer. Films thus 
were still sent abroad for optical printing.  
The Government Film Unit, which had specialized in making newsreels, was to merge 
with the Audio Visual Institute. The merger was not a cordial one, for as Saileni Dickson 
remembers: “The Danish put greater emphasis on films for social development; they did not like 
newsreels. They wanted to start the institute with their own film people, who they were to train. 
They did not want to associate with the GFU in any form. They wanted to do things their way, . . 
. but unfortunately when they came, they found us, and we were very qualified and in fact we 
were more educated than them by far. . . . That did not make them happy at all” (Interview, 
2009).  
This tug of war was soon to be settled by the government: GFU and its film experts were 
transferred to AVI. The Audio Visual Institute was first and foremost a government entity; thus it 
was guided by government policies, agenda, and ideology. Kaumbwa recalls that “back then, 
even a writer knew his responsibility . . . because we were propaganda machinery of the 
government” (Interview, 2009). As an ideological propaganda machine, AVI and other 
information sectors tied to the government made sure that their documentaries and educational 
films persuaded the people to support government undertakings. In 1979, amidst the Tanzania-
Uganda war, AVI produced a documentary, Vita Vya Kagera (The Kagera War), which showed 
how the Tanzanian military toppled “the evil” Idi Amin, the president of Uganda. Militarily, the 
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Nyerere government ousted Idi Amin and installed in his place Yusufu Lule. Cinematically, the 
documentary, shot in color, showed the horror of war but more importantly the strength and 
power of the Tanzanian army and, by extension, the government. Although AVI was only able to 
develop films in black and white, the film was shot in color “for people to actually feel the war. . 
. . There was no other way of making the documentary” (Kaumbwa, interview, 2009). The 
decision to shoot the film in color had, therefore, an ideological as well as an aesthetic basis.  
The war with Uganda together with the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
brought about financial deficits as well as disgruntled feelings among the people. The 
government failed to provide basic social services to its people, and at the same time corruption 
and misuse of resources within the government ran rampant. The Tanzanian crisis of the late 
1970s and early 1980s was not only an economic crisis, but a political one as well. This occurred 
due to the increasing inability of the state to provide avenues for effective popular participation 
and its failure to stimulate production or maintain capital accumulation. Many promises made to 
the people went unfulfilled; squandering of public services continued, and avenues for people’s 
expression and participation remained blocked. This stimulated political apathy and resignation 
on the part of the people (Kiondo, 1995). The legitimacy of the government was at stake. The 
socialist political and economic path was no longer as clear as the government had envisioned. 
Instead of critically evaluating its policies and assessing what had gone wrong, the 
government went on a campaign to bring socialism back. Film again was employed as a tool to 
strengthen the party and socialism. In 1985, the Tanzania Film Company was quickly contracted 
by the prime minister’s office to try to salvage socialism by making a sequel to Fimbo ya 
Mnyonge. Martin Mhando had just come back from a three-year stint studying film in Romania 
and was given the task of writing and directing the film. The script was written by Martin 
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Mhando; Godwin Kaduma, the production manager of TFC, and Ahmed Mushibu, from the 
prime minister’s office. It is reasonable to suggest that, although TFC was a government 
parastatal, and thus already inclined to implement the government’s views, the appointment of 
Mushibu was nothing short of a strategic move by the government. Mushibu was assigned to 
oversee the project. However, the director thought differently: “I could not accept making a film 
that said socialism was successful, because we could see a lot of pot holes in it” (Mhando, 
interview, 2009). The director’s personal ideological stance regarding socialism generated a 
heated debate among the three writers, and especially with Mushibu. The resulting compromise 
was a script and a film that depicted how socialism could be or ought to be. The film was more 
of a fantasy than a reality, Mhando notes. 
The film was named Yomba Yomba after its main character, and it began where Fimbo ya 
Mnyonge left off, with the protagonist trying to return home with news of Ujamaa villages. 
Yomba Yomba deals with that journey back home. On his return home Yomba Yomba passes 
through different types of villages, each of which symbolizes a different stage of socialism. The 
first village he comes into contact with is in total shambles and is dependent entirely on one 
leader, the chair of the village, who makes all the decisions. In a pivotal scene, the chair has 
convened a meeting, and only a few people have shown up. Yomba Yomba, questions the chair:  
YOMBA YOMBA. How long have you been the chair of the village? 
VILLAGE CHAIR. Almost twenty-five years 
YOMBA YOMBA. Why is it that you have been the chair of the village for so many years? 
VILLAGE CHAIR. There is no other person who can fill this post.  
The response of the chair puzzles Yomba Yomba, but he moves on with his journey. 
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The second village Yomba Yomba visits has energetic young people who are 
underutilized; they are not given chances by the old guards in the village. In the third village, 
women are seen working in leadership positions and are contributing to the development of the 
village. Mhando states, “Our argument in this village is that there is a need to change the whole 
social structure, the social environment.” The fourth village is portrayed as a successful village, 
showing and arguing for a mixed economy, a socialist as well as a private economy. The last 
village that Yomba Yomba visits is considered a “fantasy village” by the director: here new 
technology is employed successfully, leadership is in the hands of women, and everybody 
participates equally and harmoniously. According to Mhando, “This is an area where we hope to 
go.” 
But this hope was a fantasy, for Tanzania, after twenty-five years of employing socialism, 
was still in the first and second village stage of socialism. Leadership, as in the first village, had 
remained, since independence, in the hand of one party; one president; and one social, political, 
and economic ideology. People were underutilized and marginalized, and alternative expressions 
were blocked. The film in its subtle way critiques the government and its policies. Yomba Yomba 
did not discard socialism as a worthwhile ideology, but argued rather that there were challenges 
to be overcome if it was to succeed. Socialism in Tanzania needed to involve young people, 
women, technology, and democracy. This view of the film did not sit well with the top 
government officials. The minister of culture, Gertrude Mongela, asked to view the film before it 
was screened to the public. With some hesitation, she permitted the film’s exhibition. 
Unfortunately Yomba Yomba was never shown to the public, nor has it ever been shown. There 
has been some speculation that maybe the president saw the film and did not appreciate the 
resemblances in or the allegory of the film, for in a sense the film was critical of him and his 
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administration. The government official statement was that the film was no longer relevant 
(Mhando, interview, 2009). This is the same government that not less than six months prior had 
eagerly requested TFC to produce the film. What had changed in six months?  
The political and economic changes that were taking place in the 1970s and mid-80s in 
Tanzania influenced what was being produced and consumed culturally. No longer were 
individuals satisfied with the government’s views and policies; individuals wanted to participate, 
wanted their voice and cries heard. The debate that transpired in the production of the film and in 
the film itself not only showed that the days of passively accepting government views were 
coming to an end, but it also elaborated that within the system itself, individuals were starting to 
question and ask for alternative answers. Although Mponguliana asserts, “One had to be very 
careful on how to criticize the government, because that is where your bread came from” 
(Interview, 2009), Mhando demonstrated that sometimes bread is just not enough, especially 
when the bread provider and the bread itself are stale. The Swahili proverb Ukimuweka kwenye 
kona hata bubu hutoa sauti (If forced into a corner, even a mute person will make a sound) 
highlights the conditions that Tanzanians found themselves in: they had been put into a tight 
corner, and thus to fight back they questioned and challenged the government. Filmmakers like 
Martin Mhando could no longer just toe the party line; they questioned it and suggested the way 
forward.  
When the character Yomba Yomba asked the chairperson of the first village why he had 
held that position for such a long time, twenty-five years to be exact, the reply was that there was 
no one else to give it to. This must have hit a nerve within the party, because it had also been 
twenty-five years that President Nyerere had been in power, and it seemed his rationalization as 
to why he was still in power reflected the chairperson’s response. This state of affairs did not 
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continue for long, for in 1985, the same year that the film was made and was supposed to have 
come out, President Nyerere voluntarily resigned from his post as the president of the United 
Republic of Tanzania. Did he see the film? Did he see the writing on the wall? What was to 
come of Tanzania?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
Chapter Three 
Rukhsa: Everything Goes? Transition to Neo-Liberal Policy and Film 
In 1985 Ali Hassan Mwinyi came to power as the new president of Tanzania. Shortly 
after, in September 1986, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank was signed, signifying a major shift in Tanzania’s socio-economic and political 
worldview. The socialist ideology, which only a few months earlier was being revitalized 
through various government agencies such as the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) and its film 
Yomba Yomba, was now becoming an image of the past, and subsequently neo-liberal policies 
introduced through the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) became 
the awakening present and future of Tanzania. Mwinyi’s era is best represented by the word 
Rukhsa, uttered by the new president, who himself became known as Mzee Rukhsa (Mr. 
Permission). Rukhsa, similar to the Russian Perestroika, meant openness—opening the 
economic door to private individuals and companies, local and foreign. Rukhsa, with its 
embracement of IMF and World Bank policies, also transformed Tanzania from a one-party 
socialist state into a multiparty democratic state. What did this transformative word mean for the 
film industry, and how did this affect the way the government administered the film industry? 
For Tanzania, the IMF and World Bank SAPs entailed the devaluation of the Tanzania 
shilling, trade liberalization, elimination of government subsidies, reduction of state investment 
in the economy, encouragement of the private sector, privatization of government enterprises, 
civil service reform, and eventually the dismantling of the single-party state and the introduction 
of multiparty democracy (Mongella and Kiondo, 2006). This fundamental change meant that 
now the market, not the government, would determine how resources would be distributed in 
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society. Thus SAPs led the government to limit its role in controlling the economy and providing 
social services.  
Rukhsa, a Savior for the Film Industry? 
The devaluation of the shilling meant that film equipment, film stock, printing, and 
importing became an expensive undertaking for both the government and private companies. 
Between 1986 and 1990, the Tanzanian shilling was devalued from 7 shillings to the dollar to 
193 to the dollar, and by March 1991 it had reached 201 to the dollar (Kiondo, 1998: 83). To 
ease its burden on foreign currency expenditure, the government expanded its “own fund” 
scheme, introduced in late 1984, to allow importers to import products without requesting 
foreign exchange from the central bank of Tanzania. This meant that individuals who had foreign 
currency funds outside the country could freely (without questions being asked about how 
foreign exchange had been obtained) use their money to import goods, including film (Wangwe, 
2006: 31). This was a significant socio-economic and political shift that categorized President 
Mwinyi’s administration. This major shift meant that the private sector, which had been 
marginalized during the Nyerere era, became the savior of the economy in the Mwinyi 
administration. But did it save the film industry? Did the government loosen its control of the 
industry?  
The promotion of the private sector in terms of film caused the government to relax its 
hold on the film industry by allowing private individuals and companies to import and distribute 
films. Companies such as Pan-African film distributors, United Film distributors, and Anglo-
American film distributors were no longer required to distribute their films via the TFC; they 
could import and distribute films to exhibitors independently. This eased the bureaucratic red 
tape that film importers and distributors had previously had to endure from the TFC. Although 
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this was a major step in the reduction of the government’s hold on the film industry, censorship, 
a major apparatus of the government, remained in its control. The government continued to 
monitor and survey the kinds of foreign images and content that Tanzanians were seeing. Some, 
such as Ng’wanakilala, the managing director of the Media Publishing House, have argued that 
an increase of foreign films in Tanzania had a negative influence on Tanzanian viewers, and 
questioned whether the country should continue to depend on imports in this sector of the 
cultural industry (1981: 26). Although no research has ever been carried out to substantiate such 
a claim, and—more significantly—the government was not able to produce a sufficient number 
of feature films of its own to compete with the influx of foreign films, a close monitoring and 
control of foreign films was advocated. Foreign films were perceived to have an ideological and 
cultural effect that came into direct conflict with Tanzanian values.  
Andrew Higson reminds us that “the state intervenes only when there is a felt fear of the 
potential power of foreign cinema and particularly when the products and therefore the 
ideologies and values of a foreign cinema are widely circulated within a nation-state, and assume 
to have a detrimental effect on that nation’s state economy” (2002: 61). The Mwinyi 
administration saw cinema as an important instrument in the promotion of desirable “national 
values.” Since the government was economically challenged and could not produce a sufficient 
number of films, it relied on the mechanism of resistance to and control of other cinemas. As 
Croft notes, “Governments support films they deem worthy, and withhold support from 
unworthy ones, as part of an international politics of culture” (2002: 8). Films can reflect and 
keep in circulation values and behaviors associated with a particular nation. 
The Mwinyi regime’s fear of foreign film was not in terms of its effect on the nation’s 
economy—one could say it was actually profiting through taxation—but in terms of its effects on 
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cultural values. The fear was not so much how foreign values were destroying the cultural mores 
of the Tanzanian people, as how foreign values did not help, and in fact obscured, hindered, and 
slowed down the construction of a national culture. Therefore, to speed up the invention and 
construction of a national identity, the Mwinyi regime, just as the Nyerere regime before it, 
systematically worked to retard, monitor, and control the content of foreign films as it attempted 
to develop a national identity.  
The idea that something is going to come from outside and destroy something “organic,” 
the cry of many cultural imperialism scholars and governments, has been refuted by pointing to 
the fact that there has never been something organic to any given place. John Akomfrah, an 
African filmmaker, comments that there has always been a mixture of cultures (289). Tomlison 
calls this form of cultural mixing “cultural loss,” while Homi Bhabha refers to it as a state of “in-
between-ness.” National identity or national culture is by no means a fixed phenomenon; it is 
constantly shifting, constantly in the process of becoming. The Mwinyi regime in its endeavor to 
form a coherent and unitary identity promoted national values that supported the regime’s 
political ideology. Cultural construction was not to be left in the hands of foreign cultures, whose 
values were perceived as individualistic and capitalist at best. Although major socio-economic 
and political transformations that threatened to precipitate less government interference were 
taking place, the administration found ways to circumvent this. Through the National Film 
Censorship Board, the government ensured a continued stronghold on foreign films. 
The Foreign Film Scare  
Antipathy toward foreign films reached a peak in the parliamentary budget session of 
1987, when members of parliament called for the Minister of Social Development and Culture, 
Fatma Said Ali, to elaborate on what was being done about “the public exhibition of foreign 
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videos” and what the censorship board was doing about this foreign cultural attack. To place this 
in context, while the Nyerere administration in 1974 had banned the importation of video 
cassette recorders (VCRs), in 1985, following revision of the import laws, the ban was lifted, 
resulting in an increased import of VCRs, televisions, and video home system (VHS) tapes. This 
process prompted the emergence of an informal film exhibition business and venue. This 
exhibition business was conducted by individuals who owned television sets and VHS tapes, and 
screened, for a small fee, films at home or in a temporary shack built by the owner. These films, 
because of their informal and clandestine screenings, evaded the hands of the censorship board. 
The emergence of this covert film sector threatened the existence and legitimacy of the state, 
prompting members of parliament to demand the application of the Film and Stage Play Act of 
1976, which required business owners to obtain exhibition permits from the censorship board, to 
this new mode of exhibition. 
The parliament’s call for the censorship board to take action demonstrates the macro- 
contradiction that faced the state in its endeavor to move forward in its democratization and 
adoption of a free market economy. On the one hand, the government had allowed for the 
importation of foreign technology and cultural products, but on the other it still held to the view 
that it had to control how and what was being fed culturally to the Tanzanian people. The 
government, in this case, reverted to the authoritative rule characteristic of the Nyerere regime 
and cracked down on the informal film business by enforcing the Film and Stage Play Act of 
1976. Fatma Said Ali reassured the parliament that the Ministry of Social Development and 
Culture had distributed copies of the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976 to all districts in the 
country, and all cultural officers and district censorship boards had been informed that the videos 
that were being shown to the public fell within the film act law, and thus it was prohibited to 
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show videos in public without an exhibition permit from the censor board. The parliament 
applauded the minister and admonished the censorship board to be more vigilant in its effort to 
safeguard Tanzania’s national culture, lest it be destroyed by foreign values (Ministry of Social 
Development and Culture Budget speech, 1987). Although the government had accepted neo-
liberal policies in the economic sector, it was not ready to accept them in the cultural sector. The 
control of the film industry through censorship was not, however, without question and debate, 
especially among the government’s own filmmakers. 
Filmmakers Challenging the State 
In 1983, Siril Kaunga and other filmmakers from the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) and 
the TFC founded an organization called the Tanzania Filmmakers Association (TAFILMA). The 
organization had three objectives: (1) to advise the government on matters of film and 
filmmaking, (2) to make its own independent films outside the government, and (3) to meet and 
exchange ideas among members (Kaunga, interview, 2009). In hopes of loosening governmental 
control of film through censorship, the association proposed to the government the idea of using 
filmmakers in censoring film. After all, “We were film experts and knew how films were made. . 
. . We felt it was best that we looked at the films and advise the government where changes could 
be made” (Siril Kaunga, interview, 2009). The idea fell on deaf ears and was flatly rejected by 
the government. It is apparent that the government and the filmmakers had conflicting agendas. 
Whereas filmmakers were interested in the preservation of the story line and film aesthetics, the 
government was more concerned with political and ideological legitimacy, especially during this 
fragile period of transition for the nation. The priority of the state was to guide and control the 
path and destination of the Tanzanian nation, especially as visible cultural cracks began to 
emerge. It viewed allowing one of its film controlling mechanisms, censorship, to be in the hands 
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of filmmakers as jeopardizing its power to rule, and thus threatening its legitimacy. The concern 
of the government at this juncture was not so much, as they have suggested, the cultural values 
of the Tanzanian people, as how the relinquishing of such a cultural institution could diminish its 
political and ideological capital.  
Not only was the Tanzanian Filmmakers Association unable to persuade the government 
to employ the association’s expertise on matters of film censorship, producing films independent 
of the state also proved difficult. The association did not have the funds to make films, and those 
who were willing and able to fund, such as the international donor community, “wanted to make 
films of their nature” while “we wanted to make films that reflected us” (Siril Kaunga, interview, 
2009). The struggles and negotiations that filmmakers had to endure in the process of making 
either films that propagated government ideologies or those that catered to international donors 
has prompted some scholars such as John Komfrahn to call African cinema an “impossible 
cinema.” (2006:277). John Komfrahn notes that there is not enough money to sustain an African 
cinema and that the continued reliance on the government has constituted a major problem 
(2006: 289). In order for an African cinema to flourish it would have to be independent of the 
state both financially and in terms of content. This is something the government was neither 
ready nor willing to grant. Although the government was financially withdrawing from the film 
industry, politically and ideologically it maintained control. In the midst of new technologies and 
the emergence of private media forms, was this control to last?  
The Fourth Wall: A Challenge to the State? 
New technologies and the emergence of private media forms  
As previously mentioned, no private media forms existed prior to the adoption of the neo-
liberal policies. The neo-liberal policies, besides calling for less government interference in the 
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economy, also called for a shift in the political landscape away from one-party rule and toward a 
multiparty democracy. This meant the government had to widen its political platform and allow 
people, organizations, and political parties to form and participate in the construction of a 
multiparty democratic country. For these changes to take place, President Mwinyi, on February 
27, 1991, appointed a commission headed by the Minister of Justice, Judge Francis Nyalali, to 
review the possibility of Tanzania becoming a multiparty political system (Mwapachu, 2005). 
The report thus generated recommended that, while only a minority of respondents favored a 
multiparty system, a majority wished to see changes that, theoretically at least, could be easily 
facilitated through the introduction of multipartyism (Gibbon, 1995: 13). 
In considering the transformation of Tanzania into a multiparty state, the Nyalali report 
had, among other things, recognized the need for independent print and electronic media and 
thus the need to amend media laws that hindered or impinged on people’s freedom and rights. 
The commission cited the Newspaper Act of 1976 and the Tanzania News Agency Act of 1976 
as media laws that needed amendment (Nyalali’s report, 1991). However, the Film and Stage 
Play Act of 1976, which was just as oppressive as the other two laws, was not mentioned at all in 
the report. This could be attributed to either or both of two things: (1) the government feared the 
print media more than the film media and thus sought to maintain its control, and (2) because the 
government had controlled the film industry since its inception, the commission assumed this 
was to continue and thus an amendment was not necessary. 
Prior to and following Tanzanian independence, the print media was controlled by private 
companies and individuals, and it was not until 1974 that it was nationalized and placed under 
government control. With the coming of a multiparty system and the implementation of a free 
market economy, private-print media companies, the government feared, were bound to 
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resurface. To continue its control of the print and broadcasting media the government thought to 
embrace the changing conditions while retaining a strong hold on the industry by strengthening 
the two media laws and giving itself the power to monitor and regulate the incoming independent 
media. For example, the report recommended the strengthening of both laws by increasing the 
staff and working facilities of each institution, giving the Tanzania News Agency the right to 
distribute and disseminate news, and creating regulations that would monitor and control other 
independent agencies (Sturmer, 1998: 172). The amendments to the two laws asserted 
governmental control. Thus, overall the amendments in the two laws were to give more power to 
the government to regulate, monitor, and control the emerging independent media forms. 
Although the door had opened for private companies to import and distribute films in 
Tanzania, both film importation and exhibition declined. Whereas in 1976, 550 films were 
imported to Tanzania, in 1986 only 230 films were imported (five of which were banned); in 
1987 this figure had plummeted to 154 (of which two were banned), and in 1988, the number 
further declined to 100 (Ministry of Social Development budget speeches, 1986, 1987, 1988). By 
1993, film imports and distribution remained steady at 100 films (Ministry of Education and 
Culture budget speech, 1993). The decline of film imports and distribution has been attributed to 
two factors: audience attendance and the emergence of new media forms. 
The Withering Audience 
Because of the rising cost of film imports, distributors, importers, and exhibitors were 
forced to evaluate the future prospects of the film industry. Distributors, who sometimes also 
doubled as importers, thought to raise ticket prices as a remedy to the falling business and a way 
to recoup their investment. The ensuing decline in attendance dramatically affected the industry. 
While in 1986 the cinema halls were frequented by 3 million viewers, by 1988 audience 
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attendance had plummeted to 1 million, causing a decrease in film importation and exhibition 
(Mpongualiana, 2001). The price increase seemed a necessary strategy for the industry’s 
survival, but to the distributors’ dismay in fact acted as a severe blow to the film industry. In 
trying to keep the film business afloat, distributors lost sight of who their major filmgoers were, 
and how this price increase affected them. The majority of filmgoers were working class people 
who had been financially impaired by the economic crisis. People who went to the movies were 
typically young working class people, for whom film served as entertainment, an escape from the 
drudgery of everyday life, and a connection to the outside world (Mhando, interview, 2009). 
Martin Mhando notes that distributors were only concerned with their financial gain and had 
forgotten that “it is only the people with extra financial means who go to see a film”; in these 
trying times, when everything was a struggle, to increase the price of a ticket was to dig one’s 
own business grave (Interview, 2009). Not only was the economic environment killing film 
distribution and exhibition, by 1988 the establishment of private media forms put the last nail in 
the film exhibition business coffin. In 1992, Tanzania officially adopted a multiparty political 
system, and shortly after, in 1993, the Newspaper Act was officially amended and the 
Broadcasting Service Act was passed, opening the door for an influx of independent print and 
electronic media. 
Television Networks: The New Exhibition Venue  
Following the passage of the Broadcasting Service Act, three private television stations, 
Independent Television (ITV), Coastal Television Network (CTN), and Dar es Salaam 
Television (DTV) were established in 1994 (Sturmer, 1998). It must be noted that prior to 1994, 
Tanzania did not have a national television station. Thus the establishment of television stations 
in Tanzania was a new and exciting novelty for the Tanzanian people. In Zanzibar, Television ya 
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Zanzibar (Television Zanzibar) (TVZ) had existed since 1974 and was the first color television 
station in sub-Saharan Africa. Television Zanzibar did not transmit to mainland Tanzania, 
because at that time television sets and VCRs were banned. The ban was lifted and replaced with 
an import duty ordinance in 1985. With the introduction of television stations, not only were 
people able to watch movies on television, but more importantly, the movies viewed were free of 
charge. The economic crisis that had turned people away from cinema halls was now turning 
them toward television “halls.” 
Not everyone could afford a television set, but the homes of the families that did buy sets 
became the new neighborhood television halls. Neighbors would gather at a house with a 
television set to watch local news programming and foreign films. In addition people stayed at 
home to watch televised “free” movies. Thus the new media forms, coupled with the increase in 
film ticket prices, caused people to stay away from traditional cinema halls and shift toward 
alternative media forms such as television. Some television stations had what were called 
“watching posts,” where people gathered to watch news and evening programs. The first to 
establish a watching post was Independent Television. ITV mounted a giant television screen 
high above the busy economic center of Mnazi Mmoja in the heart of Dar es Salaam. The huge 
screen was switched on at 7:00 p.m. and went off at midnight when the ITV station went off the 
air. Home television sets and watching posts became an alternative exhibition practice to 
moviegoing.  
The mushrooming of television stations and the decline of attendance in cinema halls 
compelled film exhibitors to rethink their business venture. Film exhibitors were forced to sell 
their businesses or convert them into more profitable ventures. Within a short period of time a 
majority of theater halls, such as the Cameo Cinema, New Chox Cinema, Empire Cinema, and 
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Avalon Cinema, were converted into malls, churches, fast-food restaurants, and supermarkets. 
This transformation surprisingly did not alter the film policy of Tanzania. The film policy 
continued to forbid individuals from making or exhibiting films without the consent of the 
government. The government and its film policy were to encounter greater challenges ahead, 
facing such questions such as How was the government to monitor and censor foreign cultural 
products shown on television? For domestic television production, were the production 
companies required to obtain film permits from the censorship board? And more importantly, 
how was the government to keep control of the development of a national culture amidst the 
emergent and contending views and perspectives?  
To deal with these threats to the state-sanctioned national culture, which still persisted in 
socialist ideals and values, the government considered reviving its agenda of establishing a 
national television station. A task force was set up in 1985 to evaluate the viability of setting up 
such an entity. The task force, chaired by F. C. Kasambala, the Director of Posts and 
Telecommunication, with Siril Kaunga, an AVI filmmaker, as one of the members, carried out 
the evaluation and in 1989 submitted a report that suggested the need of quickly establishing the 
television station. When an enquiry about the cost for establishing the station came back with an 
estimation of 2 billion U.S. dollars, it became obvious that such an endeavor was way beyond the 
government’s means (Stumer, 1998). Not giving up, in November 1989 the Minister of 
Broadcast and Information, Hassan Diria, appointed a television technical committee whose 
major task was to find ways to establish a television station at a much lower price. The 
committee, headed by Ambrose Ottaru, reported that a television station could be established by 
the year 2000 at a cost of only 22.6 million dollars (Stumer, 1998). The report recommended that 
the construction of the television station be carried out in phases.  
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In 1996 the national television station, Television ya Taifa (TVT) launched a test 
transmission signal limited to the capital city of Dar es Salaam, and the year 2000 saw the 
official national launch of Television ya Taifa. With the establishment of a national television 
station, the government not only created its own institution to combat and compete with the 
private media industry in the formation of a national culture but also through its legal framework, 
with such legislation as the Broadcasting Service Act, made sure it was still able to lead the 
cultural direction of Tanzania. But with an increase of new technologies finding their way into 
the hands of ordinary Tanzanians and the emergence of media production houses, the 
government had to constantly look over its shoulders and take wider and faster steps, a task that 
was proving to be increasingly difficult. 
Media Production Houses 
The emergence of television stations as alternative venues to cinema halls precipitated the 
establishment of media production houses. A television station relies heavily for its sustenance 
on the number of advertisements it is able to generate from different companies. To sell 
advertisement time, television stations were forced to create programs that attracted the interest 
of advertisers. Media production houses emerged to fill this gap, to produce home-grown 
programs for the many television stations as well as commercials for different companies. Thus 
production houses such as Reel to Real, Benchmark Production, and Prime Time Production 
were established in the early 1990s. One of the primary functions of these media production 
houses was to produce commercials for corporations, companies, and organizations for airing on 
televisions stations around the country. These production houses later moved from just making 
commercials to making music videos and later domestic videos, films, and programs for 
television stations as well as other organizations and individuals. 
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Other production houses such as Dance Theater Studio, later renamed Dar Talent Studio 
(DTS), established in 1989, and Abantu Vision, established in 1996, chose to deal only with 
filmmaking. DTS, founded by a former production manager of TFC, Eberhard Chamblikazi, and 
a former theater teacher at a government college of arts, Gonche Materego, made commercial 
and educational films, which they shopped around to televisions stations or sold to the public via 
book stores and public events such as festivals and conferences. Abantu Vision, founded by 
Beatrix Mugishagwe, specialized in educational films. In an interview with Mugishagwe, she 
elaborated her reason for that as being “we produce films for the society; we want to participate 
in the education of our society.” 
At a glance, the media production houses did not seem to pose any threat to the 
government. For starters, the types of programs most of them produced were either just 
entertaining, such as music videos, or nonpolitical, such as advertisements and educational 
programs. But this was to change as the first multiparty election neared. Programs on most 
television stations started to reflect the changing condition of Tanzania and aired programs that 
put the government in the hot seat, so to speak. Kiti Moto (Hot Seat), a program aired by DTV 
and produced by Pascal Mayala, put politicians, members of different political parties, and other 
prominent national figures on air and asked them tough questions pertaining to the social, 
economic, and political climate of the time. This kind of program, which at times would expose 
government misdeeds or show a politician’s weakness, was openly banned from airing. Kiti 
Moto was taken off the air, to resurface later on another, “government friendly” television station 
(ITV), but this time the show had no hard, bold questions. Politicians used the program as a 
platform to air their views. But the government and its friendly television station had failed to 
read the changing times. No longer would viewers passively accept the views of their leaders; the 
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viewers wanted to question their leaders and hold them accountable to the decisions and policies 
they made. Failing to understand this, the program lost its viewership and was taken off the air.  
Although the above scenario presents the government as still in control and determined to 
go to any lengths to achieve its goals, even if it meant banning a program, media production 
houses had opened their doors to alternative media content and paved the way for an alternative 
film industry that was to be independent from the government—the video film industry 
phenomenon. At this juncture the government not only received contending views from its own 
filmmakers at AVI and TFC but also from independent media production houses.  
To deal with the challenges posed by filmmakers and other cultural practitioners, a 
comprehensive analysis of the way government cultural institutions and agencies conducted their 
business was carried out. Although conditions imposed by IMF included government enterprise 
reform, which meant closing down state-run industries or selling them to private investors, the 
AVI and the TFC were spared. Out of almost 400 enterprises the government owned, the World 
Bank had asked the government to liquidate 60 of them (Kiondo, 2006: 46). The call for less 
government intervention in the economy by IMF meant that the government had to further scale 
down or liquidate all of its enterprises. Before the introduction of the IMF conditions, the 
government had more than 400 parastatals. These enterprises ranged from banks, insurance 
companies, and industrial plants to film institutions. Since signing the IMF agreement in 1986, 
the government by 1989 had sold 40 enterprises to private local and foreign investors and 
liquidated 10. For those institutions that it had not sold, financial and personnel cutbacks were 
the norm. The AVI and the TFC fell into this category. 
The financial cutbacks at AVI and TFC were so severe that the only expenditure category 
the government was able to afford was employee salaries. Rose Sayore remembers this period 
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and notes that “the government did not have enough money to pay for productions, so there was 
a lot of wasting of time, we just sat around and became lazy” (Interview, 2009).This idleness at 
the workplace eventually became intolerable for some, who like Rose Sayore, decided to leave 
AVI. Among those who did not leave, some were forced into early retirement and others were 
laid off. Those lucky enough to evade retrenchment were forced to come up with alternative 
funding strategies for producing films. This meant soliciting funds and projects from 
international organizations such as UNICEF and the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Dick Kaombwe, an AVI filmmaker, described during an interview 
how he and others would go to various international organizations to convince them of the need 
to use film in their developmental projects; since organizations such as SIDA, the Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) financed different government ministries, AVI employees were often able to 
persuade donors to add a film component to their projects. For example, Kaumbwa notes, 
“SIDA, which used to fund the Ministry of Education, also funded films. . . . So it was not the 
government as such that funded us but it was SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), DANIDA 
(Denmark), and NORAD (Norway), those were the great financiers” (Interview, 2009). Thus 
filmmaking at AVI was kept alive with the assistance of international organizations. Films 
funded by international organizations were not that different from those made by the 
government. This is because most of the donors and their developmental activities were in line 
with government policies for social development. This was different at TFC. 
As a company established to distribute and produce commercial films, TFC had a slightly 
different experience than that of AVI. Although TFC suffered financial cutbacks and also had to 
solicit external funding, the type of films produced and the kind of cooperation developed with 
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external investors was different. With weak funding, for their survival TFC filmmakers had to 
devise a mechanism that would keep them financially afloat. Co-production became the solution 
to the economic crisis for TFC filmmakers. The difference between AVI and TFC was not only 
that the films made at TFC were co-produced, but more importantly, the films made at this 
juncture did not foreground or overtly propagate government policies. When they did deal with 
government policies or issues, it was more in the form of a critique. Co-produced films did not 
praise the government, and government agendas were now to take a back seat to social matters in 
co-produced films such as Harusi ya Mariamu (The Marriage of Mariamu) (1985) and Mama 
Tumaini (Women of Hope) (1987). The challenge to the state thus came not only from outside, 
but from its own establishment, its own filmmakers. But John Mponguliana cautions, “You must 
use your intelligence in criticizing the hands that feed you” (Interview, 2010). Co-production 
thus allowed for an intelligent criticism to occur. 
The Emergence of Co-production 
After the collapse of socialism and the rise of global capitalism, film in Tanzania had a 
sporadic existence. Cinema halls closed down, and cutbacks to film institutions and retrenchment 
of filmmakers followed. One thing that saved the industry from total collapse was the co-
production mode of operation. Co-production has been praised by some scholars as the savior of 
domestic film production and as a way of eliminating national differences and building global 
communities. Others have condemned it as cultural homogenization, whereby Western (U.S.) 
capitalist values are privileged over national culture, and in this process national issues are 
sacrificed to the creation of internationally appealing commercial films (Barbara Selznick, 2008; 
Toby Miller et al., 2005). These critics believe that co-production films lack substance and 
artistic value; terms like “Europudding” are used to describe them. These films signify a cultural 
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loss; they lack national specificity and therefore cannot provide a cultural national identity. The 
question of national identity will be explored further as we analyze the two co-production films 
Harusi ya Mariamu (1985) and Mama Tumaini (1987). 
What is clear about film is that during Mwinyi’s regime, co-production was the last and 
only hope in an effort to save the national film industry. Co-production is defined as a process by 
which at least two companies in at least two different countries work together to create a media 
text, or any production/business arrangement among organizations based in different countries, 
in which creative, artistic, and financial contributions are roughly equal and each participating 
country or government recognizes the finished product as its national product (Toby Miller et al., 
2005; Barbara Selznick, 2008). Were Harusi ya Mariamu and Mama Tumaini a national product 
of the countries involved in the production? 
There are two types of international co-production: treaty co-production and non-treaty or 
co-venture co-production, and each has distinct features. Hoskins et al., Miller et al., and 
Selznick define co-production treaties as those for which countries have signed a bilateral 
international co-production agreement and therefore are eligible for investment and tax breaks 
from government funding agencies. Miller notes that co-production treaties create rules for 
collaborative projects to qualify for subsidies and fulfill quota restrictions (2005: 184). In non-
treaty or co-venture co-production, international partners discover economic and cultural benefits 
in sharing resources, despite not meeting the criteria for treaty provisions. In these kinds of 
agreements, each partner usually holds equity and each has a voice in the project, but the level of 
creative input may vary (Hoskins et al., 205; Miller, 2005).  
In Tanzania co-production has been conducted under the non-treaty or co-venture mode 
of production. No treaties have existed that enforced or provided subsidies or tax incentives to 
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filmmakers. For example, in the production of Harusi ya Mariamu as a co-venture, it was agreed 
that Ron Mulvihill, a co-director and an independent filmmaker from the U.S., was to provide 
film stock and finance post-production, while TFC was to provide camera and light equipment, a 
film crew, and actors (Ron Mulvihill, Interview, 2010). Although Ron Mulvihill initially wanted 
to make a documentary on alternative medicine, TFC, headed by Martin Mhando, wanted to 
make a dramatic short feature that explored the conflict between traditional and modern 
medicine. The final product combined Ron’s documentary aesthetics, using a real traditional 
healer (Simba Mbili) as the healer and scripting the story around a true story. As Mulvihill 
elaborates, “Nangayoma [the co-director] interviewed Simba Mbili to find out if there was a true 
story that would fit the elements of conflict between traditional and modern medicine. . . . So 
basically Simba Mbili told us about one of his patients, Mariamu, and in a way we scripted her 
story to become Harusi ya Mariamu and Simba Mbili agreed to play the healer” (Ron Mulvihill, 
Interview, 2010). 
International co-production treaties are usually designed to pool resources so as to 
enhance the domestic film industry and combat Hollywood’s domination of screen culture 
(Miller, 2005: 177). Co-production brings knowledge that would allow for the development of a 
national film industry and thus a national culture. To qualify for subsidies and production 
incentives, co-productions are required to satisfy certain national conditions such as hiring local 
film personnel and setting the film in a national location. The irony of co-production is that 
although they must appeal to the national audience as an authentic national product, they must at 
the same time appeal to transnational audiences. This means that to succeed, as Selznick notes, 
“these productions must limit their national particularities and reflect global issues and 
concerns.” To this, Guback in his 1969 book International Film Industry: Western Europe and 
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America Since 1945 adds “while this [co-production] can yield products which are technically 
slick, the range of differences among them is reduced considerably—as among loaves of 
commercial white bread” (178). In this sense co-production calls into question and destabilizes 
national identity. Toby Miller points out that in co-production “socio-spatial power relations are 
contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated” (209).  
Co-production in Tanzania brought to the fore the question of a national identity or a 
national cinema. In a country that is trading its socialist values and ideology for the untested 
values of open market and capitalism, how is it to reconstruct itself? How is it to merge the past 
and the present? What cultural losses are to take place, and what cultural gains, identities, and 
values must be invented and propagated?  
Although co-production became a mode of production in Mwinyi’s era, it was sporadic 
and generated some controversies that pointed to the complexities of assigning national identities 
or nationality to co-production films. The primary reasons for co-production in most cases are 
the pooling of financial resources, accessing government subsidies and incentives, audience 
expansion, and gaining knowledge. Most importantly, the product is seen by each country as an 
authentic national product; each country gets to call the finished product its own. This was not so 
simple when it came to Harusi ya Mariamu. The nationality of Harusi ya Mariamu became a 
major discussion topic for filmmakers and critics alike. 
The thirty-six-minute Harusi ya Mariamu attracted attention at the Panafrican Film and 
Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO) in Burkina Faso, when it premiered there in 
1985. Harusi ya Mariamu, co-directed by Ron Mulvihill and Nangayoma Ng’oge, was the only 
African-language short feature film presented and the first film from an Anglophone country to 
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win an award at FESPACO. But with—or in spite of—all that, its nationality was questioned and 
contested. Was the film a Tanzanian or an American film?  
Harusi ya Mariamu centers on the art and science of healing through traditional 
medicine. Set in contemporary Tanzanian society, the film depicts its heroine Mariamu’s 
(Amandina Lihamba) fear of traditional doctors and their medicine. This fear stems from 
Mariamu’s childhood psychic trauma of finding her father, a famous traditional doctor, dead 
under a tree. She equates her father’s death with the practice of traditional medicine. Seriously 
ill, Mariamu refuses traditional medicine, opting for modern hospital and medicine, but as her 
condition worsens, Mariamu’s husband Senkondo (Godwin Kaduma) takes her to a traditional 
healer, where her cause of sickness is detected and as she recovers, she overcomes her fear. The 
film takes us through Mariamu’s physical, mental, and spiritual transformation and healing. 
Unlike colonial films that depicted traditional doctors and their medicine as ineffective and 
primitive, Harusi ya Mariamu shows the triumph of indigenous medicine over Western 
medicine, and thus tradition over modernity. Mhando notes, “We wanted to tell the conflict 
people go through in choosing between Western and traditional medicine” (Interview, 2009). 
Since its screening, the film has been praised and has won a number of prizes in film 
festivals, including the best short feature film and the Organization of African Union (OAU) 
awards at the 1985 FESPACO. In Black African Cinema Francis Ukadike has praised the film for 
its excellent integration of the ritual scenes into the structure without diminishing the impact of 
the story line; the Marriage of Mariamu, he notes, succeeds where most African films fail, 
“African films are replete with ritual scenes, but one must admit that most of them are poorly 
conceived” (1994: 124). This kind of praise did not, however, prevent questions from being 
raised about the film’s nationality and legitimacy. 
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Although the film was shot on location in Tanzania, with Tanzanian actors, and was a 
Tanzanian/African story, narrated in Kiswahili (Tanzania’s national language), and co-directed 
by Nangayoma Ng’oge, a Tanzanian citizen, the nationality of the film became a topic of 
contention at the 1985 FESPACO. The debate about the film’s nationality and even more its 
eligibility to compete as a Tanzanian film was brought to the fore at the festival by Haile Gerima, 
an Ethiopian-American filmmaker, and Pearl Bowser, an African-American film distributor and 
member of the jury. Haile Gerima and Pearl Bowser objected to the submission of the film as a 
Tanzanian film, arguing that “the film was presented in the United States as only being directed 
by Ron Mulvihill” (Ukadike, 1994: 138; Ron Mulvihill, Interview, 2010). Ron Mulvihill refutes 
this allegation, pointing out that the credits in the film have never been changed; he and 
Nangayoma Ng’oge share equally the co-directing spot in the film. When does a film become or 
cease to be a national film?  
The National Cinema Question 
The above debate triggers the question of a national cinema, and begs the questions what 
is a national cinema, what consists of a national cinema, how is it constructed, and who assigns a 
nationality to a film? Does a director’s nationality determine a film’s nationality? What about co-
production? Femi Shaka’s definition of African cinema gives us a hint of the complexity of 
assigning a nationality to a cinema. According to Shaka, for a film to qualify as African cinema 
and therefore national cinema, its primary audience must be Africans; the text must be inscribed 
in the broad range of African subjects, identities, and social experience; and finally, its director 
must be African by birth or naturalization. A film that explores indigenous language as a medium 
of expression, Shaka states, is beyond doubt African cinema. Therefore, for Shaka, Harusi ya 
Mariamu is African cinema and thus a national/Tanzania cinema. But Harusi ya Mariamu is also 
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a co-production, and this is where the notion of a national cinema becomes more complicated. 
As Andrew Higson notes, “The concept of national cinema is equally fluid, equally subject to 
ceaseless negotiations. It is clear that the concept is mobilized in different ways, by different 
commentators, for different reasons” (2002: 53). The concept of national cinema, Higson 
observes, is used “prescriptively rather than descriptively, citing what ought to be the national 
cinema, rather than describing the actual cinematic experience of the popular audiences.” (2002: 
53). 
The complexities of assigning a nationality to film have been argued by numerous 
scholars (Higson, 1995; Jarvies, 1998; Croft, 1995; Willemen, 1989, 2005). In most cases a 
national cinema has simply been defined as a cinema produced within a particular nation-state. 
The discourse about national cinema has been debated in a variety of ways. National cinema has 
been defined in economic terms, where such questions as who owns and controls the industrial 
infrastructures, the production, the distributors, and the exhibition circuits are articulated. It has 
also been defined in textual terms, with questions such as What is the film about? Does it share a 
common style or theme? How does the film project the national character? Is the film concerned 
with questions of nationhood? and What role does it play in constructing the sense or the image 
of a nation? (Higson 1995). 
Consumption is another way by which the national cinema has been defined. The major 
question here has been which films are audiences watching? What percentage of these films are 
foreign films, how do audiences use these films, and what is their effect? Defining national 
cinema in terms of its consumption is problematic when it comes to African or Tanzanian 
audiences. The majority of the films viewed by Tanzanian audiences are American films and a 
few Indian films. The question then becomes are these films (American and Indian) to be 
 85 
considered Tanzanian national films? This form of analysis, as with other forms, is inadequate 
for defining a national film, especially in this era, where border, technology, and artistic 
crossings are taking place. As Alan Williams warns us, we should be wary of concluding that 
there is such a thing as a “national cinema.” 
Others have defined national cinema in relation to Hollywood. Croft comments that 
national cinema is usually defined against Hollywood. Most national cinema, he asserts, has to 
operate in terms of an agenda set by Hollywood. In Croft’s view, national cinemas compete with, 
imitate, differ from, critique, or simply ignore Hollywood. Cinemas that compete with 
Hollywood are European and Third World commercial cinemas that struggle against Hollywood 
in domestic markets. There is also a cinema that attempts to beat Hollywood at its own game. 
Such aspirations have emerged in Britain, Canada, and Australia. The cinemas that differ from 
Hollywood but do not compete with Hollywood are cinemas that target a distinct, specialist 
market sector art cinema. These cinemas aim to differentiate themselves textually from 
Hollywood, to assert explicitly an indigenous product, and to reach domestic and export markets 
through specialist distribution channels and exhibition venues usually called “art houses.” 
There are those national cinemas that critique Hollywood, such as Third Cinema. Third 
Cinema opposed the United States and Europe with its anti-imperialist insistence on national 
liberation and in its insistence on the development of aesthetic models distinct from those of 
Hollywood and European art cinema. And there is national cinema that ignores Hollywood, such 
as that of India and Hong Kong; these cinemas have large domestic audiences and effective trade 
barriers and typically outsell Hollywood films. Lastly, there are national cinemas that work 
within a wholly state-controlled and often substantially state-subsidized industry.  
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For Paul Willemen the issue of national cinema is primarily a question of address, rather 
than a matter of the filmmaker’s citizenship or even of the production finances’ country of origin 
(2006: 36). Martin Mhando, the director of Mama Tumaini, an employee of the Tanzanian Film 
Company, and a partner in Harusi ya Mariamu, agrees with Willemen; he chooses to look at 
film, especially African film, not as a national product but as a regional product. “Films of 
African can only been seen in its identity factor and the identities we have are not national as to 
call Tanzanian cinema or Kenyan cinema. . . . For me it is more a cultural base, and the base is 
never national” (Interview, 2009). For Mhando it is best to speak of regional cinema, for, as he 
points out, “The culture of Zambia and the culture of Zimbabwe are very similar to the culture of 
Tanzania”; thus, the cultural base from which one expresses oneself is more important than the 
physical one of being in a specific location. For Mhando the space in which one creates is much 
more important than the space in which one lives. Therefore, in this changing social, economic, 
and technological environment where cultures cross borders and global financial exchange takes 
place, the logic of assigning nationality to a cinema becomes difficult, contested, and blurry.  
The space created in Mama Tumaini (Women of Hope) (1986), a co-production film 
between Tanzania Film Company and the Norwegian Ministry for Development Cooperation, is 
a Tanzanian space, occupied by Tanzanians who are struggling to survive and foreign 
development experts whose attitudes are being questioned and evaluated. Directed by Martin 
Mhando and Sigve Endresen, Mama Tumaini is about women and their struggles for survival. 
The film centers on Mama Tumaini (Penina Mlama) and her women friends and their efforts to 
raise their socio-economic standard of living through the establishment of a co-operative union 
of potters.  
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The film starts by showing Mama Tumaini (called that because she has a child by the 
name of Tumaini, which means hope), a village pot maker, who is forced to move to the city and 
tend to her husband, who lives and works there and has fallen ill. While in the city Mama 
Tumaini, together with other women potters, forms a cooperative union and struggles to get it 
registered. Registration of the union is hampered by a corrupt officer who gives them the 
runaround until, with the help of Hawa, a city girl, and the police, the officer is apprehended and 
the union registered. 
A subplot of the film is the friendship between Mama Tumaini and Elizabeth, a 
Norwegian woman who has come to Tanzania with her husband, a development expert at a 
cement factory. The husband, Jan, a drunkard and a racist, does not want Elizabeth to socialize 
with locals such as Mama Tumaini. Jan’s racist attitude offends Elizabeth and is the final factor 
in the breaking up of their marriage. Elizabeth leaves her husband and joins the cooperative of 
women potters. 
The film not only criticizes development aid and its personnel, it also further criticizes 
government bureaucratic structures that hinder participation and development. This is revealed in 
the way the corrupt government registrar officer solicits money from the women before he will 
register their union, something that he is already being paid to do by the government. The film 
challenges how the government runs or conducts its business.  
As a co-production, the film had other objectives. One of these was to bring an 
understanding of development work and aid to expatriates who come to work in Tanzania. In the 
transformative era of the 1980s and early 1990s, where socialism and capitalism crossed paths 
and the political ideology was unclear, the vision and mission of development aid and work also 
became unclear. Prior to the SAPs, the mission of development aid was clear, and most of the 
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expatriates coming to Tanzania knew exactly what was required of them, but recently most of 
them came to “just have fun and for their own benefit” (Mlama, Interview, 2009). The 
Norwegians were feeling that their own expatriates were losing a sense of what the mission of 
development aid was all about. Thus the film was made to be shown to Norwegian expatriates 
who were coming to Tanzania, those who were already in Tanzania, and those who had left. Its 
purpose was to remind them why they were in Tanzania and what was expected of them. Thus 
the film was a challenge to development aid and development aid relationships.  
For the Tanzanian audience the film was designed to promote self-help and community-
based projects and organizations and critically examine the obstacles such programs face 
(Mlama, Interview, 2009). The film was also created to promote and empower grassroots 
development and participation. With the government no longer able to sufficiently provide for its 
people, grassroots organizations emerged to fill the gap. These organizations mobilized resources 
for development independent of the state. Mama Tumaini gave credence to grassroots 
organizations as well as criticizing the government through the portrayal of the corrupt 
government office worker.  
Harusi ya Mariamu and Mama Tumaini are milestones in Tanzanian film production. 
Just as the nation was going through political and economic transformations, so was the film 
industry. Through the advocacy of traditions and civil society, these films turned their backs on 
government agendas and became more people centered. These films empowered individuals to 
question and even challenge the status quo. Co-production films of the Mwinyi era were able to 
criticize and challenge the government. This was made possible by the emergence of alternative 
modes of participation and expression in social, economic, and political life—the emergence of a 
civil society. 
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The Emerging Third Sector: Non-Governmental Organizations 
The civil society, an alternative venue for filmmakers 
The introduction of neo-liberal policies with their social, economic, and political reforms 
in Tanzania promoted another sector where Tanzanian filmmakers were to find refuge: civil 
society organizations. Civil society organizations, also known as the third sector—the others 
being the state sector (power and politics) and the private sector (capital and economics)—
allowed for more participation of people in governance through their collective powers. The 
rapid growth of civil society organization in Tanzania has been attributed by some scholars to the 
widespread and persistent poverty and the failure of the government to provide its citizens with 
basic social services and security (Mukandala, 2006; Ndumbalo, 2006; Mogella, 1996). Other 
scholars (Shivji, 2001; Nyangoro, 2006) have attributed the emergence of civil society to the 
entrenchment of external forces, thus decapitating the government’s capacity to perform its duty 
to the people. Shivji notes that the role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
helping Western “development” agencies to “get around” uncooperative national government 
sheds a good deal of light on the current disdain for the state and celebration of civil society that 
one finds in both theoretical and policy-oriented literature. Shivji concludes that the sudden rise 
of NGOs and their apparently prominent role in Africa is part of the neo-liberal organizational, 
and particularly ideological, offensive. Thus the anti-state stance of the so-called donor 
community was the real push behind the upsurge of NGO activity (Shivji, 2005: 19–22).  
What both views agree upon is how these organizations have stimulated greater citizen 
involvement in socio-economic and political activities of the country. Thus NGOs became an 
alternative venue through which people’s expression and participation was emphasized and 
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valued, and this arena became a place where international financial institutions and other donors 
diverted their aid. Instead of the government, NGOs became the alternative aid recipients.  
In Tanzania, the post-1992 period saw a rapid increase in the number of NGOs. Whereas 
between 1961 and the late 1980s only 18 NGOs were formed, by 1992, 200 NGOs were 
registered, and by 2000, 2,700 (Kiondo and Mogella, 2006; Mkandala, 2006). NGOS such as the 
Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women Association 
(TAMWA) emerged as alternative voices to that of the government and also became a refuge for 
many of the retrenched government filmmakers and newly aspiring filmmakers. The major 
objectives of these organizations were to bring about social justice and people’s participation. 
Ussu Mallya, the managing director of TGNP, states that “the adoption of the structural policies 
which reduced the power of the state to deliver sound economic services was one of the reasons 
TGNP emerged. We needed to organize and engage with different strategies that would enable 
the mobilization of individuals to move forward” (Mallya, Interview, 2009). Filmmaking became 
one of the strategic tools that TGNP and other NGOs used to mobilize and empower people. 
NGOs like TGNP emerged in Tanzania, not as a celebration of the neo-liberal policies or 
against the state as many would assume. Many Tanzanian NGOs challenged the neo-liberal 
policies for reducing government’s role in the society as well as challenging the states to deliver 
services. In Tanzania, Ussu states, “we need a stronger state, but it is not a matter of supporting a 
corrupt state, we are challenging the state to transform” (Interview, 2009). In the process of 
challenging the state and empowering people to participate in their own social, economic, and 
political lives, NGOs used artistic expressions such as film/video to disseminate, produce, and 
articulate social realities. Thus NGOs became a place where filmmakers, either those still 
working for the government or independent filmmakers, found a platform to make films.  
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For example, production houses like DTS teamed up with TGNP to produce several 
video films: Ukatili Wa Kijinsia, Pambazuka La Mashaka, Mapambano, and Lupi Mikokoni. 
These films, which were shown at different events, such as gender festivals, seminars, and 
workshops, were made in the hope of raising people’s awareness of and empowering them to 
question and challenge social injustices. The films also challenged social realities, be they 
patriarchy at the household level, decision making at the district and national level, or corruption 
and lack of accountability at the governmental level. Although films of this nature could be 
placed in the same category as the government educational films made by AVI in the 1970s and 
1980s, a major and important difference exists. NGO films are participatory in nature and aim 
for social empowerment through questioning and challenging, rather than the acceptance of the 
status quo.  
As much as their legitimacy as the third sector may come into question, the role of NGOs 
in the sustenance of a film industry cannot be disputed. Through the NGOs’ use of video and 
film as tools for social participation and questioning of everyday realities, filmmakers found a 
space, a venue where they could navigate and support their economic as well as creative life.  
Were NGOs to continue to be a venue for Tanzanian filmmakers? Was the influx of 
foreign cultural products to continue to dominate programming? What kind of a national identity 
was to emerge out of this? Just as the Nyerere regime before it, the Mwinyi administration in its 
last days struggled with the idea of how to sustain a national culture and how to go about 
defending a culture in the midst of an open-market economy. In describing his era and the 
implementation of neo-liberal policies and the effect of the SAPs, Mwinyi has been quoted as 
saying, “We had to open windows to let in fresh air, but in the process we could not totally keep 
out flies and mosquitoes” (Shivji, 2006). In 1995, before the Mwinyi administration came to an 
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end, it seemed, especially in regard to foreign cultural products, that the administration was 
toying with the idea of creating a mechanism that would keep the flies and mosquitoes out. In 
September 1995 the administration, through the Ministry of Education and Culture, held a 
meeting to brainstorm about the possibilities of establishing a “mosquito net“—a cultural policy 
document that would advocate the promotion and implementation of cultural values and identity 
in Tanzania. 
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Chapter Four 
Uwazi na Ukweli? (Transparency and Truth): Accelerated Neo-liberalism and the 
Emergence of Diasporic and Video Films 
The year 1995 for many Tanzanians was a historic watershed year. It was the year in 
which, for the first time since independence, Tanzanians participated in a multiparty election. 
The whole country was excited; Tanzanians were free to cast their ballots and express their 
views on which party and candidate was to take them out of their “less than a dollar a day” 
existence and toward a better future. I, too, participated in this historic moment. As a student at 
the University of Dar es Salaam I was eager to cast my first political vote. My determination to 
participate in the election was not only because I was excited to become involved in this new 
democratic political system, but because I thought I was going to help transform the country for 
the better. Thirteen political parties participated in the election, their candidates vying for 
parliamentary seats as well as for the presidency. Out of the thirteen political parties, only two 
presidential candidates, William Benjamin Mkapa, from the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(Party of the Revolution) and Augustine Lyatonga Mrema from the opposition party National 
Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi seemed to be true contenders for the 
presidency of Tanzania. In a couple of days, one of them would be announced as the president of 
Tanzania.  
I cast my vote, along with 63 percent of my fellow Tanzanians, for William Benjamin 
Mkapa. Mkapa, a journalist and a seasoned politician, who had held various positions in the 
country—President Nyerere’s press secretary (1974), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1977–1980, 
1984–1990), Minister of Information and Culture (1980–1982), Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting (1990–1992), and Minister of Science, Technology and Higher Education (1992–
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1995) and outside the country as High Commissioner to Canada (1982–1983) and ambassador to 
the United States (1983–1984))—became the third president of the United Republic of Tanzania. 
Dubbed by his critics as Nyerere’s “errand boy” and viewed as a socialist, Mkapa was to prove 
them wrong. 
The newly elected president formed his administration and quickly accelerated the neo-
liberal policies initiated by his predecessor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The administration’s primary 
role, as Mkapa notes, was “to set the economy right, . . . creating the legislative policy 
framework which invites investment, production and trade by a private sector that will be vibrant 
and therefore bring about growth” (2001: 3). Mkapa further observed, “For almost three decades 
of our independence, we looked to the state to do most things. . . . Now when you are 
transitioning into a private sector-driven economy, .it will take a while for us to do for ourselves 
as individuals. That reaching out, that go-getting spirit is what we have to build quickly, because 
the process of globalization is not going to wait for us” (2001: 10). Mkapa informed his people 
that they had no choice but to embrace and follow neo-liberal policies, even if the result seemed 
grim at the time. Juma Mwapachu, a seasoned politician, commented, “Whilst the reform 
programme commenced in June 1986, it is from the financial year 1997/98 that Tanzania 
seriously began to take great leaps forward in pursuing bold and radical economic reforms” 
(2005: 39). 
To initiate the globalization process, Mkapa aggressively pursued economic recovery 
programs, structural reforms, and the privatization of state-run institutions. In addition, in 2002, 
he liquidated the Tanzanian Film Company (TFC) and merged the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
with Television ya Taifa (TVT), the national television station. This acceleration of the economy 
through an embracement of globalization was seen as the only solution to the persistent poverty 
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of Tanzania, but the government also knew that globalization, if left unchecked, tended to benefit 
richer nations. Therefore, to curb the threat of globalization, the Mkapa administration adopted 
measures for safeguarding cultural products. 
To accomplish this, Mkapa designed policies that not only took advantage of the new 
opportunities offered by the global economy but also strategized ways to minimize the risk of 
undesirable exposure to global currents. Although he embraced economic and political 
globalization, he took a more critical stance when it came to cultural globalization. While Mkapa 
understood that globalization was not going to wait for Tanzania, he nevertheless felt compelled 
to find ways to minimize unwanted foreign exposure, especially in the cultural sector—which 
included the film industry. 
The Cultural Globalization Debate and Tanzania’s Position 
The cultural globalization debate in Tanzania, as in other African countries, has been 
characterized by politicians and intellectuals as both an imposition and domination of Western 
cultural products upon local cultures. Some scholars view it as a new form of colonization, an 
exploitation of African social, economic, and cultural life. Severine Rugumamu notes, 
“Globalization is not some process out there, but is a social construct engineered and channeled 
by powerful economic, technological and political processes in the service of an increasingly 
transnational bourgeois class” (2005: 20). 
The debates about cultural globalization are reminiscent of the cultural imperialism 
theory propounded by Schiller, 1976; Hamelink, 1983; Mattelert, 1983; Shivji, 2006; and others, 
who have noted that foreign cultural flows are unidirectional and bring about cultural 
homogenization whereby local cultures are exploited and threatened. For these scholars 
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globalization induces the obliteration of local cultural values. thereby moving the world toward 
cultural homogeneity. The influx of foreign cultural products such as fashion, television 
programs, films, and music have been cited as evidence of the erosion of Tanzanian culture and 
cultural values. According to Mrutu, 80 percent of the programs broadcast on television are 
Western, and mostly American.  
Opponents of the cultural globalization theory (Berker, Tomlinson) foresee problems in 
looking at cultural flows as solely emanating from the West and streaming into other cultures, 
producing a dominating effect. They refute this claim by demonstrating how African music and 
art have influenced Western artists, and how telenovelas from Latin America are exported to the 
United States and Europe. John Tomlison notes, “Global culture as it is now, can no longer be 
said to emanate from the West and imposed upon the non-West.” (1994: 54). What takes place, 
for Tomlison is not cultural imperialism but rather a process of cultural loss, and instead of 
cultural homogenization, a hybrid culture emerges, one that takes foreign cultural flows and 
localizes them The forces of globalization, for these scholars, are unpredictable, disjointed, and 
multidirectional.  
These scholars claim that cultural crossing should not be seen as an imposition or 
domination; Chris Berker asks, “What sense can it be argued that the popularity of rap music in 
South Africa represents coercion?” (2002: 40). They also refute the notion of an authentically 
pure African culture. The notion of a stable culture is unsustainable, especially in this era of 
globalization (Mensah, 2008: 3). All cultures are involved with one another; none are single and 
pure. All are hybrid and heterogeneous, none monolithic (Said, 1991: 34). The notion of a pure 
African/Tanzanian culture disregards the long-standing cultural exchange between societies. 
Appandurai notes that globalization induces the dynamic movement of ethnic groups, 
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technology, media images, and ideological conflicts that are not neatly determined by one 
harmonious “master plan”; rather, the speed, scope, and impact of these cultural flows are 
complex, overlapping, fractured, and disconnected. (1990: 296.) 
What is evident, though, concerning globalization is the inequality of power relations 
between the West and the non-West. As Doreen Massey notes, “Some people are more in charge 
of it than others; some initiate flows and movements, others don’t” (1994: 149). Most Africans 
are unequal participants in contemporary globalization, not only because of present power 
inequalities, but also because of the material and epistemic violence brought by the Western 
imperialism of the past. It is important to recognize these imbalances, especially when discussing 
Africa’s involvement in the global economy. 
The Mkapa administration, while embracing globalization, still viewed it as an unequal 
playing field and established means to prevent an imbalance. In order to curb the infiltration of 
foreign cultural products the government was forced to develop strategies and policies that took 
into consideration this globalized aspect of the economy and culture and attempted to slow down 
the invasion. In its cultural development plan document, the government noted the infiltration of 
foreign products, vehemently denouncing the phenomenon and promising to rid Tanzania of 
such influences. The document stated, “The current situation is a grave confusion. The youth are 
busy copying foreign culture, particularly Western and Arabic   it is not clear what actually 
constitutes a Tanzanian way of life anymore. . . . Television, films, video shows [video films] 
often espouse cultural degeneracy” (Cultural Development Plan Document, 2001: 47). This 
analysis of the infiltration of foreign culture gave the Mkapa government an impetus to formulate 
policies that were designed, supposedly, to safeguard the identity and culture of the nation. But 
in actual fact, it was one of the mechanisms the government employed to make sure it remained 
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in power, especially in an era when a diversity of views and voices flourished, views that 
challenged and thus threatened the interests and stability of the state. As Andrew Filbert reminds 
us, “Nations frequently declare their cultural specificity in order to legitimize and materialize 
unity” (2005: 17). Without unity, the legitimacy of the government is threatened. Thus to reduce 
this risk, the administration established policies and institutions that would advance Tanzania 
toward becoming part of the global market, but would also safeguard Tanzania against the 
influence of unwanted foreign cultural values, thereby promoting and disseminating Tanzanian 
cultural products that would promote Tanzanian cultural values. All this was in an effort to 
counteract the dominance of foreign products and globalization and to give the government more 
leverage to continue to control the content of cultural products. 
In order to accomplish this, the government established several policies and institutions: a 
cultural policy document that outlined the mission and objectives of Tanzanian culture, values, 
and customs; the Copyright Law, to safeguard and protect artistic works; the Cultural Trust 
Fund, a funding organization for individual artists and companies that promoted the 
advancement of Tanzanian cultural activities; and the Zanzibar Film Festival, a platform for 
showcasing Tanzanian cultural film heritage. The government also reviewed the Film and Stage 
Play Act of 1976 so as to give it more power and legitimacy in dealing with technological 
innovations. These policies and institutions were to play a leading role in the kind of films and 
filmmaking practices that were emerging in Tanzania. 
The Cultural Policy: Controlling National Culture? 
A cultural policy, according to Andrew Flibert, consists of the state’s effort to shape 
national identity and articulate a public philosophy embodying its most significant values (103). 
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It is a regulatory guide to action that is adopted by organizations and governments to achieve 
their cultural goals. In short, it is bureaucratic rather than creative (Miller and Yudice, 2005: 2). 
State cultural policy seeks to influence, and sometime to control, the prevailing definition of 
salient social identities. According to Miller, this cultural policy is frequently made “on the run” 
in response to unpredictable pressures (2). National cultural policies are, then, a privileged 
terrain of hegemony. They provide a means of reconciling cultural identities by holding up the 
nation as an essence that transcends particular interests (8). The Mkapa administration, through 
the Ministry of Education and Culture, formulated a cultural policy that presented a notion of 
how people would live, work, and pursue their goals. The cultural policy and the Copyright Law 
proposed ways to manage the people through suggested behavior. The cultural policy document 
became the basis for all cultural development operations in the country.  
Cultural policy as a controlling mechanism 
Although established in 1997, the historical trajectory of the cultural policy document can 
be traced back to the 1974 UNESCO-sponsored cultural policy document compiled by L. A. 
Mbuguni, director of arts and language in the Ministry of Education and Culture. The document, 
entitled “The Cultural Policy of Tanzania,” laid out the strategies and implementation of cultural 
activities by the Nyerere administration. The cultural policy document did not go much further 
than maintain shelf space in both the UNESCO archives and the Department of Arts and 
Language. The second attempt at establishing a cultural policy came in 1986 when Edwin 
Kaduma was the director of arts and language. But as Rashid Masimbi, a former commissioner 
of the Culture and Development Department at the Ministry of Education and Culture stated, 
“The need of a cultural policy was not enthusiastically taken up by some government officials. It 
is within those years that people were starting to say we should privatize culture; therefore, there 
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was no need for it to have or be in a specific ministry. The government should not involve itself 
in cultural affairs” (Interview, 2009). According to Robert Kayombo, the managing director of 
the national museum and the executive secretary of numerous cultural policy conferences held 
by the government, during Nyerere’s administration, the government knew exactly what culture 
was and how to administer it. This was because at that time there was one vision—the socialist 
vision, which had guidelines, and now, there are multiple voices and perspectives and no 
guidelines. This makes it difficult to implement any cultural activities (Kayombo, interview, 
2009).  
In reality, two points of view can be ascertained as to why the government thought it 
necessary and timely to have and put into law a cultural policy that spelled out the cultural 
direction of Tanzania. With the social, economic, and political transformation that swept the 
Third World and Eastern Europe in the mid-1980s and 1990s in the wake of the fall of 
communism, the Tanzanian government, like many other Third-World governments, witnessed 
cracks in the political as well as cultural arena and the emergence and spread of dissidence. 
These emerging voices threatened the stability of the people in power and questioned their 
legitimacy. To prevent the spread of an authorized belief system and images, stern measures had 
to be implemented; thus the cultural policy was seen as a viable solution in controlling the 
cultural behavior of the public. 
The second, which relates to the first, is that most of the government officials debating 
the plight of culture are of the old guard, whose view of culture is stipulated in the notion of a 
“pure” culture and nostalgia for the “lost” culture of a long-forgotten past. These officials, who 
have held government posts ever since Tanzania attained its independence in 1961, are 
accustomed to giving orders, and for them, foreign culture not only disturbs and destroys an 
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authentic Tanzanian culture, but also slows and threatens their power in shaping the opinions and 
minds of the Tanzanian people. 
Therefore, to combat this threat, and to cast out mosquitoes and flies, as the Mwinyi 
administration had intended to do, on February 14, 1995, under the chairmanship of John 
Ndagala, the commissioner for cultural development, a meeting was held in the town of 
Morogoro to establish a cultural policy. Stakeholders involved in the meeting were mostly 
government officials coming from different sectors and institutions. Recommendations from the 
meeting were compiled by Kayombo, and a second meeting was held in 1996 to cement the 
policy and make it ready for official adoption. Finally, in May 1997, the policy was established 
and passed by the parliament. The process of establishing the policy was, as Penina Mlama 
comments, not inclusive. “It was just a government process. . . . The ministry decided we need a 
cultural policy; they brought stakeholders, but they decided which stakeholders to bring in.  . . . 
So I’m not sure if those who drew up the cultural policy were pushed by a particular movement 
or not” (Interview, 2009). As Toby Miller had noted earlier, cultural policies are usually made on 
the run and in response to unpredictable pressures. What pressure was the Tanzanian government 
facing, and what movement propelled the government to establish the policy?  
Looking at the cultural development plan document established by the government, 
provides an idea of what the government was facing. The document states that the “economic 
liberation has brought into Tanzania the inevitable capitalistic spirit, attitude and practices of cut-
throat competitions. [We] seek to address this problem by putting into place regulations and 
mechanisms which will curb and control the proliferations of cultural wayward tendencies and 
practices currently being displayed in the reckless commercial industry in Tanzania” (54). The 
cultural policy was therefore passed and became the basis for all cultural development in the 
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country, including film. The objective of the cultural policy was to lay out ways the government 
could achieve its cultural hold and at the same time become a participant in the global market. 
For the first time in the history of Tanzania, culture was stipulated as an economic activity rather 
than a political and an ideological tool (Cultural Policy Document, 2.1.7). For example, the 
cultural policy defined film as an industry rather than the propaganda instrument for the re-
enforcement of state ideologies it had been in the Nyerere administration. At this juncture, 
culture parted ways with ideology and turned into a business enterprise. But this departure was 
closely monitored by the government.  
Although the cultural policy had stipulated that individuals and various organizations 
were encouraged to invest in the cultural sector and use their talent to earn a living from their 
creative works, this was predicated on the individuals and organizations adhering to the objective 
of the cultural policy, which was predominantly to safeguard and promote Tanzanian customs, 
traditions, aesthetics, and ethics. Organizations and individuals were asked to be cognizant of 
Tanzania’s national values and culture. Radio and television stations were asked to observe 
national customs and traditions and to provide more airtime to Tanzanian arts (4.1.2). As much 
as the government gave freedom to individuals to earn a living from their works, it was clear 
who was to dictate what was appropriate. The policy stipulates, “The government shall continue 
to manage the cultural sector. The cultural sector shall continue to be part of the government 
structure” (Cultural Policy Document, 7.1.1). The government was the overseer, the gatekeeper, 
and the judge and jury of what was allowed to be produced and become part of Tanzanian 
culture. This policy was the same as the unwritten policy of the earlier administrations of 
Nyerere and Mwinyi. The cultural policy, as an instrument of hegemony, aimed to safeguard and 
supervise the kinds of local and foreign cultural product that were made and offered in Tanzania. 
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This hold became complex as technological innovations and economic obstacles and 
opportunities brought unforeseen shifts in the film industry.  
Although the cultural policy laid out parameters for cultural production and expression, it 
still called for private investors to invest in the cultural sector. To attract these private investors, 
the government created an attractive “package” environment for them. To accomplish this, the 
Mkapa administration rectified and amended the Copyright Law of 1966, established an 
institution to oversee copyright matters, and established the East-African Community Act of 
2001. 
The Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999: An Infringement on Creativity? 
The establishment of the Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 and the 
establishment of the East-African Community Act of 2001 were predicated on the cultural 
policy’s call for more integration and exchange with outside countries and for the recognition of 
an individual’s right to earn a living from his or her creative works. But as Laikwan Pang and 
Lawrence Lessig have noted in their studies on copyright laws in China and the U.S., instead of 
promoting and protecting creativity, the copyright law actually suppresses and controls culture. 
The first copyright law in Tanzania was established in 1924 by the British colonial 
authority, and in 1966 was amended by the Nyerere administration. The Copyright Law of 1966, 
which gave some rights to artists but did not have an organization to oversee the implementation 
of the law, was more or less identical to the colonial law. In 1967, when the government became 
a socialist state, the law became inefficient. Under socialism the government controlled all 
means of production; thus everything produced became the property of the government. 
Individual ownership was marginalized and criminalized at the expense of the collective, in this 
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case the collective being represented by the government. For example, since the government 
owned and controlled the film industry, films produced by filmmakers became the property of 
the government. But as the shift from socialism to an open-market capitalist economy took hold, 
so did the need to rectify and review the copyright law.  
Rectification of the copyright law first began in 1986 when the minister of culture and 
development, Fatma Said Ali, assigned members of the Tanzanian Film Company, Radio 
Tanzania, and the National Arts Council to evaluate the Copyright Law of 1966 and provide 
suggestions and recommendations regarding the best way to change it. The selected committee 
members came up with a report that provided a draft of the new copyright law. In 1992, 
representatives of the World Intellectual Property Organization came to Tanzania and held a 
national workshop on copyright law. The government was able to move forward with the 
amendment, and in 1994 Dr. Philomon Sarungi, the minister of education and culture, informed 
the parliament in his budget speech that the formulation of the copyright law was completed and 
being prepared for endorsement. In 1995 the copyright law was still being finalized, and it was 
not until April 1999 that the new copyright law was introduced to the parliament. In June, 
President Mkapa signed it into law. But what must be kept in mind is that the copyright law is 
designed to regulate culture under the disguise of protecting individuals and cultural heritage 
(Laikwan Pang, 2005: 10).  
It is conventionally believed that copyright exists to reward makers of creative materials 
and to encourage further creative material to be made for the benefit of the society. But rarely is 
copyright seen as a controlling agent of culture used by corporations and governments primarily 
to ensure their protection and stability. This is no more evident than in Tanzania, where the 
Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 is regulated by the government through the 
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Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing and administered by the Copyright Society of 
Tanzania (COSOTA) a government institution within the ministry. 
Under the copyright law, COSOTA’s main functions are to protect the interests of artists, 
collect and distribute royalties, maintain registers of works and artists, fight piracy, print and 
distribute materials relating to copyrights, and finally advise the minister on all matters under the 
act. (Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999: 737). As an organization under the 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, it is fully controlled by the minister. The minister has 
the constitutional right to appoint board members to the society as well as to remove them. The 
minister also chooses the board’s chairperson. This form of control, which is purportedly 
designed to promote and protect creativity among artists, clearly reveals the government as the 
watchdog of culture. 
The copyright law, among other things, is designed to protect the moral and economic 
interests of filmmakers by granting them relevant rights. The economic and moral rights of 
filmmakers, as stipulated in the law, shall be protected for fifty years from the date on which the 
work was first made available to the public. But in order for the work to be protected, 
filmmakers must register their work through the government agency, COSOTA. As the law 
stipulates, “A person shall not produce, distribute or import for distribution audio-visual 
recordings in Tanzania except under a license issued by the copyright society of Tanzania” 
(1999: 745). To make sure that all audio-visual materials have had a government approval, a 
label called HAKIgram shall be fixed to each audio-visual recording. Without the seal, a 
filmmaker’s work is considered a copyright infringement and can be seized. Mkinga, the 
executive secretary of COSOTA notes that “all production companies have to register, especially 
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now when we want to use stickers because we want to know how many companies there are” 
(Interview, 2009). 
Once filmmakers register their work with COSOTA, the society carries out a review of 
the work and may accept or refuse the application. Filmmakers are forced to register with the 
society and fear that not registering with the society will have more negative consequences than 
they can handle. According to William Mtitu, a filmmaker, “To register with COSOTA is a must 
because that is a government organization. If you register with COSOTA, you put yourself closer 
to the government; without their approval you can never know what will happen to you” 
(Interview, 2009). Filmmakers fear that any contention with the government will result in their 
films being banned, and thus in producing their films, filmmakers must be aware of and in line 
with the government. Filmmakers, although they don’t trust COSOTA since it is an institution of 
the government, nevertheless have no choice but to comply; as filmmakers William Mtitu and 
George Otieno state, “Without a permit from COSOTA, we cannot enter into agreement or 
contract with international television channels such as African Magic Plus” (Interview, 2009).  
There has never been a time in our history when more of our “culture” was as owned as it 
is now. And yet there has never been a time when the concentration of power to control the use 
of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now (Lessig, 2004: 12). Although Lessig 
frames this in terms of how corporations collude with the government to control culture in the 
United States, especially the Internet, this can be similarly applied to the Tanzanian 
government’s effort to control culture through the Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 
1999. Lessig notes the irony here: to critique the culture around us one must first ask for 
permission. Permission is, of course, often granted, but rarely to properties expressing critical or 
independent views (2004: 10). Therefore, the government through policies and laws such as the 
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copyright law has the power to discourage critical thoughts, especially when those critical 
thoughts are leveled against the government. The law functions less and less to support creativity 
and more and more to protect the government against divergent views that may threaten its 
interests and legitimacy. 
The cultural policy together with the copyright law were not sufficient to curb the spread 
of undesirable foreign and local cultural products through private media; the government in their 
cultural development plan stated, “The private sector [which the government had invited and 
enticed into the cultural sector] has brought some problems such as deterioration of ethical, 
aesthetical, and moral standards. If left uncontrolled, the private sector, profit-driven as it is, can 
destroy our culture” (2001:47) To curb this deficiency, the Mkapa administration established the 
Cultural Trust Fund and the Zanzibar Film Festival as ways to implement some aspects of the 
policy and its power.  
The Cultural Trust Fund and the Zanzibar International Film Festival  
The Tanzania Cultural Trust Fund, otherwise known as Mfuko (Basket) and the Zanzibar 
International Film Festival (ZIFF) were established to protect and promote the cultural heritage 
of Tanzania. Whereas the Cultural Trust Fund is a government arts funding organization 
established in 1998 by the Tanzania and Swedish governments, the ZIFF is a film festival that 
showcases the rich cultural heritage of Tanzania as well as encouraging tourism, and was 
established in 1998 by the Zanzibar and Tanzanian government and Emerson Skeens, an 
American hotelier. 
The Cultural Trust Fund was established solely to grant financial assistance to individual 
artists and to organizations that propose to advance and promote Tanzanian culture. Through 
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selective allocation of funds, the trust fund supports activities that strengthen the capabilities and 
competitiveness of Tanzanian artists and promotes and rewards merit and excellence with the 
purpose of enhancing the quality of cultural activities in Tanzania. The activities that the trust 
supports must be within the framework of the cultural policy. To deliver its service efficiently, 
the trust has six areas of constituency: (1) cultural heritage; (2) performing arts; (3) fine arts and 
crafts; (4) cultural industry; (5) language and literature; and (6) film, audiovisual, and 
multimedia production. Each constituency is headed by a committee or a focal point that 
oversees and reviews the applications and recommends those it finds suitable for funding. The 
Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC1), a government-run television station, oversees the 
film and audio-visual constituency. Fine arts and crafts is headed by the National Arts Council, 
cultural heritage by the Dar-es Salaam Museum, language and literature by the Tanzanian 
Writers Association, performing arts by the Bagamoyo College of Arts, and the cultural industry 
constituency is headed by Afrika Sana, a cloth-manufacturing company owned by Ndesumbuka 
Merinyo. All of the constituencies, with the exception of cultural industry, are headed by 
government-controlled institutions. 
The recommendations for these constituencies are then “brought to the board, the board 
screens them and eventually the decision on who should be funded is communicated to the 
secretariat who provides the amount of funds that are available for that particular year” (Rose 
Sayore, executive secretary of the Cultural Trust Fund and chairperson of the National Film 
Censorship Board, 2009). These committees are supposed to represent the cultural stakeholders, 
who according to the Cultural Trust Fund are the federal government and all its cultural agencies 
and departments, the local government, non-governmental organizations, cultural training 
institutions, and private organizations that deal with the cultural sector.  
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Throughout its existence the trust has provided funding for individuals and organizations 
that have adhered to the government’s vision of Tanzanian culture. For example, one of the 
institutions that has received funding from the trust is the National Film Censorship Board. 
Funding was provided in 2004 to conduct a workshop entitled “Control of Cultural/Ethic 
Disintegration in Films and Stage Plays.” The workshop’s goal was to establish mechanisms and 
strategies to strengthen both the Film Act and the National Film Censorship Board. This is a 
clear example of efforts made to maintain the status quo and avoid seeking any new types of 
cultural production. The trust also funds documentary and archival filmmakers. Not a single 
filmmaker from the commercial video film industry has received funding from the trust.  
The Zanzibar International Film Festival, founded by the Tanzanian government and 
spearheaded by Mark Leveri, the managing director of the Tanzanian Film Company; Hassan 
Mitawi, the director of Television Zanzibar; Emerson Skeens, an American businessman; and 
many others, was established to celebrate the rich cultural heritage of Tanzania, Africa, the 
Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean islands. The festival is known as the 
festival of the Dhow countries, because of the historic significance of the Dhow in linking the 
countries for trade. According to Martin Mhando, the current artistic director of the festival, the 
festival’s ultimate aim is “to promote culture as an asset, and use the festival of the Dhow 
countries as a vehicle to create a flourishing cultural industry in East-Africa” (2007: 45). Run by 
nine board members, most of them affiliated with the government, and supported by a staff 
headed by a chief executive director, the annual festival brings together a diverse range of films 
from Africa, the Middle East, and the rest of the world. Hassan Mitawi, a board member of ZIFF 
and a former director of Television Zanzibar, notes that ZIFF was a response to the decline of the 
film industry in the region and a mechanism to fight foreign cultural influx. According to 
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Mitawi, “In order for the Dhow countries to compete in the global economy, there was a need for 
countries to consider and give priority to the dynamic growth of their cultures vis-à-vis the 
Western culture” (2007: 43). ZIFF was in this way a form of resistance as well as, it was hoped, 
a promoter of the local film industry. But unfortunately, throughout the years, most of the films 
showcased at the festival have been art cinema and thus are privileged over the commercial films 
that comprise the majority of the domestically produced films. 
Since the festival’s inception, only one Tanzanian film has won an award (Maangamizi: 
The Ancient One, 2001) and thus the festival has yet to contribute to the development of a local 
film industry. No single Tanzanian video filmmaker can boast of being trained or inspired by the 
film festival. Although the festival has conducted some film training workshops, they have not 
managed to boost the local film industry. According to Imru Barak, a former director of ZIFF, 
these short courses are “a disaster, and they only give people false hope about what they can do” 
(Interview, 2009). The duration of these short courses usually ranges from two to ten days. It is 
not clear if someone can actually acquire proper and sufficient knowledge of the film business in 
such a short period. When it comes to the exhibition of Tanzanian commercial video films, ZIFF 
has yet to play a distinct role. According to Mtitu, “ZIFF does not see the value of local 
commercial films, and if any Tanzanian films are shown at the festival those films are usually 
made by university people”(Interview, 2009). And these university films are usually message 
films that have been funded by an NGO or an international organization. Thus ZIFF has 
alienated Tanzanian video filmmakers and failed to promote the development of a domestic film 
industry. What ZIFF has managed to do to some extent is to bring an awareness of film to the 
Zanzibar audience, but these are not the Tanzanian or East African films Mhando had stipulated 
as the aim of the festival. 
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The big question, though, is what is the value of creating an audience if the local film 
industry is not nourished and all the cinema halls are being demolished? At one time Zanzibar 
had five cinema halls and Tanzania mainland had thirty-six, but currently all the cinema halls 
have been converted into malls, business offices, and fast-food restaurants. In mainland 
Tanzania, two cinema multiplexes have opened that show Hollywood blockbuster films and 
Indian melodramas but have no space for local films. ZIFF, like other government film agencies, 
has done little to inspire local filmmakers and nothing to promote a local film industry.  
What ZIFF has managed to do is to promote Zanzibar as a tourist destination spot, 
thereby increasing government tourist revenue, and thus the main beneficiary of the festival is 
the government. Situated just a fifteen-minute flight from the city of Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, 
historically known as the spice island because of its production and export of cloves, has become 
a major tourist attraction, thus toppling cloves as its major export and turning the island itself 
into its primary export item. With its white sandy beaches, historical buildings and sites, and the 
Zanzibar International Film Festival, Zanzibar attracts millions of visitors to the island. The 
festival through its more than ten years of existence has grown into an international festival that 
attracts and caters to foreign visitors, paying little attention to the needs of local filmmakers  
By establishing the Cultural Trust Fund, which gives prominence to individuals who 
promote Tanzanian culture, and ZIFF, which proposes to combat foreign influences and culture, 
the government continues to give itself the prominent role of safeguarding Tanzanian national 
culture. But to assume that the government will continue to effectively and efficiently control 
cultural products is to underestimate the role, strategies, and struggles that filmmakers and other 
artists undertake in their effort to challenge and question the status quo, especially in this 
globalized, technologically advanced and border-erasing world view. 
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The conflicting relationship between the Mkapa government and filmmakers has 
impacted the kind and types of films produced in Tanzania. This relationship has ushered in 
alternative filmmaking practices that take into consideration national, regional, and transnational 
cultures. Two modes of filmic production emerged out of this juncture: a diasporic transnational 
filmmaking practice and a national video film practice.  
Emergence of a Diasporic and Transnational Cinema in Tanzania  
In this era of global capital and cultural flow, circulation of people and images, and 
advancement of telecommunication technology, Tanzania has witnessed an intensification, 
acceleration, and interconnectivity of events that has brought about fundamental changes in the 
way Tanzania is defined and represented in film. Permeability of national borders, acceleration 
of global flow of capital, shifting geopolitical climate, and accessibility of technologies have 
called for a re-imagining of Tanzania and called into question old models that took the nation 
and national identities as something fixed and homogenous, and reevaluated them as concepts 
that must be questioned and contested.  
The global linkage of people and institutions across nation-states has been loosely 
defined as transnationalism. Transnationalism as a conceptual framework has been advanced in 
coming to terms with the complexity of the global cinematic landscape. Transnational cinema 
has been made possible by the decline of national sovereignty as a regulatory force in cinema 
and the impossibility of assigning a fixed identity to much of today’s cinema (Ezra and Rowden, 
2006). Transnational cinema has also been defined as a result of the globalization of the 
mechanism of film production, distribution, and consumption (Sheldon Lu, 1997). The increase 
in transnational migration and circulation of cultural commodities has propelled the development 
of transnational and diasporic film and filmmaking practices. 
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Film scholars define diasporic transnational cinema as a “cinema created by migrant 
filmmakers living in a transnational situation and profiting from the infrastructure of at least two 
nation states” (Desai 2004). It is a cinema that blurs boundaries and thus is not confined to the 
form of territorial nation-state and that which is interstitial, not only looking on the margins of 
society and media institutions but also inside them. The filmmakers “operate both within and 
astride the cracks of the system, benefiting from its contradictions, anomalies and heterogeneity” 
(Naficy, 2001: 47), making them simultaneously global and local. Its mode of production is 
considered by transnational film scholars as artisanal, performing multiple roles, and its mode of 
distribution and exhibition marginal and confined to alternative modes such as film festivals, 
university libraries, museums, and art cinema houses; digital technology and television have 
become new markets (Desai;2004). Thus the emergence of a diasporic filmmaking practice is 
attributed to the permeability of the nation-state and the increase of migration to the metropolis. 
At the height of the political and economic shift of the late 1980s and 1990s, Martin 
Mhando, once an employee of the Tanzania Film Company, was among the few filmmakers who 
left the country and migrated to Australia. He left Tanzania during the period of the failure of 
nationalism and socialism. He, like many diasporic filmmakers, occupies a hybrid position, 
multiple identities generated by geographical displacements, which is reflected and elaborated in 
his 2001 film Maangamizi: The Ancient One. To paraphrase Mhando, “I’m a filmmaker, an 
African filmmaker, a diasporic speaker, and an academician.” Through these hybrid positions, 
diasporic transnational films depict a world of multiplicity, plurality, and multilingualism. More 
often than not the hybridization of these films is a process in which local cultural features are 
fused with foreign influences in order to appeal to a global market. Naficy notes that “accented 
(transnational) films in general derive their power not from purity and refusal but from impurity 
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and refusion” (6). This impurity and “refusion” stems from the filmmakers’ “in between” 
position, their identity in their homeland before their departure, versus their diasporic identity. 
While working for the Tanzania Film Company prior to leaving Tanzania, Mhando was 
relegated to directing numerous documentaries and feature films that were confined to 
propagating the state ideology of socialism and self-reliance; with the emergence and adoption of 
the global capitalist economy and multiparty democracy in 1992, this view was no longer 
possible. Since the TFC was not longer needed to promote socialist ideals and lacked resources 
to remain operational, the Mkapa government prepared the company for liquidation. The making 
of Maangamizi was the last resort in trying to save the company, as co-director Ron Mulvihill 
remembers: “TFC was sort of in its last days—it needed something big or a feature film that 
could be used to prove that it was worth keeping it open” (Interview, 2010). Maangamizi: The 
Ancient One was not able to save TFC from liquidation, and the company was terminated in 
2002.  
Maangamizi: The Ancient One and Transnationality 
This film, a co-production of Ron Mulvihill, Martin Mhando, and the Tanzanian Film 
Company, centers on three women: an African-American doctor, her Tanzanian patient, and the 
ancient and mysterious ancestor who brings them together. Realizing a longtime dream, Dr. 
Asira (Barbara O) journeys to Africa after securing an appointment with a national institute of 
psychiatric medicine in Tanzania. While at the psychiatric hospital she meets Samehe 
(Amandina Lihamba), a patient who has not spoken in more than twenty years. As Asira delves 
into Samehe’s past, images from her own past surface. The ensuing relationship, Mhando notes, 
“leads Asira to delve into her haunting Mississippi past and, furthermore, elevates both of them 
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to a higher understanding of themselves and the world” (2003: 11). It is a story of healing 
through love, compassion, and forgiveness. This film is described as one “that steps out to 
reclaim the spiritual connection that threads us together as a global community” (Maangamizi 
website). 
The screenplay was written by an African–Native American woman, Queenae Taylor 
Mulvihill, the wife of Ron Mulvihill, and is based on the story of Hecate, the Greek goddess of 
magic, witchcraft, the night, moon, and ghosts. The story’s journey from Greek mythology to an 
African-American and African story captures diasporic/transnational cinema’s plurality, fluidity, 
and permeability. The transnationality of Maangamizi lies not only in the thematic origins of the 
story and its filmmaker, but also its international crew and ensemble cast, multilingualism, 
finance, and mode of exhibition. The crew included Australian makeup and costume designers, 
an African-American cinematographer; Amandina Lihamba (Tanzania), BarbaraO (U.S.) and 
Waigwa Wachira (Kenya) starred, with a supporting cast from Tanzania; and the film was shot 
on location in Tanzania. The international cast and crew “enabled the cross cultural experience to 
come through” (Mhando, 2003: 11), which reflected the cultural diplomacy policy that Tanzania 
embarked on following the end of socialism.  
This policy promoted cultural exchange and understanding. One manifestation of cultural 
exchange in the film is its use of Kiswahili, Tanzania’s national language, and English. 
Transnational cinemas are often multilingual, both the films themselves and their production 
crews. Because of their bilingualism, transnational cinema more often requires dubbing or 
subtitling. Maangamizi has been subtitled in English and French. The international crew, the 
origins of the story, the multilingual aspect, and the multicultural nature of the film reflect an 
increasingly globalized world.  
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Although transnational cinema fights to reach a global audience, its distribution and 
exhibition is marginal. It typically finds an audience in ethnically noted film festivals, art houses, 
and university and colleges. The spectators for these films are not automatically there; they must 
be cultivated and nurtured. In nurturing its audience Maangamizi first premiered in Tanzania at 
the 1998 Zanzibar International Film Festival. At the time of the premiere, the film was still in 
post production in the U.S. To meet the submission deadline, co-director Ron Mulvihill says, 
“We felt that Maangamizi would not be able to compete at the festival, however since the 
festival was viewing both films and video on video format, we were encouraged to complete the 
film on video and submit it as a video entry” (Maangamizi website). At the festival the film won 
best feature, and Amandina Lihamba was awarded best actress. But as is noted by Maalista, with 
transnational cinema, “It is more likely that they will be screened only in film festivals 
specialized in certain geographical areas, such as Milan African Film Festival, Los Angeles Pan 
African Film Festival and New York African Film Festival” (2007: 83). This is precisely the case 
for Maangamizi; it was exhibited and won awards or official mentions at the Newark Black Film 
Festival, the San Francisco Black Film Festival, the Tokyo African Film Festival, the Pan 
African Film & Arts Festival in Los Angeles, and the African Diaspora International Film 
Festival in New York. Transnational films are more often than not “classified within either the 
national cinemas of their host countries or the established genres and styles” (Naficy, 2001: 19) 
and remain marginal in the new host country.  
Another characteristic of transnational cinema that Maangamizi displays is its production 
time lag. It took six years to complete the film. Principal cinematography was shot in 1995, but 
the film was completed until 2001. The artisanal mode of production of transnational cinema 
contributes greatly to this time lag. In these types of films the director is often the director-
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producer. Naficy states that “this independent and alternative mode of production is a 
characteristic of the accented (transnational) film practice and constitutes its accented 
(transnational) style” (2001: 37). This style or mode of production reflects the meager output of 
many transnational filmmakers. Since the completion of Maangamizi, Mhando has produced 
only one more film, Liyarn Ngarn (2007), a documentary on the history of Australian Aboriginal 
politicians. He continues to lecture on film and television at Murdoch University in Australia and 
works (2006–present) as the director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival in Tanzania. 
The socio-economic and political conditions that fostered the migration of people and 
crossing of cultures has witnessed the transformation of an insular, introspective cinema into a 
hybrid, transnational cinema that looks to capture a transnational, global audience. Maangamizi, 
through its transnational status, has permeated and transcended boundaries, forming a diasporic 
filmmaking experience that never existed before in Tanzania, opening doors to filmmakers such 
as Josiah Kibira, who lives and makes films in the United States, to make diasporic/transnational 
films such as Bongoland I (2003), Tusamehe (Forgive Us, 2006), and Bongoland II (2008). 
The Emergence of Video Films in Tanzania 
The emergence of video films in Tanzania and in Africa as a whole can not be adequately 
examined without an overview of the historical and theoretical discourse that it garners from 
politicians, intellectuals, and filmmakers. Video films, or films produced through the use of 
video or digital cameras as opposed to celluloid film, has an “entirely different social, political 
and historical character from that of African cinema” (Haynes, 2000: 4). It has received either 
negative or little recognition from political leaders, intellectuals, film critics, and some African 
filmmakers from the Pan-African movement era. Video film is a local, popular, privately funded, 
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and commercially based industry that has been criticized for its orientation toward 
commercialization and its apolitical stance compared to African cinema. This ideological 
difference between video films and African cinema has brought about conflicting views of what 
should constitute or represent a national cinema identity.  
Video films have no manifestos like their African cinema counterparts, no masterpieces 
or renowned directors; they are commercially motivated and exist almost “entirely outside the 
pan African institutions and international circuits that have shaped most of African Cinema” 
(Haynes, 2000: 7). The apolitical and commercial stance of video films is in opposition to the 
Pan-African film movement and filmmakers of the 1960s and 1970s. African cinema was 
“shaped by the historical moment of decolonization and its twin ideologies of cultural 
nationalism and a more or less left-wing social revolution” (8). Therefore, African cinema was a 
militant and political cinema that intended to decolonize the African mind and propagate an 
African identity and national and cultural unity. It was a cinema that stood as an alternative to 
Hollywood. Taher Cheriaa spoke to African filmmakers during a Pan-African Federation of Film 
Makers (FEPACI) meeting: “Your cinema shall be a militant cinema, it shall be first and 
foremost a cultural action with social and political values, or it will be nothing. If it eventually 
can also become an economic action that will only be a by-product” (Haynes, 2000: 6). 
This view of African cinema has been held by many African filmmakers, politicians, 
intellectuals, and critics. In a conference titled Nollywood Rising (“Nollywood” being a term 
given to Nigerian video films), held in Los Angeles in June 2005 , a heated debate erupted 
between video filmmakers and intellectuals. Intellectuals criticized the videos for fetishizing 
wealth and violence, emphasizing glamour over substance, and using themes of witchcraft and 
ritual abuse, while the video filmmakers unapologetically proclaimed, “We give the people what 
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they care about” (Orji, 2007: 110).  In general, critics argue that video films lack the ideological 
mission that could make them relevant to political and social transformation in Africa. 
What is clear from the ongoing debate is that video films in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Africa 
as a whole have become the driving media, a popular art form that is both loved and accessible to 
its African viewers, unlike African cinema. “It has always been difficult for African cinema to 
address an African audience at all” (Larkin, 2007: 109) because of the monopolization of 
distribution and exhibition circuits by foreign investors. As Diawara observes when examining 
the development of video films in Africa, “the movement toward popular culture constitutes a 
step toward giving African cinema its own identity” (1993: 125). Paradoxically, African cinema 
has not managed to garner an audience in its own continent; it is a product for Western film-
festival goers and Western television stations. The Tanzanian video film industry, like its 
Nigerian counterparts, is an industry that has no affiliation with any government enterprises or 
institutions and whose objective is to “give what the people care about” and make a profit.  
The video film industry in Tanzania  
The video film industry in Tanzania was born out of the intersection and convergence of 
the global and the local. Foreign film, especially American films, Indian films, and later Nigerian 
video films, dominated television scheduling in the mid-1990s and became the staple diet for 
most Tanzanian viewers. Nigerian video films took the lead in scheduling and popularity because 
of their cultural proximity to Tanzanian culture. Most viewers expressed identification with the 
environment, issues, traditions, and appearances of the characters. American and Indian films 
suffered from cultural discount, which “arises because viewers in importing markets generally 
find it difficult to identify with the ways of life, values, history, institution, myths and physical 
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environment depicted” (Colin, Hoskins, et al., 1997: 3). Tanzanian viewers saw in Nigerian 
video films similarities to their own ways of life and as a result these films became extremely 
popular on television. Nigerian video films offered the strongest and most accessible expression 
of contemporary Tanzania popular culture. They projected a contemporary worldview that 
Tanzanians could understand and connect with. Even though they were foreign, they were still 
viewed as “like us.” These films/videos utilize indigenous folklore, themes, and settings to 
explore socio-economic experiences such as polygamy, class, corruption, deception, wealth, 
power, and love. Tanzanian video film was born out of this global interconnectivity. 
Tanzanian filmmakers, business individuals, and media production owners were not blind 
to the Nigerian film phenomenon that swept Tanzania, and quickly got on board by acquiring 
Nigerian VCDs and DVDs and retailing them for home consumption. Now viewers could not 
only watch Nigerian videos on television, but they could also purchase and play them at their 
own convenience. As the demand for Nigerian films increased, shrewd entrepreneurs and 
filmmakers—and just about anyone with a digital camera—jumped on the opportunity to 
produce videos to meet the demand. They made video films for television stations and then sold 
them to the public. Mwangaza notes that filmmakers “started by compiling popular soaps 
programmes that had been shown on local TV stations in VHS format for sale to the public . . . 
[and] later graduated into making commercial video films” (2006: 36). The liberalization of the 
economy that brought an influx of foreign cultural products and inexpensive digital technology, 
and the introduction of a cultural policy that encouraged individuals to invest in the cultural 
sector, became a landscape from which the video film industry emerged.  
The first video film that popularized the industry and proved profitable was Girlfriend 
(2002), directed by George Otieno and produced by Eric Shogongo and Sultan Temba. The video 
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film was made for 3 million Tanzanian shillings (US$3,000), and at its premiere it grossed more 
than 50 million Tanzanian shillings (US$50,000) (Otieno, Interview, 2009). I was fortunate 
enough to be at the premiere held at a four-star hotel, the Tulip in Dar es Salaam. The film was 
well publicized and the turnout was massive. The price of a ticket ranged from 20,000s (US$20) 
for front row seats to 3,000s for standing room only. The film, about the struggles and rise to 
fame of a young musician, received accolades for opening a new chapter in the Tanzanian film 
industry. Though it also received some negative reviews because of its nontraditional views of a 
mother-daughter relationship, where a girl yells back at her mother, Girlfriend’s reception 
proved that the Tanzanian film industry was no longer under the purview of the government and, 
with the influx of inexpensive cameras and film equipment, no longer reserved for professional 
filmmakers. 
George Otieno, Eric Shigongo, and Sultan Temba had very little prior experience with 
filmmaking. Otieno had some experience with photography while attending high school, while 
Shigongo and Temba both wrote stories for newspapers. The massive profit generated by 
Girlfriend gave other individuals incentive to join the industry. According to Otieno, “When 
people saw the success of Girlfriend, everybody thought they could do it. And when they did try 
to produce movies, each film was bought by film distributors, and everyone made a profit” 
(Interview, 2009). These films filled a void experienced by local people; they represented local 
environments and experiences while speaking in Kiswahili, the local language. Another video 
filmmaker, William Mtitu, made his first video film Sandra (2003) for 150,000 Tanzanian 
shillings (US$150) and sold it to the distributor for 12 million Tanzanian shillings (US$12,000). 
These kinds of profit margin propelled a wave of young people with little or no training in 
filmmaking to enter the film business, thereby dominating the industry. The film industry 
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became known as the “video film industry,” an amateur or nonprofessional film industry 
associated with poor-quality filmmaking.  
The influx of unskilled labor into the film industry can be said to emanate not only from 
the cultural policy’s call for individuals to use their talent to earn a living, but also from 
President Mkapa’s call for kujiajiri (self-employment). In his acceleration of the neo-liberal 
economy, President Mkapa intensified government service reforms by firing many government 
employees. The Mkapa government from 1995 to 2003 had retrenched 536,478 individuals and 
was not looking to hire anytime soon. Kujiajiri became a slogan that the Mkapa regime used as a 
defense and an answer to the massive unemployment that faced Tanzania. Mkapa preached 
kujiajiri to the point that even criminals, when caught in the act, proclaimed they were merely 
implementing the president’s call for self-employment. The self-employment motif also 
manifested itself in the film industry, where the majority of individuals entering the business had 
no prior training in filmmaking. This phenomenon proved to be a bone of contention and brought 
about contested views of filmmaking between those who called themselves professional 
filmmakers and those who identified themselves as amateur commercial video filmmakers.  
The video film debate 
Whereas Imru Barak, a professional filmmaker and academician, says that “people are 
fooling themselves that we have a film industry, that we have something called Tanzanian 
cinema,” William Mtitu and George Otieno, both commercial video filmmakers, contend that 
“Tanzania is the second highest film producing country in Africa, after Nigeria. It produces 30 
films a week, 100 films a month” (Interview, 2009). These contrasting views represent the 
cornerstone in the debate between professional filmmakers and amateur video filmmakers. What 
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is Tanzanian cinema and who defines it and its characteristics are just a few of the questions 
raised in this debate. 
Professional filmmakers in Tanzanian can be categorized as individuals who have studied 
filmmaking, primarily abroad, and the majority of whom own their own production houses, with 
film projects being funded by NGOs and international organizations. Thus their films tend to be 
donor funded and could be called message films. Some of these filmmakers and their production 
houses are Imru Barak (Savannah Films), Beatrix Mugishagwe (Abantu Vision), Maria Sarungi 
(Compass Communications), and Carrie Matiku (African Image). While these filmmakers, 
according to Carrie Matiku, are busy looking for funding, video filmmakers are rapidly 
producing films. Although she appreciates and admires the energy of these video filmmakers, in 
her view the rapid output of video films marginalizes Tanzanian filmmaking and the quality of 
films. “There is a feeling among the international community that Tanzania is not capable of 
making quality films” (Interview, 2009). This marginalization blankets the few professional film 
production companies that exist in Tanzania who make quality films.  
Not only do professional filmmakers lament their lack of visibility amongst the plethora 
of amateur filmmakers and video films, but they also challenge the themes and quality of these 
films. “These films are doing more damage than Hollywood films because a lot of them are 
culturally backward, reinforcing all the negative values. They may be African, but they are 
negative” (Barak, Interview, 2009). To discredit the video filmmakers, professional filmmakers 
have pointed out the lack of video films and awards in the international film festival circuits. 
“Although Tanzania makes about 100 films a month, this is nothing to boast about since none of 
them can win a prize at any international film festival” (Barak, Interview, 2009). 
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The argument that video films and filmmakers give people what they want or care about 
is refuted by professional filmmakers as nonsense. According to Pius Mota, the production 
manager of Abantu Vision, “The films are garbage. The people don’t have a choice; when you 
watch a Tanzanian video film, you cannot watch it for the second time” (Interview, 2009). But 
Tanzanians do have a choice; they can choose to buy and watch Nigerian films, watch the Latin 
American telenovelas shown on multiple television stations, or watch the multitude of American 
programs aired daily on all the television stations in Tanzania. 
Video filmmakers unapologetically note that they are proud of what they are doing and, 
unlike professional filmmakers who wait for donor funding, are in the field and making films and 
money. Video filmmakers resent the fact that professional filmmakers and intellectuals have 
viciously attacked them for doing something that they themselves have not managed to do: 
satisfy the demand of the local Tanzanian audience. Mtitu states, “Professionals and intellectuals 
have a lot to contribute to our industry; the problem is their method of airing their 
views/perspectives. Professional filmmakers do not appreciate the fact that our films are loved by 
people. We may not have the best training, but we are improving” (Interview, 2009). 
They may not have the best training, but their films have become the staple diet of a 
majority of the Tanzanian audience. This is what the video filmmakers care about most, not 
winning awards at international film festivals. The video film industry may be in the hands of 
amateur filmmakers, but unlike the political economy of professional filmmaking practice, it is 
an economically viable, sustainable, and entertaining medium, as the video film Dilema (2004), 
directed by George Otieno Tyson, illustrates.  
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The production of Dilema 
The production, distribution, and exhibition of Dilema proves that Tanzanian video films 
are both a business and a popular art form that continues to influence the East-African market. 
Since the film’s critical reception, Dilema, George Otieno Tyson’s second film, has 
demonstrated that the video film industry can be profitable and that Tanzanian audiences are 
eager for stories that are closer to their social experiences. 
Dilema was produced in response to the government’s call for cultural cooperation and 
diplomacy within East Africa and because of the director’s eagerness to expand the market for 
video films. The government cultural master plan states, “The East-African community has re-
emerged out of the political goodwill of the leaders, . . . but sustainable cooperation will only be 
achieved if there is the cultural goodwill and cooperation amongst the citizenry” (2001: 86). The 
producers of Dilema heeded this call and, in its production, assembled a regional cast and crew. 
By recruiting a regional cast and crew, the director’s intention was to capture the East-African 
market. Otieno notes, “We were thinking of producing a film that was going to sale in East 
Africa, therefore involving actors from the three countries ensured the sale of the film as a local 
product in each of the perspective countries” (Interview 2009). The cast consisted of Ken 
Ambani, a famous Kenyan television actor; Khalfani Ahmadi, a Ugandan hip-hop musician; and 
Yvonne Otieno, Jenerali Ulimwengu, and Mudhihir Mudhihir, all famous Tanzanian television 
personalities and politicians. This assemblage gained favorable response from East-African 
audiences, thus generating a profit for the filmmaker.  
The story of Dilema centers on Baraza (Ken Ambani) a young Kenyan man who is forced 
to leave his village and find work in Tanzania, in the hope of returning to his home village a rich 
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man. The film starts with an exterior long shot of a eerie village hut and quickly cuts to Baraza 
entering the hut. A pan of the camera shows the body of a woman sleeping on a bed. Baraza 
quietly looks around and slowly approaches the woman. While he is standing beside her, he 
starts to unbutton his pants, but before he pulls his pants down, a man enters and asks Baraza 
what he is trying to do with his mother. The man, who we subsequently learn is Baraza’s father, 
chases Baraza out of the hut and tells him not to return. The next shot is of Baraza running 
frantically at night and eventually reaching another hut, that of a medicine man or witch doctor. 
He falls onto the floor inside the hut. The medicine man, dressed in all red, tells Baraza that 
because of his attempted deed, he has angered the ancestors and needs to get out of the village. 
Through the use of montage, the film shows Baraza, with a friend, hitching rides and eventually 
reaching Tanzania. While in Tanzania he finds work as a house servant for Mr. Athmani, a 
respected university professor, but is fired as soon as Athmani finds out his teenage daughter has 
been impregnated by Baraza. The story follows Baraza as he navigates his way through different 
jobs and women and descends into drunkenness.  
Kiswahili, which is spoken throughout East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Congo, and parts of Mozambique and Malawi), is the film’s major language. Kiswahili 
thus provides a vehicle for cross-cultural flow, especially in regards to media products such as 
video films.  
Distribution and exhibition of Dilema in Tanzania 
The distribution and exhibition of video films in Tanzania and East Africa is quite 
different from that of feature films. For example, once a video film is complete, a premiere is 
organized at either a cultural center (such as the local Russian or French cultural center), a social 
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hall, a Starlight cinema, a hotel, at the multiplex, or, depending on the budget, even at a bar. This 
is a one-time event. Both during and after the premiere, video/DVD copies are sold and an 
announcement of where the copies are to be sold is made. 
Dilema premiered at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam for an audience of 3,000 
people. The guest of honor was a famous Nigerian video actor who was flown in just for the 
occasion. This collaboration between Tanzanian and Nigerian video filmmakers not only shows 
how influential Nigerian films are in Tanzania but also that a continental cooperation that Pan-
African filmmakers of the 1960s and 1970s hoped to achieve, but could not, was being realized 
by the video filmmakers.  
The distribution of video films in Tanzania is more or less controlled by the “Big Five,” 
five Tanzanian families of Indian descent. Before video films, the primary business of these 
families was selling music cassettes and owning and operating music stores all over Tanzania. 
As the video film industry mushroomed, the Big Five stores became the logical distribution 
channels for video films. The Big Five not only distributed video films, but also later financed 
them.  
The financial logistics for distributing video films to a large extent benefited the 
distributor. There are three different contractual categories. In the first, the filmmaker completes 
a film independently and enters into contract for distribution only. The contract for this category 
gives 20 percent of the profit to the filmmaker and 80 percent to the distributor. In the second 
category, the filmmaker produces the film and sells it wholesale to the distributor. Here the 
filmmaker receives a lump sum of money and is not concerned whether the film makes a profit 
or not. Similarly, in the last category the distributor commissions a filmmaker. The filmmaker 
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takes money from the distributor and in return hands in a complete film. Because the video film 
industry is such a profitable business, distributors and financiers rarely interfere with film 
production.  
Dilema was not financed by the Big Five, but it was distributed by one of them, GMC Wasanni 
Promoters. Dilema was privately financed by the director himself; business investors such as 
hotels, bus companies, Coca-Cola, and a local boutique and hair salon; and private individuals. 
The film made its return and a profit during its premiere. It was produced for 75 million shillings 
(US$75,000) and grossed at the premiere 150 million shillings (US$150,000). This proves the 
profitability of the video film industry. The exhibition of a video film occurs basically at a single 
premiere in a public space and then goes straight to video stores for home consumption.   
With the liquidation of the Tanzania Film Company, cinema was no longer only in the 
hands of the government or foreign distributors. Tanzania filmmakers and business individuals 
have taken advantage of the open market economy to create a diasporic cinema and a popular 
video film industry that speaks to audiences at home and abroad, creating a fluid geographical 
and cultural boundary that allows for borrowing, appropriating, and adopting of foreign cultures. 
The shift has not only facilitated regional and global integration but has laid the groundwork for 
the formation of an indigenous popular art form, the video film.  
The drumbeat of Tanzanian cinema since the early 2000s had heralded cinema’s 
economic value. The arrival of video films had since taken Tanzanian cinema to its commercial 
roots, undermining the pedagogical values of cinema promoted by the state. It had transformed 
Tanzanian cinema from a subsidized film industry into a popular, commercial film culture. This 
popular film culture was about to receive a response from the government.  
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The government’s response to the diasporic video film phenomenon: Review of the Film 
Act and the National Film Censorship Board 
Viewing the proliferation and success of the video film movement as a threat to 
Tanzanian mores and culture, the Mkapa administration responded by strengthening control of 
the Film Act and its film censorship board. 
In its cultural development plan document the government recognized the influx of 
foreign films and an increase of local film production following market liberalization and the 
expanding private sector, and thought to restructure the Film Act and the film censorship board 
so that “films presented to the public are in line with national values and aspirations” (2001: 11). 
To redress this situation the government, beginning in 2004, thought to review the structure and 
function of the censor board and the Film Act. This was seen as a potentially successful strategic 
move despite the existence of a market-oriented economy. To accomplish this, the government 
held numerous workshops and conferences. 
In 2004 and 2005, the government held numerous workshops on film during which it 
stressed the necessity of constructing and establishing procedures for how filmmaking should be 
organized and run. As Mwantunu Malale, the executive secretary of the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, states, “No country on the planet does not have policies or legislations that 
administer the production, distribution and exhibition of film. Although film can bring about 
knowledge and entertainment, in Tanzania, it has significantly contributed to the disintegration 
of norms and values to the point that the Tanzanian public has complained to the government to 
take appropriate measures to curb the situation” (2004: 2). Using the public welfare as its shield, 
the government strove to ensure that no films that imitated values or culture alien to its people 
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were allowed for exhibition. As Rose Sayore, the executive of the Cultural Trust Fund and the 
current chair of the National Film Censorship Board claimed in discussing video films, “There is 
much of this other culture that has overtaken our culture. . . . When I look at these films coming 
from Tanzania, there is very little that shows that this is Tanzania” (Interview, 2009). 
The call to ensure that the public is protected from “alien culture” has been to strengthen 
all institutions that deal with the control of film; as Malale states, “Film is an important tool for 
the protection and promotion of national culture, but it is also a weapon of destruction if they are 
not controlled and instructed” (2004: 24). Both workshops conducted by the government called 
for a review of the Film Act and the National Film Censorship Board. In its review of the Film 
Act, the participants recommended the name of the censorship board be changed from the 
National Film Censorship Board to the National Safeguard Board. It was recommended that 
personnel from the board receive training on the importance of cultural control. Recognizing 
social, economic, political, and cultural changes, the participants also recommended that the 
changes to the Film Act and the board should be in accordance with the realities of globalization. 
In both of their conferences, the government nowhere touched upon the issue of promotion, such 
as how to promote the film industry, or how to nourish individual talents. Great effort has been 
spent on controlling the film industry by imposing laws that reduce and control the creativity of 
artists and their productions.  
In this technologically savvy world where production, distribution, and exhibition of 
films are constantly shifting, and border crossing and cultural borrowing are the norm, the 
Mkapa government, like its predecessor, sought to create speed bumps that would slow the 
process and thus keep them in control of cultural affairs and public consumption. This form of 
public control gives the government reassurance as to its existence and legitimacy. The cultural 
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policy, the Copyright Law, the East-African community, the Cultural Trust Fund, the Zanzibar 
International Film Festival, and revision of the Film Act and National Film Censorship Board 
were ways the government sought to curb and control the representations of a national culture. 
But despite all this apparatus, a popular film culture that strayed from government ideological 
agendas emerged. The commercially driven video filmmaking practices conquered the public, 
not only in Tanzania and Africa, but as far away as the United States, London, and Australia. 
The next chapter demonstrates the production, distribution, and circulation practices of the 
Tanzanian video film industry and how it has expanded from a national phenomenon to a 
transnational product, and how the newly elected Kikwete administration has dealt with it. 
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Chapter Five 
Firming Up Neo-liberalism: Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya, and the 
Transregional/Transnational Video Film Industry 
In late 2005 President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete came to power with the slogan Ari Mpya, 
Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya, (With new strength, new velocity, new vigor), a new Tanzania is 
possible.” This motto captured the spirit of young people who, during the Mkapa administration, 
had felt marginalized, and gave unprecedented support to Kikwete, who won the presidency with 
a historic 82.3 percent of the vote. Kikwete promised to create employment opportunities for the 
millions of young people who were either fired or could not find work during Mkapa’s regime. 
The challenge for Kikwete was to translate “new strength, new velocity, new vigor” into a policy 
framework for his regime. 
By the time President Kikwete took office the cultural sector, especially the film industry, 
had already shown signs of becoming a strong economic contender that, if promoted right, had 
the potential of creating revenue for the government. The new administration determined to 
capitalize on culture as an economic activity by reviewing and changing the cultural policy, 
established during the Mkapa administration, and the Film and Stage Play Act, established 
during the Nyerere’s regime, to reflect the expansion and flow of cultural activities in Tanzania. 
The government was forced to recognize film as a burgeoning, independent industry that was 
popular and had the potential of becoming economically viable and influential.  
According to Rashid Masimbi and Hermus Mwasoko, former and present commissioners 
of culture, the review of the cultural policy was due to the political, economic, and social 
changes that had developed since its establishment in 1997. Masimbi notes, “The intensification 
of globalization has forced the government to have a different view, an improved world view” 
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(Interview, 2009). One of the improved views was to look at the cultural sector as an economic 
activity rather than just recognizing culture for its own sake. Therefore, in numerous meetings 
held by the Ministry of Education and Culture and later by the Ministry of Information, Culture 
and Sports, the primary objective was to see the economic aspect of culture, and in terms of film, 
recognize it as a legitimate and important art form. To this end, articles 4.0 and 4.1 of the draft of 
the new cultural policy defined film and categorized it as one of the four major art forms, the 
others being arts and crafts, performing arts, and literature and languages. 
A significant change in the cultural policy, apart from the inclusion of film as a viable art, 
is the language and terms used to describe Tanzania and its colonial past. In the 1997 cultural 
policy, British people or Westerners in general were referred to as colonialists who imposed their 
social, economic, political, and cultural life on Tanzanians and made Tanzanians believe that 
they had no culture of their own. In the current draft, the word colonialist has been substituted by 
wageni (guests), and colonialism with utawala (administration). This change in perception is a 
major shift in the way the Kikwete administration was to enter a dialogue with Western as well 
as other countries; they were not our enemies but rather our guests and partners. But although the 
new strength, velocity, and vigor was seemingly taking hold in Tanzania, the review of the Film 
Act proved otherwise. Instead of relaxing restrictions and meeting the demands of a new 
democratic country, the new Film Act called for more centralized control, not only of the video 
film industry, but also of programs aired on all television stations. The Film Act seemed to 
regress to the stringent hold on the film industry of the 1960s and 70s. 
Although within the new cultural policy the government had recognized film as an 
important art form, the Film Act was to receive only a cosmetic change. Two obvious changes 
contemplated by the government were the name of the act itself and that of the National Film 
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Censorship Board. During Mkapa’s administration a name change had also been considered, and 
it was suggested that the the National Film Censorship Board be renamed the National Film 
Safeguard Board. The Mkapa administration felt the major task of the law and the board was to 
protect and safeguard Tanzanian national culture and values. The name was never officially 
changed, and subsequently the Kikwete administration considered renaming the Film Act either 
the Tanzanian Film Authority Act or the Film Classification Act and Board. According to 
Herbert Makoye, a professor of cultural studies and a participant in the review meetings, “People 
don’t like the name censor board, because censorship is very negative and people hate it” 
(Interview, 2009). Renaming the Film Act was simply placing old wine in a new bottle. 
Other reasons for the name change were due to current realities, in which new 
technologies for production, distribution, and exhibition had brought on new sets of challenges 
for the film board. Previously the board was able to monitor films by inspecting them before they 
were shown to the public in cinema halls, and once in a while, a board member paid an 
unprompted visit to cinema halls to check up on the films and how they were exhibited. But with 
the rise of new technologies such as satellites and the Internet, which allowed people to 
download films, and with the disappearance of cinema halls, this kind of monitoring and control 
was no longer possible. New forms of exhibition had developed, leaving censor board members 
to ask themselves what, how, and where do we censor? The compromise was to rename the film 
censor board the film classification board. According to Makoye the function of the censor board 
was “to classify, saying this film in this particular context should be A or X” (Interview, 2009). 
This name change was only a smoke screen, however, for the content of the new law and most of 
the functions of the film classification board either remained the same, expanded, or became 
more stringent.  
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The draft for the new Film Act of 2009 empowered the film board to monitor the 
production, distribution and exhibition of film. The board was to inspect and monitor all video 
films made in and out of the country. The board was also empowered to inspect all films shown 
on all television stations in the country, private or otherwise. In addition the board was given the 
mandate of registering all film distributors and producers in the country. Not only were 
distributors and producers required to register their companies and works with the Copyright 
Society of Tanzania (COSOTA), another government agency, they were also forced to register 
with the film board. Anyone violating the law was fined no less than 20 million shillings (20 
thousand dollars) and/or received a five-year prison sentence. This new law, unlike the old one, 
did not allow for appeals. Once a film was denied a permit or was banned, a filmmaker could not 
appeal to the minister or take the matter to court. The board’s verdict was final. Not only does 
this deny a filmmaker justice, but more importantly to the government, it reinforces conformity 
to the status quo and self-censorship. 
The irony of the new law is the amount of responsibility that is invested in the film board. 
The tasks given to the film board exceed the material and human resources available to meet the 
challenges they present. The board, appointed by the minister, is comprised of six voluntary 
members and a staff of three office employees. In the budget speech of 2005–2006, the minister 
of education and culture informed parliament that the film board was to classify 2,000 films and 
5,000 DVDs and inspect 1,000 television programs. In addition, the board was also to carry out a 
training workshop for twenty-one district cultural officers on the use of new technologies in 
safeguarding Tanzanian national culture and values. The allocated budget for all of these 
activities was 20,362,100 shillings, less than 1 percent of the ministry’s total budget (Budget 
speech of 2005/2006, the Minister of Education and Culture). Not only was the budget 
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insufficient, but to expect the six board members to inspect 8,000 films and videos was an 
unrealistic expectation, especially when the board only met twice a week (Tuesday and 
Thursday) for one hour.  
In actuality the board meets infrequently, sometimes not meeting for a month or more. 
While I was in Tanzania from late May to mid-August 2009 conducting my research, the board 
did not meet even once. This scenario proves that the government was not eager to support the 
film industry as it had proposed to do. Its main objective was to curtail the development of a 
viable film industry. Penina Mlama, a cultural anthropologist, comments on this when she says, 
“Political leaders think they are better off if they don’t develop the film industry, because if they 
really develop it so that people themselves have got power to make films to use it to really 
express their views, it will get out of hand. . . . I don’t think they would put money into the 
development of a film which is not controlled” (Interview, 2009).  
Not only does the film board lack resources to carry out its activities, but more 
importantly, how and where were they to receive those 8,000 films? As much as the video film 
industry was booming in 2005, it was not producing 2,000 video films a year. Currently it still 
does not produce that amount. How did the film board arrive at that figure? Even if it was 
capable of producing that amount in the year 2005, filmmakers were not taking their films to the 
film board; in fact, they did not know of its existence. As for the 1,000 television programs, no 
law or policy existed at the time that gave the film board the authority to inspect the content of 
films shown on television stations. The only institute with that kind of authority was the 
Tanzanian Content Regulatory Authority (TCRA), which monitored the content of aired 
programs on television and handled complaints from viewers. The television owners had no 
obligation to send their films to the film board, nor have they done so. The figure concocted by 
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the film board shows how the government is not serious about the development of the film 
industry and how it will go to any length to mislead its people. 
The budget speech of 2007–2008 was more realistic regarding the actual capacity of the 
film board. The minister of information, culture and sports, George Mkuchika, noted to the 
parliament that the board had inspected seventeen films, classified fifty-nine DVDs, and read six 
synopses and eight scripts. Additionally, it had printed and distributed across the country 2,000 
pamphlets entitled Ijue Film Bodi Yako (Know Your Film Board) in order to demonstrate 
transparency and to inform the public of its existence. The budget for the year was 15,554.500 
shillings. In the budget speech of 2008–2009 no activities of the film board were listed, but it 
received a budget of 1,440,000 shillings.  
The location of the censor board office can be viewed as an allegory for how filmmakers 
perceive the board and the government in general. The office is located in the midst of a busy 
crowded street in the center of the city of Dar es Salaam. When I made my first research visit to 
the office, it took me awhile to locate it. After a close scrutiny of nearby buildings on Morogoro 
Road and Azikiwe Street, I came across a dark hall that had on its wall numerous gold- and 
silver-plated signs of companies that had offices in the building. Amongst these was a sign 
printed on white paper, with the words National Film Censorship, 3rd floor. As I ascended the 
narrow, dark stairs to the third floor, a feeling of fear and anxiety overwhelmed me; I felt like 
somebody was constantly near me. When I eventually got to the office, I was greeted by a guard 
uniformed like a policeman; I was asked to sign a visitor’s book and was ushered in for my 
research interview. The office consisted of four small rooms, one for the executive secretary, two 
for the assistants, and one for the receptionist/secretary. There was only one television set and a 
DVD player, which were used to inspect all video films brought in by filmmakers. 
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The poor location of the office and meager allocation of resources for board and film 
activities by the government demonstrates the contradictory nature of a government that purports 
to support the film industry by recognizing it as both an art form and an economic activity and at 
the same time creates obstacles and makes it difficult for filmmakers to survive and express 
themselves. This form of ambivalence forces filmmakers to either conform to or bypass the film 
laws, and renders the board useless. This antagonistic relationship between filmmakers and the 
government has impacted the way video films are produced and distributed. 
Distribution Deals 
There are two ways in which arrangements are made for distribution of video films in 
Tanzania. In one of the first distribution agreement methods used, an independent filmmaker or 
producer made a film and took the film package to the major distributing companies and sold it 
to them. This was the most prevalent form of distribution agreement when the video film 
industry was emerging in the early 2000s. Whereas deals with Hollywood majors entail a long, 
complicated contract that includes assignment of rights for all potential markets, etc., in Tanzania 
that is not the case. According to Mrisho Mpoto, a video filmmaker and poet, “Our contracts are 
simple.” In other words, no lawyers are involved, and the filmmaker sells their rights to the 
distribution company. As films started to sell at a faster rate, distributors eagerly to bought all the 
films that were brought to them and subsequently made profits from them. For example, William 
Mtitu sold his first film, Miss Bongo (2003), for 6 million shillings and his second film, Sandra 
(2006), for 12 million shillings. According to Mtitu, they “made it for 145 thousand shillings, 
and sold it for 12 million shillings” (Interview, 2009). The 145 thousand shillings only covered 
the cinematographer, however; the payments for actors and other crew members were deferred 
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until the film was sold. Although Mtitu made a profit out of the films, he no longer owned them. 
The films became the sole properties of the distributing company. 
The distributing companies owned a film outright after buying it. This form of agreement 
is called “trading the master” by video filmmakers—that is, handing over the master copy of the 
film to the distributor. As Mtitu notes, “I have sold the film, and it’s his for the rest of his life; I 
have no right to Sandra nor Miss Bongo” (Interview, 2009). 
The second type of agreement entered between filmmakers and distributors is called 
“stamping” or—as it is called by Hollywood majors—“negative pickup.” This kind of deal is 
usually made before the film is completed. The distributor often provides an advance to the 
filmmaker and in the end the revenue of the film will be shared by both filmmaker and 
distributor. Both agree on the number of copies to be replicated, the distributor duplicates the 
video film and hands the copies to the filmmaker to put his or her seal or signature on each copy 
of the film before it is distributed. The purpose of the seal or signature is to show the authenticity 
and originality of the copy and also to protect and ensure the filmmaker and consumers against 
fraud or pirated copies of the film. Once the copies are sold, another agreement can be made 
between the two parties. Since the distributor manufactures copies of the film and thus takes 
more risks than the filmmaker, he or she receives a larger share of the revenue, usually on the 
scale of 70/30 percent. This form of agreement did not last long, as filmmakers became 
suspicious of distributors, fearing that distributors were dishonest with revenue collection. This is 
because filmmakers had no way of tracking the sale and thus had to be content with what the 
distributors told them. This did not settle well with filmmakers, who often accused distributors of 
fraud. They felt distributors were illegally making and distributing copies and selling those 
instead of the sealed and agreed-upon copies.  
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To prove this, filmmakers traveled to video stores in different cities and towns and found 
numerous pirated copies of their films on the shelves and none of the original ones. Distributors, 
upon confrontation, attributed the situation to piracy, which they vehemently denied participating 
in. To come to an agreement, distributors and filmmakers settled by returning to the former type 
of agreement, paying the filmmaker a set sum in exchange for full rights. Ignacio Kambarage, 
the marketing manager of KAPICO distribution company, states, “If you bring us your master 
copy, and we agree on the price, we would pay your price in installments” (Interview, 2009). For 
filmmakers who entered into distribution deals with KAPICO, for example, a contract might be 
signed that specified that the filmmaker would be paid twenty-one days after the release of the 
film. This form of agreement has been adopted by almost all distribution companies in Tanzania. 
This has somehow eased the business relationship between the two parties, but it has not fully 
erased the suspicions once leveled.  
The mistrust between filmmakers and distributors extended particularly to distributing 
companies owned by Tanzanians of Indian heritage. Distributors of Indian descent were the first 
business individuals to venture into the video film business in the late 1990s, and this was 
because they were already in the business of distributing local and international music 
throughout the country. As filmmaking became a prominent fixture in Tanzania, distributing 
outlets that catered to the recording industry welcomed film and diversified their distribution 
outlets to include video films. The relationship that these distributors had with local musicians 
was marred with suspicion and mistrust. Musicians constantly complained of being cheated out 
of money and of not getting their royalties. This form of a distributor-artist relationship 
continued with video filmmakers, who also complained of being cheated and put forth 
allegations of exploitation and fraud; embezzlement became the cry for most filmmakers who 
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worked with these distributors. One of the major claims of exploitations leveled against Indian 
distributors was price fixing. Because of the close familial relationships among some distributors 
(such as MAMU distributors and Wananchi Production), price fixing became the order of 
business. For example, if a filmmaker took his or her film to MAMU, MAMU would offer to 
buy the film for 2 million shillings. If the filmmaker declined this offer and shopped the film 
around to another distributor who also happened to be of Indian descent, a phone call would 
already have been made by MAMU to all other distributors informing them of the price deal. 
Therefore, upon reaching another distributor, according to Irene Sanga, a video filmmaker, “The 
filmmaker would be given a lower price than that of MAMU, forcing the filmmaker to return to 
MAMU, and at this time MAMU would lower the price even further” (Interview, 2009). The 
filmmaker, having no other way of distributing his film, was forced to accept MAMU’s offer. 
With this type of cutthroat business deals, Indian distributors were castigated constantly in 
numerous newspapers articles, and consequently garnished negative public opinion and, on 
occasion, a glance from the government.  
This oligopolistic business condition was erased only when other businesspeople not 
affiliated with Indian distributors made an entry into the distribution market. The establishment 
of Mtitu Game Quality Production and KAPICO brought on the demise of price fixing. But it did 
not reduce the mistrust filmmakers had with distributors. Although currently all distributors are 
looked upon suspiciously by filmmakers, Indian distributors, because of their history, are held in 
the greatest suspicion. When I was interviewing distributors, it was only the Indian distribution 
companies that I had difficulty tracking down. Out of the three major distribution companies 
owned by Tanzanians of Indian descent, only one agreed to be interviewed, and they dictated the 
kinds of questions I was allowed to ask. For example, questions that dealt with the perceived 
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contentious relationship between Indian distributors and filmmakers were off-limits. Distribution 
companies owned by Tanzanians of African descent were more willing and open to the questions 
posed. Was it because I was not of Indian descent that Indian distributors were unwilling to 
speak to me? When I raised this concern to some of the filmmakers, one of the filmmakers, 
Mrisho Mpoto, said no. “It’s because you approached them too officially, and so they probably 
thought you were from the government or COSOTA” (Interview, 2009). The antagonistic 
relationships among filmmakers and Indian distributors—and indeed all distributors—and the 
government continue to exist between filmmakers and distributors and thus it motivates the way 
the film industry is operated.  
To combat this antagonism, most filmmakers have returned to the original form of 
agreement, selling their rights to the distributors for a lump sum of money. This way filmmakers 
do not have to worry about how many copies the distributors has sold or pirated. But currently 
this form of agreement has come under scrutiny by COSOTA. This scrutiny was prompted by 
complaints the society received both from filmmakers and distributors, especially in regards to 
the airing of video films on the international television channel African Magic Plus. Owned by 
Electronic Media Network of South Africa, Magic Plus is an English-speaking pay cable channel 
that broadcasts African films. The channel accepts films from filmmakers and distributors, and if 
the films meet their criteria, they are aired and seen by people all over Africa. Filmmakers and 
distributors not only receive financial benefits but also international exposure and recognition. 
The problem that COSOTA encounters more often than not is that filmmakers have sent their 
films to Magic Plus, only to realize later they no longer possessed the rights to the film. The 
filmmakers did not understand the parameters of the distribution deal they signed with the 
distributor. In such cases, COSOTA has acted as the go-between. Yustus Mkinga, the executive 
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secretary of COSOTA, states, “We tell filmmakers they must specify the distribution markets 
and territories. We are trying to encourage them, but it is still happening” (Interview 2009). The 
distribution deals that are made between filmmakers and distributors are not supervised by 
lawyers as one would expect, but instead the filmmaker simply signs a contract formulated by 
the distributor. Video filmmaker Mrisho Mpoto, in referring to these contracts, says, “They don’t 
require a lawyer; it’s between the distributor and a filmmaker” (Interview 2009). 
Filmmakers like Mtitu have decided to sign agreements that have an expiration date. In 
his latest film Kamando Yosso (2010), Mtitu entered a deal with Steps Entertainment to 
distribute his film for only two years. After the two years the distribution rights will revert to 
Mtitu, who can then decide on the next course. Mtitu hopes that within that time he will have 
expanded his film company, Five Effects, to include a distribution division. This will allow Mtitu 
to have full control of production and distribution of his films.  
As much as filmmakers and distributors are intent on formulating ways to sustain 
themselves in the cutthroat business of film, government institutions such as the National Film 
Censorship Board and COSOTA have not had the same kinds of enthusiasm for the industry.  
COSOTA, the National Film Censorship Board, and the Film Industry 
Although filmmakers and distributors have had a contentious relationship that has been 
guided by mistrust, they both agree in their view of government institutions and policies such as 
COSOTA and the National Film Censorship Board. Theoretically, filmmakers and distributors 
take the films to the censorship board and COSOTA for inspection and registration, but in 
practice this does not often happen. Makaraghe Mkinda, during her one-year employment as a 
film inspector at the film censor board, commented, “Since I have been here, only two DVDs 
have been brought here” (Interview, 2009). Filmmakers and distributors are often reluctant to 
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take their films to the censor board. Some distributors have accused the institution of corruption. 
Even if one took a film for inspection, Ignatus Kambarage claims, “They will tell you, ‘You see 
this pile here? All of them are waiting to be inspected,’ and they would finish by saying, ‘Mkono 
mtupu haulambwi [an empty hand cannot do the job],’ and you would know exactly what they 
mean by that” (Interview 2009). So if a filmmaker or a distributor wanted his or her film 
inspected quickly, he or she must put something in the hand of the inspector, or else nothing 
would be done. The end result is that filmmakers and distributors don’t take their films to the 
film censorship board. The board, to them, is there to serve the state, not the film industry. As 
there is no enforcement of the law or a penalty if they do not, there is no incentive to do so. 
COSOTA, on the other hand, although a government institution just like the censor 
board, is viewed more favorably by both filmmakers and distributors. They view COSOTA as a 
partner who has created a rapport with its clients. COSOTA has captured the interest of 
filmmakers and distributors because of the aggressive campaign it has waged against pirates by 
seizing and destroying pirated video films and collecting and distributing royalties to 
filmmakers. In describing and contrasting the work of the censor board and COSOTA, Mrisho 
Mpoto comments, “The censor board has not managed to tell filmmakers who they are and what 
they do. We know the board is there, but it is more governmental, it is not for us, whereas 
COSOTA is for the people, it has come to and for us” (Interview, 2009). These different views of 
government institutions are echoed by Irene Sanga, who puts this question to a censor board 
employee: “The film censor board has been in existence longer than COSOTA, so why are artists 
aware of COSOTA? Even if it does not work properly or efficiently, artists are still aware of its 
existence, but artists are not aware of the censor board” (Interview, 2009). The censorship board 
is viewed as a government agency that is there to monitor and control filmmakers’ artistic 
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creativity and expression, whereas COSOTA, according to filmmakers and distributors, has 
showed support to the film industry not only by cracking down on piracy, the film industry’s 
major nemesis, but also in its effort to support the development of the video film industry by 
training law enforcement officials on issues of copyright law and infringement, thereby allowing 
video films to flourish. 
The Process of Producing Video Films 
In his 2008 presentation of the trends in filmmaking in Tanzania, Frowin Nyoni identified 
two emerging trends: artistic and commercial filmmaking. For Nyoni, artistic filmmakers are 
those who adhere to the professional principles of filmmaking and ensure that the production has 
adequate crew, equipment, and time. Most of the films in this category, according to Nyoni, are 
under sponsorship, and producers spend millions of shillings to produce them. Commercial 
filmmakers produce films that adhere to market demands rather than the professional principles 
of filmmaking. Films of this type are low budget and poor quality, and payment is always 
deferred until the movie is sold. Mwangaza Kang’anga in her study “New Trend in Tanzanian 
Film Making” categorizes films in terms of “the best” and “the moderate.” She says the best 
filmmakers are those who are able to carry out at a professional level the three phases of 
production (preproduction, production, and postproduction), are able to demonstrate both artistic 
and commercial attributes, and have a large production crew. The moderate filmmakers are those 
who “lacked artistic ingenuity [and] are often driven by opportunistic consideration, such as 
making a profit” (2006: 45). Production crews in this category comprise “only a few individuals 
with some assuming double or multiple roles” (46). The major difference between these two 
types of filmmakers is their filmmaking practices and aesthetics.  
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The editor of the Sunday Citizen newspaper of July 12, 2009, summarize this attitude 
succinctly: “The filmmaking revolution has finally reached Tanzania, but as is typical of the 
country’s other sector of the economy, imposters have swamped the industry. Professionals are 
complaining that films produced in a hurry are ruining the industry.” Another newspaper, the 
Sunday Daily noted that “filmmaking in the country, has been invaded by a legion of get-rich 
quickly producers, who often lack professional know-how and thus prey on the easier themes of 
love and crime for a not-too-critical audience” (Salome  Gregory, July 19, 2009 ). The imposters 
and the get-rich-quick producers that the newspapers have called out are the video filmmakers.  
Whereas professional filmmaking has been cited by both the critics Nyoni and Mwangaza 
Kang’anga as a film practice that follows the three phases of filmmaking and therefore results in 
quality films that adhere to the aesthetics and techniques of filmmaking, video filmmakers have 
been perceived as filmmakers who use techniques and aesthetics that do not follow the three 
stages of filmmaking and as a consequence yield poor quality films that are geared toward profit 
maximization only. While it is true that video films’ major preoccupation is financial gain, what 
is left out in these arguments is that the film industry is a business, be it in the hands of video 
filmmakers or professional filmmakers, and it exists to make a profit. It is both a commerce and 
an art.  
The biggest misconception is that the video film industry does not have a coherent 
structure and does not adhere to the three stages of filmmaking. This cannot be further from the 
truth; the video film industry has a coherent structure that has clear preproduction, production, 
and postproduction phases. 
In Tanzania, distribution companies are the major producers of films, and dominate the 
video film industry. They are in control and often set the terms of deals. There is a contingent of 
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independent video filmmakers who look upon the major distribution companies to distribute their 
films if they hope to sell them in video stores. These distribution companies or studios, like 
Hollywood majors, are the main producers as well as distributing giants of the video filmmaking 
business. These five companies are GMC Wasanii Promoters, Mwananchi Production, Mtitu 
Game Quality Production, KAPICO, and Steps Entertainment. They own their own film 
equipment, which they provide to filmmakers for use. The method employed by these 
distribution companies is used here to illustrate the process of producing video films in Tanzania.  
Development and preproduction: Acquisition of ideas/stories, actors, and locations 
This initial part of the process, which often takes anywhere from one week to a month, 
involves the seeking and buying of interesting stories and ideas from filmmakers, budgeting, 
casting lead actors, and location scouting. A typical scenario goes like this: A filmmaker 
approaches a distributing company and pitches his or her idea or story. The distribution company 
spends anywhere from a week to a month reviewing the script or story. If the idea is liked by the 
distributing company, it is bought from the filmmaker. As Solank Diresh, the general manager of 
Steps Entertainment, notes, “You come with an idea, we sit with you and see how the story goes; 
if we find it ok, we tell you our purchasing price” (Interview 2009). At this point the distributing 
company may hire its own director and continue with the process of producing the film or else 
hire the writer, who then becomes the film director. According to the marketing manager of 
KAPICO, at this juncture, “I will pay him the money for the script and the money for directing” 
(Interview 2009). At this stage the director takes charge and works closely with the distributor to 
cast the film, making every effort to lure a major actor to the project. A deal with a major actor is 
important for distributors, because consumers often request a film by the actor’s name. As 
Mrisho Mpote says, “You have people who go to stores and ask for a Kanumba or Ray film and 
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[therefore], you make a film according to the producer/distributor’s request because they know 
what is in the market” (Interview, 2009). According to Ignatus Kambarage, the managing 
director of KAPICO, “The basis of a great film is the story, the location, and actors. A film must 
have a recognizable actor, interesting scenery, and a great story. If a film has those elements and 
it is marketed well, the film will make a profit” (Interview, 2009). While I was interviewing 
Diresh Solank at Steps Entertainment, no less than five filmmakers and actors came by looking 
for work or with ideas or stories they wanted to pitch to Diresh. One famous video film actor, 
Raymond, dropped by to pick up a copy of a film just released by the company that he had 
starred in.  
Once the story or script has been accepted, casting completed, budgets finalized, and 
locations scouted, the project is given a green light, and the second phase of production begins. 
Most distributors don’t go on location to supervise the process; they allocate the funds to the 
director or filmmaker and wait for the final product. Solank Diresh states, “They produce it for 
us, and finally it becomes our property” (Interview, 2009). Of course there is always the issue of 
adhering to the budget and problems that may lead to going over budget. The distributing 
company KAPICO has diverted from the practice of giving funds to filmmakers and now buys 
films that are already made. Other distribution companies have followed suit, and either buying 
completed films or make their own. As video filmmaker Mrisho Mpoto describes the process, 
“You go and make a film at your cost. The distributor tells you he will pay you this amount, so 
when you are making the film you know the exact amount you will receive” (Interview 2009). 
The amount of money filmmakers receive for their work can range anywhere from 3 million 
shillings to 14 million shillings. According to KAPICO marketing manager Kambarage, the 
location, story, and casting determine the price of a film. “If you bring your film to me I will take 
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about ten days to inspect it. I look at the location and the artist involved, so depending on the 
work the price ranges from 3 to 14 million shillings” (Interview, 2009). 
Production: Rehearsal and principal photography 
The production of a video film takes anywhere from one to four weeks. This phase of the 
filmmaking process consists of a rehearsal period and principal photography. An extensive 
rehearsal period is allocated to the production of a video film. This is not only to hone the acting, 
but more importantly, it makes sure the film is completed in a timely manner. The video film 
industry relies heavily on how quickly a film commodity reaches the market. The faster it is 
produced the less costly it is and the more profitable it becomes. To achieve profitability at a 
minimum investment filmmakers have come up with an arrangement that calls for the director, 
actors, and crew to live together in a rented apartment or house for the duration of the rehearsal 
and principal photography. This form of living arrangement is aimed toward, among other 
things, combating lateness and any distractions that may have presented themselves if actors and 
crew stayed at home. By confining actors and crew to a single space, the apartment or house, 
societal problems such as traffic and family issues are avoided, allowing the film to remain on 
schedule and on budget. The Ramada Inn (a hotel located in the commercial part of Dar es 
Salaam and a convenient distance from headquarters of most of the distribution companies) is 
one of the most famous hotels used by filmmakers. Other hotels outside the commercial center 
are also used. The Atriums hotel has become a popular rehearsal venue. I had an opportunity to 
visit a rehearsal there of a film entitled Tears on Valentine’s Day, directed by Hammie Rajab and 
produced by Erick Shigongo through his newly established distribution company, Tollywood. 
Ten actors were present together with the director, assistant director, and a script supervisor. The 
assistant director was in charge of the rehearsal, making sure actors memorized their lines and 
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spoke accordingly; director Hammie Rajab conducted a meeting with a couple of people on a far 
away table; and Issa Hamis, the script supervisor, kept actors within the parameters of the script, 
although improvisation was allowed. “We don’t follow the script word to word, we improvise a 
lot.” Hammie Rajab, who has directed numerous video films and is considered one of the leading 
video film directors in Tanzania, stressed to me the importance of rehearsals in making films that 
are well acted and of high quality. To reach that standard, according to Rajab, investment in the 
rehearsal period must be made. The rehearsal period of a video film can last anywhere from one 
to two weeks. Kambarage notes, “It takes two weeks. . . . In the beginning it was three weeks, 
but now people don’t train actors, they take actors who already know the craft” (Interview, 
2009).  
After an intense two weeks of rehearsal a film is shot in one or two weeks. Since 
Tanzania has no film studios, all of the shooting is done on location. Just as in Hollywood, 
Bollywood, and Nollywood, the film is shot out of sequence. This is done predominantly to 
reduce rental cost. The major filming equipment used by filmmakers consists of a digital camera, 
a boom microphone, a monitor, and—on rare occasions—a lighting kit. Once shooting is 
complete the postproduction phase consisting of editing, marketing, distribution, and exhibition 
commences. 
Postproduction: Editing, distribution, and marketing 
Editing 
Editing usually begins during principal photography and continues after shooting is 
finished. During editing, dialog, music, and sound effects are mixed and subtitles are added to 
the film. The editing of a video film can either be done at the distribution company studio, since 
they own film equipment, or completed elsewhere, depending on the agreement. As a general 
 151 
rule the editor, together with the director/filmmaker, edits and mixes the visual, audio, and sound 
effects of the film. The major preoccupation of the editor and director at this stage is to make 
sure the film is audible and comprehensible to the public. Scoring of music is minimal, if 
incorporated at all. Typical music protocol in the video industry is the plagiarism of Western 
music. Distributors such as Mtitu Game Quality have stopped using Western music and have 
opted to use one continuous and monotonous tone of music throughout the film. This has not 
increased the quality of film, but at least the company cannot be accused of music piracy. The 
editing of a video film can take anywhere from one to two weeks depending on the length and 
complexity of the film. Upon completion of the editing process, the filmmaker takes the film to 
the distribution company and awaits remuneration for the service rendered. Theoretically it is at 
this juncture that the film is taken to the National Film Censor Board for a permit and to 
COSOTA for copyright registration. Most of the distributors interviewed noted it was the 
filmmaker’s responsibility to take the film to the film censor board before they surrendered it to 
the distributors, and since the distributors owned the film, it was their responsibility to take it to 
COSOTA. 
Distribution 
Distribution is the backbone of the video film industry. The film industry exists and 
flourishes because of distribution. Distributors have tremendous power, handling the distribution 
of a film in all outlets and determining when the video film is to be released. Therefore, they 
have full control of a film and the film industry. Although Pius Mota in 2009 called the video 
distribution system in Tanzania “crude,” it is this same crude system that has propelled Tanzania 
to its position as the leading film-producing country in East Africa, second only to Nigeria in the 
whole of Africa.  
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Numerous film distribution companies have come and gone since the emergence of the 
video film industry. In the late and early 2000s the distribution industry was dominated by six 
distribution companies, but by the mid-2000s, this number was reduced to five: GMC Wasanii 
Promoters, Wananchi Video Production, Mtitu Game Quality Production, KAPICO, and Steps 
Entertainment. These distribution companies are in charge of manufacturing, storing, and 
shipping video films through their retail outlets in Tanzania. The majors are also producers and 
manufacturers of video films and have distributing outlets throughout major cities and towns in 
the country. For example, KAPICO has at least one agent in each of the twenty-five regions in 
Tanzania; in some cities KAPICO has two or more agents: Dar es Salaam, the commercial 
capital, has more than ten agents, Mbeya three and Dodoma two. Steps Entertainment, a 
newcomer to the distribution business, has outlets in 70 percent of the country and by the end of 
2009 “will be in every region” (Solank Diresh, interview, 2009). Mtitu Game Quality 
Production, GMC Wasanii Promoters, and Wananchi Production each have agents in all of the 
regions in Tanzania. 
Other upcoming distribution companies such as Tollywood, Five Effects, and Tuesday 
Ltd as of 2010 were setting up distribution divisions in their companies and were only able, at 
the moment, to distribute films in Dar es Salaam. These minor distribution companies have 
developed informal channels such as newspaper stands, market areas, music stores, and street 
peddlers. In addition, there are independent filmmakers who devise their own means of 
distribution. Mrisho Mpoto comments, “Now most of the filmmakers distribute their own films 
as they know where to produce posters, they make television ads, and regional distributors call 
and request for orders” (Interview, 2009). And it’s mostly through these informal means, 
Mwangaza Kang’anga notes, “that video film reaches out to the market” (2006: 37). But if 
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independent and minor distribution companies want their films to ultimately appear in video 
stores around the country, they still depend upon distribution deals with the majors. Major 
distributors have the power to decide how, where, and when a film is to be distributed and 
promoted.  
Finding reliable agents and outlets is an involved activity that is conducted by major 
distributors by surveying and visiting each region in the country and scrutinizing each individual 
who wants to become an agent. All of the majors, with the exception of GMC and Wananchi 
production (who already had distribution agents prior to the emergence of the video film 
industry), had to first visit and conduct visibility studies of each region. They had to survey and 
convince music shop owners to venture into the film business and become agents or retailers of 
video films. “I have been all over Tanzania for twenty-one days. We have been to each shop and 
we follow up with calling and calling. It is a very difficult job” (Diresh Solank, interview, 2009). 
Another method distributors have used to entice individuals to become their agents is to get the 
film commodity out there and have shop owners call distributors and request to become retailers 
of the product. Kambarage notes, “When we make a film, we put our telephone number in all of 
our films, so when we advertise the film on TV, our prospective agents take the number and call 
us. They tell us where their store is located, we find someone that we know in that region to go 
and evaluate the store. If it is legitimate, we make them our agent, and we send them the 
package” (Interview, 2009). 
The packages are usually sent via bus or truck, Kambarage continues. “If we intend to 
release a film tomorrow, then today we send the film via bus or truck to the regions, so that 
tomorrow at 8:00 a.m., when we are distributing films to our agents/retailers here in Dar es 
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Salaam, the same is happening in other regions” (Interview, 2009). Once agents are established, 
they then sell the films to local video shop owners and/or to individual consumers.  
Through the five majors and minor distribution companies and other alternative means of 
distribution, Tanzanians of all classes are able to consume video films as their principal leisure 
activity. Although the majors are able to control what Tanzanians see and hear, the continuation 
of the control and popularity of video films is fueled by the kinds of marketing strategies 
undertaken by distributors. 
Marketing: Advertising, promotion and publicity 
Marketing and distribution are an important process in the commercialization of the video 
film industry. How a product is marketed and distributed will result in a profit or loss for the 
producer. Marketing is a key means for the industry to establish product recognition and 
differentiation by highlighting a film’s marketable elements prior to release. Marketing thus not 
only responds to consumer demand, but also attempts to both anticipate and create demand. The 
function of marketing is therefore to establish the film as a recognizable brand with strong 
audience appeal. Kambarage states, “Marketing is very important. If marketing is done well, you 
will be surprised that within seven days you have recouped all of your investment” (Interview, 
2009). Marketing strategies are therefore formulated during preproduction and are constantly 
revised depending on the product marketed. 
The marketing of video films is divided into two categories: promotion and publicity. The 
main focus of marketing is to create a recognizable brand; thus, at the onset of production 
arrangements are made to meet this objective. In the video film industry, the marketing or 
promotion of a video film entails an elaborate marketing scheme that consists of creating colorful 
posters, television ads, tabloid news (gossips), banners, film trailers, newspapers, and interviews. 
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The most visible and utilized promotional materials are film trailers and posters. It used to be 
that if a producer/distributor had money, the film usually had a premiere before it was released 
for sale in video stores. Because there are no video film cinema halls, a premiere usually took 
place at a cultural center, a five-star hotel, or a bar depending on the budget and was one of the 
primary promotional tools of a film. 
Recently this form of promotion has no longer been feasible. Not only has it become too 
expensive, but the way premieres were organized and structured, they did not reach the intended 
audience: avid buyers of video films. Most of the people who attended the premieres went for the 
purpose of listening and dancing to the local music band that usually preceded the event. In order 
to organize a premiere, a filmmaker/distributor had to rent a venue and hire local musicians to 
play and entertain the audience. Venue rents ranged anywhere from 200 thousand to 1 million 
shillings. For the band, the distributor/filmmaker would pay anywhere from 1.5 million to 5 
million shillings.  
The primary purpose of the band was to attract people to the event, with the hope that 
they would buy the film there or later at designated outlets. But as filmmakers and distributors 
soon found out, the premiere often attracted the wrong crowd—music lovers—not video film 
buyers. According to video filmmaker Irene Sanga, “If you say you will only screen the film 
without the band, the only people that will come to the premiere are filmmakers and other 
artists” (Interview, 2009). The working-class Tanzanians, who are the major viewers of video 
films, cannot afford to attend a premiere. Thus due to its prohibitive cost and therefore the 
inability to reach the targeted audience, the premiere has been shelved as a promotional device in 
favor of television ads and posters. 
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The most important element of a marketing campaign is the creation of posters and a film 
trailer. The aim of posters and trailers is to condense the film’s highlights and showcase its 
elements, creating a narrative image of the film in the minds of audiences (Philip Drake, 2008). 
Once a trailer is made it is used in two ways: as a promotional spot on television and a trailer on 
upcoming DVDs. According to Diresh Solank, “We look at the screenplay. Once we know 
where the climax is, where the suspense is happening, we design, and while on location we ask 
the director to take still pictures and bring them to us . . . and before a final cut of a film is made, 
to make us a one- or two-minute trailer. We then put the trailer in a movie which we are about to 
release” (Interview, 2009). 
The still photos are used to create posters and fliers that are to be distributed in all regions 
of Tanzania. Kambarage confirms, “When we send video films to our agents in the regions, we 
also send them posters of other films that are to come” (Interview, 2009). Posters are usually 
mounted all over the city in places such as bus stands, restaurants, bars, electricity poles, and 
cultural centers. But as the film release date nears, Irene Sanga notes, “posters and fliers are 
again distributed in different places, banners are mounted in busy street crossings, and fliers are 
handed out to pedestrians and drivers as they pass by” (Interview, 2009). Young boys are 
recruited, and they strategically stand on busy street corners, at major bus stops, and near market 
stands and hand out posters and fliers. The posters are usually very colorful and feature the faces 
of the major actors in the films. On the poster the name of the video film, the distribution 
company, and the date of the film’s release are spelled out (see Appendix C). 
The largest part of the marketing budget is spent on purchasing television spots. The TV 
spots are chosen strategically; “We look at programs that are viewed by a majority of the people, 
and we buy advert time” (Kambarage, Interview, 2009). The expense of advertising on television 
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ranges from 500 to 700 thousand shillings a minute. Television ads are extremely important, not 
only because the trailer helps to create an audience for the film, but also because it is at this 
juncture that would-be agents come forth. “If we advertise twice or three times, phones start to 
ring, asking for the film. . . . So through people calling, we sometimes are forced to release the 
film earlier” (Kambarage). And according to Kambarage, if marketing is massive and well done, 
within a week one can see a return on the investment. 
Since buying an advertising spot on television is very expensive, some distributors like 
KAPICO and Wananchi Production have ventured into buying one to two hours of air time. 
Within those hours, they show their old films as well as show previews of their new films. This 
form of marketing is lucrative to distributors, Kambarage notes. “If sponsorship is found, they 
screen their advert; we divide the proceeds between the television stations and us” (Interview, 
2009). 
Another form of marketing used by distributors is publicity, media coverage for which no 
payment is made. This consists of interviews, newspaper articles, tabloid magazines, and blogs. 
These forms of publicity benefit both the distributors and the media, and are a reliable means of 
increasing an audience (Philip Drake, 2008). Newspapers and especially tabloid magazines with 
stories of video film stars are always of interest to the public and have been used by filmmakers, 
producers, and distributors to create a fan base. Personal stories, tragedies, or scandals of actors 
are printed and can be found in tabloid magazines such as Kasheshe (Turmoil), Uwazi 
(Transparency) and Ijumaa (Friday). Interviews with actors and a synopsis of the film they are 
promoting can be found in the entertainment section of most of the Sunday newspapers. These 
interviews are used by filmmakers and distributors as a springboard for Monday’s video film 
releases. Websites and personal blogs of actors have become the latest form of advertising 
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filmmakers and distributors use to sell their films to the public. Mtitu Game Quality has gone 
further than other distributors in the country by establishing a viable website where the 
distributor sells backlist films as well as promotes and sells the most recent films.  
Proper marketing strategies for video films ensure that the product reaches the widest 
possible demographic and thus makes a hefty return on the investment. But this is not always the 
case; piracy has become a thorn in the side of the video film industry. George Otieno laments 
that “piracy is a pregnant problem in the video industry” (Interview, 2009). 
Piracy: A Challenge for the Video Film Industry 
“Despite the existence of copyright legislation, Tanzania is the leading country in 
copyright infringement in the Southern and Eastern African region. The Tanzanian market apart 
from being flooded with fake (pirated) carriers is the main source of the same in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.” states executive secretary of COSOTA Yustus Mkinga (2008:3). 
“In today’s global economy with its easy and wide spread access to computers, copies 
and scanners, there is no product line that escapes the reach of pirates. The profits are huge, the 
cost of entry is minimal and the risks are relatively low,” observe Treverto et al. (2009:3). 
Most of the studies conducted on film piracy (see Wong, 2003; Pang, 2006; Sefrave, 
2003; Treverto et. al., 2009; Mertha, 2005) tend to examine how Hollywood is economically 
affected by piracy. They also elaborate on how the Motion Picture Association of America and 
the U.S. government have vowed to fight piracy by influencing how copyright laws are 
implemented and reinforced in countries that are perceived to be centers of piracy. Recently 
China has been attacked for copyright infringement, followed by Eastern Europe, Japan, and 
Italy. Little to no attention has been paid to how local film industries have been hampered by 
local piracy, let alone how those local industries combat piracy.  
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Film piracy, the unauthorized manufacturing and selling of film for profit without the 
consent of the copyright holder, can range from a complex organization of mass-produced video 
films with wide distribution networks to a video store owner who buys a legal video film and 
then burns copies for his video rental shop. Piracy can be set up in a single room or apartment 
and be up and running within a matter of hours. Video piracy in Tanzania is a booming industry 
that, according to Kambarage and George Otieno, makes its purveyors more money than the 
filmmakers, producers, or distributors of video films. Tanzania is unlike Australia or Japan, 
where piracy has been attributed to the delay of the theatrical and DVD release dates of films, or 
China, with its tight control of the number of foreign films allowed for screening each year.  
In Tanzania most of the films pirated are not Hollywood films, but of Tanzanian origin. 
Tanzanian filmmakers and distributors are hurt by local piracy predominantly because of the 
early release dates of pirated films. A bootleg copy of a video film appears hours after a film is 
first released. As Mrisho Mpoto comments, “You receive your film today in the morning and by 
the afternoon, you will find 200 pirated copies of your film piled up at the market or bus stand 
selling like peanuts and for peanuts” (Interview, 2009). According to George Otieno, the people 
involved in the piracy business are “people who have a big investment, who cannot be arrested, 
have got an army behind them, and are ready to risk their lives for piracy” (Interview, 2009). To 
get their business running, pirates have somehow developed a partnership relationship with law 
enforcement officers and thus are shielded and protected by them. In their study of film piracy, 
organized crime, and terrorism, Gregory F. Treverto et. al. call this kind of a relationship 
“protected spaces,” whereby governments are either too complacent or too corrupt to take serious 
action against piracy (98). If law enforcement officials are not corrupt or in compliance, then 
they are usually ignorant of copyright law and policies.  
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The enormous demand for pirated films is abetted by lack of enforcement of copyright 
laws. Filmmakers and distributors are critical of the government’s handling of piracy. KAPICO’s 
Kambarage has gone as far as to write a letter to the Ministry of Culture and complain about the 
impact of piracy on the industry and on the government and even suggest a course the 
government should take to remedy the problem. Filmmakers and distributors have suggested that 
a copyright law and infringement course be established and taught in all of the police academies 
in the country. According to Kambarage, police officers do not see film piracy as a criminal 
offence. “I have caught more than 300 copies of pirated copies. When I take them to the police, 
there is a problem, as the police do not know about film piracy, they don’t understand the value 
of a film, and they tell us, ‘Why don’t you negotiate with pirates?” (Interview 2009). Kambarage 
remembers two occasions when he was able to catch pirates and involved the police, but nothing 
happened to the perpetrators. On one occasion, Kambarage raided an apartment that had fifteen 
computers and bootleg copies of video films from different distribution companies, but the police 
were not willing to make an arrest, nor were the computers confiscated. The police officer 
contacted suggested that the distributor and pirates strike a deal among themselves. On the 
second occasion the culprit was taken to the police station, only to be freed because one of the 
police officers was going out with the culprit’s sister. “It is very hard to convict a pirate,” 
William Mtitu laments. “There is no strong legislation in place that can be used to arrest pirates. 
He only pays a small penalty and goes free” (Interview, 2009).  
Inadequate legislation and lack of resources, coupled with government complacency, has 
forced some distributors, like KAPICO, to in fact make deals with pirates. When Kambarage 
catches them, “I tell them to pay me the money or I will take them to COSOTA and destroy all 
of the bootleg copies. We also try to turn them into our agents” (Interview 2009). Filmmakers 
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and distributors have called for an increase of government awareness of the seriousness of piracy 
and adoption and enforcement of appropriate national legislation against piracy and are fighting 
to make piracy a criminal offense. But lack of political will or strong legislation has made piracy 
a thriving business that has expanded into erstwhile legitimate businesses such as television 
stations and video store rentals.  
Television stations and video store rentals as forms of piracy 
Broadcast piracy is a form of piracy that a number of Tanzanian television stations have 
practiced and continue to practice. This form of piracy involves the broadcasting of a bootleg 
copy of a film or the showing of a legitimate film or television program without permission from 
the copyright holder (Segrave, 2003). Private television stations are major infringers of the 
copyright law. Television stations in Tanzania don’t commission works or buy programs from 
independent Tanzanian producers as mandated by the Broadcast Service Act of 2003; likewise, 
they do not pay for some of the local and international programs aired on their stations. The 
popularity of Nigerian films originated in Tanzania because television stations, especially ITV, 
did not seek permission or pay the copyright holder for airing those films. Nigerian filmmakers, 
producers, and distributors did not receive payment for the aired films. The airing of 
unauthorized films included both Nigerian films and Tanzanian video films. According to 
Kambarage, when filmmakers confronted television owners, they were met with “we are 
promoting you and your film.” Filmmakers thus are reluctant to pursue the matter further; as one 
of them noted, “At least they are showing our films without us paying for the air time, and 
maybe after seeing the film, audiences may want to buy it” (Hamis, Interview, 2009). As 
filmmakers and distributors continue to fight with television stations over infringement, the 
 162 
video rental libraries, as they are called, have emerged and have taken over the film exhibition 
industry. 
Video libraries as a form of piracy 
Video libraries emerged in Tanzania in the mid-1990s when cinema halls were shutting 
down and importation of foreign films allowed. The video libraries filled the void left by the 
closing cinema halls. Most of the video libraries were membership only and their film inventory 
contained exclusively Western, and mostly Hollywood, films. This was prior to the popularity of 
Nigerian films or the emergence of the video film industry. To become a member of a video 
library, one had to pay a nonrefundable fee of 30,000 shillings ($30); one could then enjoy an 
array of European and Hollywood films for 5,000 shillings ($5) a night. With the popularity of 
Nigerian films in the late 90s and the coming of Tanzanian video films in the 2000s, these video 
libraries went bankrupt and in their place, the current video rental stores, also called video 
libraries, emerged.  
The collapse of the former video stores can be attributed to its exclusively middle-class, 
English-speaking clientele. Those video rental shops were frequented by middle-class people 
who were attuned to Western culture and film and who owned television and VCR sets, which 
were too expensive for working-class people. With the emergence of television stations in the 
mid-1990s, followed by the popularity of Nigerian films and the spread of inexpensive 
technologies for television sets and digital camera DVD players, and the eventual rise of the 
video film industry, Tanzanians of all classes bought and consumed local video films, thus 
forcing Western-oriented video rental libraries to go under.  
There are over 700 video libraries in Dar es Salaam alone; these video libraries have 
become major exhibitors of Tanzanian video films and can become influential partners in the 
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development and growth of the industry. But this relationship has yet to develop between video 
rental houses, filmmakers, and distributors. Prior to 2004, the majority of the video rental houses 
stocked Nigerian films. Many of those films were bootleg copies. When the Tanzanian video 
industry emerged it became a conduit for bringing the local viewing experience to the people. 
Now there was a direct link from the distributor’s designated agent or outlet to the video library 
owner who bought the film to the consumer who rented it. Steps Entertainment managing 
director Diresh Solank recognizes the importance of video libraries: “People depend on video 
libraries to watch movies, and this directly affects the film business” (Interview, 2009). It affects 
the business because it costs anywhere from 4,000 to 2,500 shillings to buy a video film, but it 
only costs 1,000 shillings to rent it for a day. The fact that distributors were not getting any 
royalties or money from the video libraries created animosity between distributors and video 
library owners. 
The antagonistic relationship between distributors and video libraries is not in the pricing 
of a rented film but more in how the libraries operate. Video libraries pirate video films and rent 
them to consumers. Video libraries usually buy one copy of a film at the original price and then 
burn extra copies for their rental stock. This form of operation, filmmakers and distributors note, 
stifles revenue from them. During one of my visits to a video library, I observed a girl coming in 
and asking for a “Kanumba” (the name of an actor) film that had just been released. The 
storekeeper told the girl to come back in an hour, when a burned copy of the film would be ready 
for her. The storekeeper informed me that all the copies he had previously burned were rented 
out. When I pointed out the illegality of his action, he asserted it was not illegal because he had 
bought one original copy, and even if it was, who was going to catch him? During the thirty 
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minutes that I spent at the store, I witnessed eight individuals coming and renting Tanzanian 
video films. 
Tanzanian filmmakers and distributors acknowledge the importance of video libraries and 
thus have not come out and aggressively condemned the business. They have expressed the need 
for video libraries to join hands with distributors and become their agents or partners. “We don’t 
want them to close down. Let them be our agent: we supply them with our films, we charge 
them, but not the price we are selling to individual consumers” (Diresh, interview, 2009). Other 
distributors have suggested charging video libraries a higher price than that charged to an 
individual or that video libraries be required to buy at least five original copies of films. 
Communication between video libraries and distributors has not been fruitful, since each video 
library is individually owned and operated and there is no association of video libraries that 
distributors can negotiate with. But distributors have thought about and suggested other ways of 
changing the business structure of video libraries. 
Filmmakers and distributors have turned to legislative efforts to regulate the structure. 
Some have sought to push legislation that would require the installation of antipiracy devices in 
films. Others have asked the government to enact and enforce a law that prohibits video libraries 
from renting a film until a three-month period has passed since the film’s release date. All have 
suggested that the government, through COSOTA, provide a sticker certifying proof originality 
for each copy sold. This suggestion has been taken up by COSOTA; executive secretary Mkinga 
states, “The government is in the process of preparing a security device for differentiating 
between original and pirated works, but the implementation is not yet in place.” Until that 
happens COSOTA is preparing to have a Hakigram sticker that shall be affixed to each film. The 
copyright law stipulates, “The Hakigram shall be delivered exclusively by the society 
 165 
[COSOTA] after verification that the audio-visual recordings have been produced in the United 
Republic of Tanzania . . . without infringing any copyright granted by the Act” (Act, 1999: 745). 
This, hopefully, will reduce the number of pirated copies on the market. But in the meantime 
filmmakers and distributors have devised ways of reducing piracy. 
Price reduction as a means of controlling piracy 
One of the major reasons consumers are attracted to pirated films is their pricing. 
Whereas an original copy of a film may cost 4,000 or 5,000 shillings, a bootleg copy is sold at 
anywhere from 1,700 to 2,000 shillings. Most viewers of video films are working-class 
individuals who cannot afford the 4,000 or 5,000 shilling price tag. When the video film industry 
was emerging in the early 2000s, one film copy of a VCD sold for 5,000 shillings and a film 
copy of a DVD was 8,000–10,000 shillings. As technology advanced and expanded and became 
inexpensive, the price of VCDs and DVDs came down, which precipitated a reduction in price 
for films in VCD and DVD format. VCD films sold for 3,000 shillings, and DVD films for 
5,000. Although the prices were expediently reduced, they were still out of reach for the majority 
of film viewers. Since filmmakers and distributors did not meet customers’ financial capacity, 
piracy filled the gap and sold films at a price that the majority of working-class Tanzanians could 
afford—1,500 for a VCD and 2,000–2,500 for a DVD.  
Filmmakers and distributors were blindsided by this move and, not wanting to reduce 
returns on their investment, were reluctant to reduce the price and thus opted to crack down on 
pirates. But as cracking down proved difficult, some distributors, like Steps Entertainment, were 
forced to reduce their prices to compete with pirates. As Diresh notes, “Slowly we started to 
increase our sale by reducing the price to reach the price of piracy. It was a challenge in the 
market, and we were criticized by many. People were thinking that reducing the price wouldn’t 
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help, but it did” (Interview, 2009). Not all distributors jumped onto the price-reduction 
bandwagon; GMC and Wananchi held back for a while, hoping the process would backfire and 
perhaps even drive the other distribution companies out of business. That did not prove to be the 
case, however, and other distribution companies such as Mtitu Game and KAPICO followed in 
the footsteps of Steps Entertainment and reduced the prices of their video films. Kambarage of 
KAPICO notes, “We used to sell a copy of a DVD film for 4,500–5,000; now we sell it for 2,000 
and our agent sells it for 2,500. It has reduced piracy, but not eliminated it” (Interview, 2009). 
Because of price reductions, the majority of working-class people were able to afford to pay for 
an original DVD film copy. This resulted in an increase of sales for Steps Entertainment video 
films by 100 percent. “We wanted to win the people at a cheaper price at a minimum 
profitability” (Diresh, interview, 2009)). GMC and Wananchi took notice of this development, 
and they too reduced the price of their video films. Although this move has not completely 
eradicated the piracy of video films, it has slowed the process.  
Besides the reduction in DVD and VCD film prices, distributors are also aggressively 
pursuing other ideas for obtaining viewers and reducing piracy. Steps Entertainment and 
KAPICO are both exploring the use of lottery tickets to lure viewers into buying original works. 
Steps, in collaboration with a radio station, Clouds FM, teamed up to promote the buying of 
original copies by giving out motorcycles to the buyers of Steps video films with winning 
numbers found inside the cover. KAPICO as well as Steps have also formulated a service that 
delivers video films straight to their customers’ homes. Mtitu Game has beaten other distribution 
companies in the game by establishing a website that showcases all of the distributor’s film 
repertoire and sells them on-line. While all of these efforts may help solve some of the piracy 
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problem, it is likely that this will continue to be a significant problem for distributors and 
filmmakers. 
Despite the lack of supportive policies to promote the film industry, distributors and 
filmmakers have come up with innovative ways to persuade consumers to buy from them and 
therefore reduce piracy. “Let nobody lie to you, the film industry is a money-making industry,” 
Kambarage proclaims (Interview, 2009). To continue to make more money, distributors and 
filmmakers have crossed borders and are reaching as far away as the United States, Australia, 
London, and Nigeria and as near as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Republic of Congo, in 
order to market their films.  
International Video Film Distribution 
While visiting Tanzania in 2007, I noticed a new phenomenon in the video film industry: 
subtitling. Most of the films in the market had English-language subtitles. Upon enquiring I was 
informed that filmmakers were responding to criticism leveled against them for using English 
titles in Swahili films, something regularly done. Visiting a video library or a video store in 
Tanzania, one is bound to see titles such as Girlfriend (2002), Family Tears, parts one and two 
(2008), From China with Love (2008), and Yellow Banana (2008) on the shelves. While English 
titles are a direct influence of Nigerian films, the way it is applied in Tanzania is quite different. 
In Tanzania it is more of a promotional device, used to draw in the interest of consumers. 
“Filmmakers and distributors think English titles sell more movies than a Swahili title, and 
therefore they keep coming up with English titles” (Irene Sanga, Interview). Therefore, 
responding to the critique leveled against them, instead of parting ways with English titles, and 
thus losing customers, filmmakers decided to complement their films by adding English 
subtitles. This, they hoped, would silence critics and at the same time allow them to continue 
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with the English title tradition. As other transformations and innovations such as border crossing 
and the emergence of cable television and film festivals took form, the subtitling of video films 
took on a different meaning. 
Video films crossing borders of Africa 
As Tanzania is the leading filmmaking country in East Africa and second to Nigeria in 
Africa as a whole, border crossing became essential and one of the defining reasons for subtitling 
video films. Tanzanian video films have found markets in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Mozambique, Malawi, the Republic of Congo, and all the way up to Nigeria. “That is why we 
have thought it was important that we put subtitles” (George Otieno, interview, 2009). For 
countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and parts of Congo subtitles might not be as 
important because of the spread and use of Swahili in those countries, but if Tanzanian video 
films were to reach countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, and other African countries, 
subtitling became imperative. 
To maintain dominance in East Africa and expand to other African countries, producers 
of Tanzanian video films not only used subtitling, but also employed and incorporated border-
crossing themes, actors, and locations. Filmmakers and distributors in Tanzania have 
collaborated with actors from Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and as far away as China and Singapore 
in such films as Dilema (2004), My Cross Sin (2007), The Twins (2007), From Dar to Lagos 
(2008), and From China with Love (2008). Foreign locations have also played a big part in 
expanding the market for these films. For example, Mtitu Game has extensively used Nigeria, 
especially Lagos, as a prominent location site for his films. In his film From Dar to Lagos 
(2008), a title that encapsulates a journey, Mtitu Game, who doubled as director and distributor 
of the film, not only brought in actors from Nigeria, but also shot the film in Nigeria and 
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Tanzania. The film tells the story of a man on his deathbed whose last wish is to see and rekindle 
his relationship with a long-lost son before he dies. He sends his trusted servant to Lagos, 
Nigeria, where the son and his mother had moved, to look for him and bring him back to 
Tanzania. The film was favorably received by Tanzanians, prompting more border crossing and 
subtitling of films.  
The prominence and expansion of Tanzanian video films via subtitles has propelled 
distribution companies such as KAPICO, Steps Entertainment, and Mtitu Game Quality 
Production to consider opening retail outlets outside the Tanzanian border. Steps Entertainment 
has already established an agent in Kenya and is considering expanding to Uganda; KAPICO has 
an outlet in Kenya; and Mtitu Game has agents in Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria. For countries 
that Tanzanian distributors don’t have agents or outlets for, individuals from those countries 
often come to Tanzania to purchase video films for sale in their home countries. For those 
individuals, Mkwepu Street, a busy street in the center of Dar es Salaam and a short distance 
from most of the distribution companies’ headquarters, is their destination. It is the transport 
center of video films. On this street individuals from the Republic of Congo, Malawi, Rwanda, 
and Mozambique can be seen conducting business transactions and conversing in French and 
broken Swahili as they load their video film packages onto buses and trucks. Mkwepu Street is a 
gateway to Africa for most of the subtitled video films in Tanzania.  
Video films and the diasporic community in the West 
Much scholarly literature exists on the topic of diasporic communities (Naficy, 2001; 
Mishra, 2002; Desai, 2004: Kaur and Sinha, 2005; Thussu, 2008), but little has been written on 
the African diasporic community in the West. The emergence of film titles such as A Trip to 
America (2009) and From China with Love (2008) is an indication that the Tanzanian video film 
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market is expanding beyond Africa and entering diasporic communities in the West. Diresh 
Solank states, “There are a lot of Tanzanians living in the U.S., London and Australia; we are 
starting to tackle that market” (Interview, 2009). The market was recognized once distributors 
noticed an increase in customers buying films for their relatives abroad. Recognizing the 
diasporic community as a target market, distributors and filmmakers have intensified the 
subtitling of Tanzanian films in the hope of marketing not only to Tanzanians living abroad, but 
also to Africans and other individuals interested in learning the Kiswahili language and culture. 
According to Kambarage, “A lot of Africans like to watch Tanzanian films or would like to learn 
Swahili. . . . You give them subtitles, and they may be able to learn Swahili a little” (Interview, 
2009).  
The video films have crossed borders and captured viewing audiences not only of 
Tanzanians living abroad, but also of Africans living in and outside of Africa. The video films 
represent for the diasporic community a window to home; as Diresh comments, “Video films 
allow the diasporic community to see itself, to see its people; they are a link that holds the home 
and away together” (Interview, 2009). Subtitling of video films has provided the diasporic 
community with an opportunity to go home without actually going home. This has prompted 
distribution companies in Tanzania to consider the diasporic community as a distribution 
territory to be fully explored. 
Subtitling for Television Stations and Film Festivals 
The emergence of the South-African based cable network African Magic Plus and the 
localization of film festivals further fueled the demand for subtitled films. African Magic Plus 
established itself in Tanzania in 2007 and became a major exhibitor of Tanzanian video films. 
The prerequisite for airing a video film on the Magic Plus channel is that the film must be in the 
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English language or subtitled in English. Because Magic Plus is an international channel viewed 
by audiences across Africa and beyond, independent filmmakers have found the channel to be 
both a financial and a professional, resource.  
Airing on Magic Plus has become a seal of approval for many of the video filmmakers. 
This is because there is a sense that once a filmmaker’s work is accepted and aired by Magic 
Plus, his or her status is elevated and acquires the “I have made it” status. Financially Magic Plus 
has become a first-rate investor that independent video filmmakers run to. Magic Plus has 
become a savior to independent filmmakers who do not have a reliable distribution outlet. Not 
only are the films screened at Magic Plus seen internationally, but the financial rewards are 
better than those obtained selling the film to local distributors. Magic Plus pays more than the 
local distribution companies, and its eighteen-month agreement deals are more desirable than the 
for-life stipulation that other distribution companies ask for. With these advantages, independent 
filmmakers favor subtitling their films for the purpose of showcasing them on Magic Plus. The 
station has become a promotional and financial platform for independent filmmakers and their 
films. 
Wanting to attain, if nothing else, international exposure, filmmakers who have 
contractual deals with local distribution companies or have sold their films to them are 
negotiating with their distribution companies to also take their films to Magic Plus. Although the 
majority of the distribution companies have not considered Magic Plus a major market, the push 
they get from their filmmakers has encouraged them to reconsider and eventually take their films 
there. Diresh notes, “We are forced by our filmmakers to take the films to Magic Plus, because 
for filmmakers that is a venue where one can claim their status” (Interview, 2009). Therefore, to 
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satisfy filmmakers, distributors like Steps Entertainment have subtitled some of their old films 
and taken them to Magic Plus for broadcast. 
Film festivals in Dar es Salaam have also become consumers of Tanzanian video films, 
as evidenced by the number of video films that have been showcased in local film festivals such 
as the European Film Festival, the Korean Film Festival, and the Zanzibar Film Festival. These 
festivals have opened up their repertoire to include films by both professional Tanzanian 
filmmakers and the amateur filmmakers who comprise the majority of the video filmmakers. 
Like Magic Plus, subtitling became a major requirement of festival organizers. Since festivals 
are frequented by a diverse group of people coming from different parts of the world, the 
subtitling of films has become a common denominator that brings the audience together for a 
viewing experience. In 2008, the European Film Festival, organized by the French Cultural 
Center, had for the first time a special screening of Tanzanian video films. From October 10 to 
30, one Tanzanian film a day was screened for the general public. “Professional” art house films 
such as Beatrix Mugishage’s Unsung Heroes (2008), Imru Baraka’s African Tales (2008), and 
Omar Chande’s Fimbo ya Baba (2008) were screened side by side with commercial video films 
such as Khalfan Ahmad’s Copy (2007), Irene Sanga’s Kolelo (2007), and Mrisho Mpoto’s 
Twenty Million (2008). For the first time in Tanzania commercial video films were presented on 
a par with art house films at the festival, thus blurring the high and low culture divide that has 
been so prevalent.  
The Future of the Film Industry in Tanzania 
The European Film Festival also conducted a screenwriter’s workshop and a roundtable 
discussion on the future of the film industry in Tanzania. Film producers, distributors, 
filmmakers, academicians, and government representatives attended and discussed the 
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challenges and prospects of the film industry and resolutely called for the need to support the 
growing industry by creating supportive policies and training institutions.  
Inadequate policies and training institutions have compelled filmmakers and distributors 
to find ways to adapt, resist, and develop, despite the lack of sufficient support from the Kikwete 
government. The Kikwete administration, through its policies and institutions, continues to seek 
control of the production, distribution, and content of video films. But with technological 
innovations, the spread of the market economy, and the loss of an ideological vision of the 
government, this endeavor has been difficult to fulfill. 
To control and monitor the artistic expression of filmmakers and distributors, the 
government had mandated the registration of all art works and companies with government 
institutions such as COSOTA, BASATA (Baraza la Sanaa Tanzania) (National Arts Council), 
and the National Film Censorship Board. This, though, has not deterred filmmakers and 
distributors; they have found ways of negotiating with and even bypassing government agencies 
and policies. Some filmmakers have dared to respond to the government by openly refusing to 
take their works to the film censor board, and some have questioned the legitimacy of such 
institutions. Filmmakers, in defiance of the government, have continued to make and distribute 
films, and in doing so, they have disregarded the laws and penalties the government and its 
institutions have mandated. This form of defiance has awakened the Kikwete administration and 
has forced it to reevaluate its stance on the film industry, and especially the young people who 
are the driving force behind it. 
In August 2009, the Kikwete administration, via the minister of finance, Mustafa Mkalo, 
announced to the parliament that a duty tax on all film equipment had been removed “so as to 
promote the film industry for the purpose of encouraging employment of young people” (Budget 
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Speech, 2009). Many of the filmmakers and distributors received the news with some skepticism. 
“Our problem is not equipment, it is a comprehensive policy to educate and support the film 
industry. . . . The industry needs investment in education and most of all investment in ideas” 
(Imruh, Interview, 2009). Not to seem disrespectful, filmmakers welcomed the gesture of the 
government but knew exactly why the gesture had come at that opportune moment. Presidential 
and parliamentary elections were around the corner. 2010 was an election year, and this was a 
calculated move on the part of the government. In 2005, the Kikwete administration had come to 
power largely due to the support and votes of young people, and in 2010 they were needed even 
more.  
It was clear that if Kikwete wanted to be re-elected, his base, the young people, had to be 
galvanized, lest they fall to the opposition. To get filmmakers’ support Kikwete did not stop at 
tax breaks. In his farewell speech to the parliament on July 16, 2010, President Kikwete noted, 
“Right now we have paid an expert from the University of Dar es Salaam to help develop a 
reliable and proper distribution network for filmmakers and musicians so that they may receive 
proper payment for their sweat.” The removal of taxation on film equipment and a promise of a 
better distribution circuit was a way to lure young people to remain loyal to the Kikwete 
administration and show their gratitude by re-electing him and his administration to a second 
term.  
To further its hold on filmmakers and artists in general, in July 2010, the Kikwete 
administration, through the Tanzanian National Arts Council, established a video filmmaker’s 
association whose aim was to safeguard the interests of filmmakers. It is a government based and 
mandated association that, on the surface, seemed to be in the interests of filmmakers, but in 
reality was there to service and strengthen the government. But if filmmakers were not to comply 
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with or be fooled by this smoke screen, Kikwete made it clear what he was capable of doing. In 
his closing remarks to his party’s National Executive Committee meeting, Kikwete uttered, “It is 
said that the country disregards human rights and that the media is not free. . . . There were 
certain individuals who started to question, ask them where there are now? We quietly dealt with 
them. I will do the same to anybody who will be a ‘trouble maker’ in the country. Presidents’ 
powers are enormous; if I say this is no, it is no, even if you come with people from the human 
right watch, I will kick you out. You will get nothing and they can’t force me to change 
anything” (2010). 
This shows that the Kikwete administration, just like administrations prior, continues to 
want to control the media industry; it continues to flex its muscles as a sign of power. And it 
continues to try to tame the industry to its own advantage. Time will tell if Kikwete will be 
forced to demonstrate his power in silencing people, or the media, especially the video film 
industry, will continue to flourish despite his threats. 
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Conclusion 
Nancy Morris and Silvio Waishord have explored the role of the state in communication 
and argue that the most tangible power available to states is law and policy making (2001: 10). 
Robert Gilpin, likewise, argues that it is the state that sets the rules within which other actors 
function and the state that uses its considerable power to influence outcomes (2001: 18). Thus, 
the state is an important agent in shaping the structure of media markets. In this study, I have 
examined this power and analyzed how state cultural and legislative policies—or the lack 
thereof—have influenced the type of films produced in a particular administrative era in 
Tanzania. This study has also examined to what extent the film industry remains under 
government control through legislative mechanisms. I have explained how the economy and 
politics have interplayed in the shaping of film legislation. Critical political economic theory that 
calls for questioning the role of the state in reproducing the structure of power in the film 
industry has been employed.  
In Chapter Two I examined President Julius Kambarage Nyerere’s administration (1961–
1985) and its contribution to and control of the film industry. Chapter Three is an explanation of 
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s administration (1985–1995) and its adoption of neo-liberal 
policies and the consequences to the film industry. Chapter Four explains President Benjamin 
Mkapa’s administration (1995–2005) and its schizophrenic relationship with globalization and 
the emergence of alternative modes of film production, and finally Chapter Five describes 
President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete’s administration (2005–2010) and the expansion of the video 
film industry.  
Through an in-depth analysis of government archival reports; interviews with 
government cultural officials, government filmmakers, independent filmmakers, film producers, 
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distributors; and first-hand observation, this study reveals a strong government’s hold on the film 
industry in Tanzania. In advancing their power and legitimacy, different administrations have 
established cultural and film policies and legislation as mechanisms for monitoring and 
controlling Tanzania’s cultural industry. They have co-opted, manipulated, negotiated, and 
invented policies and institutions that have protected their interests. 
In my analysis of the Nyerere administration I discuss how the Ujamaa and self-reliance 
policy advocated, centralized, and controlled all major means of production, including the film 
industry, and how this informed the kinds of films that were produced and distributed in the 
country. The major question in this chapter was why and how did the government invest in the 
cultural sector. In an attempt to build a unified nation out of the 120 ethnic groups, the Nyerere 
presidency was called the “nation building phase,” during which the government banned all 
political and social organizations and citizens became subservient to the state and its ruling party. 
This was arguably done because indulging in diverse and multiple organizations would introduce 
elements of disunity and retard development. In this regard the government gave itself the power 
to define national social, cultural and political characteristic of Tanzania.  
 Through the ideology of socialism and self-reliance, also known as Ujamaa, the 
government created policies and cultural institutions that solidified and spearheaded government 
cultural agendas. This was done through several means; by establishing the Ministry of Culture 
and Youth in 1962 whose main objective was to seek and collect the best traditions and make 
them part of the national culture. The goal of the ministry was to reconstruct, preserve and 
promote nationally sanctioned traditions which reflected the politics of the country. In this 
regards the government sanctioned national culture showed a tendency toward pleasing and 
praising the government.  
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In terms of the film industry, the government established the Government Film Unit 
(GFU), to produce government newsreel, the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) to produce 
documentaries and educational films and the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) a distribution and 
commercial film company, in order to promote and construct cultural values and traditions that 
adhered to the government version and vision of a socialist Tanzania. With the use of newsreel, 
documentaries, and educational films, the government was able to construct and control of what 
cultural image/identity was permissible to the Tanzanian public.  
To also control the commercial film industry, which was in the hands of private 
individuals, the government established the Tanzania Film Company and made it the sole 
distributing company of foreign films. All importers and exhibitors of foreign films were forced 
to take their films to TFC for distribution and censorship. The Nyerere administration used and 
solidified the colonial Cinematographic Ordinance of 1932 and strengthen the National Film 
Censorship Board. All the oppressive and authoritarian tendencies of the cinematographic 
ordinance were left intact; filmmakers still could not make films without the consent of the 
government. The new administration further controlled and limited the artistic expression of 
filmmakers by turning them into workers of the state.  
To legitimize and strengthen their version of a national identity/culture in film, the 
National Film Censorship board comprised of government officials and TANU party members. 
These members had the power to permit, revoke, and or ban any film that was exhibited or 
produced in Tanzania. Institutions established by the government, the Government Film Unit 
(GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), the Audio Visual Institute (AVI), the Ministry of 
Culture and Youth, and the National Film Censorship Board facilitated government control of 
what cultural image/identity was permissible.  
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The Nyerere regime, through these institutions, was able to control what was perceived as 
the social, cultural, economic, and political path of Tanzania. Through its nationalization of the 
economy and control of the film industry the government was able to project an identity of 
Tanzania that adhered to its own interests. The Nyerere administration through its policies and 
cultural institutions saw to it that only government-sanctioned national culture and identities 
were accessible to the public. 
During the period economists refer to as “Africa’s lost decade,” the Mwinyi 
administration (1985–1995) saw the rise of an economic and social crisis and the introduction 
and implementation of International Monetary Fund and World Bank sponsored structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) as remedies to the country’s economic difficulties. The 
implementation of the SAPs signified a major shift in Tanzania socio-economic and political 
worldview. SAPs brought on the adoption of neo-liberal policies that transformed Tanzania from 
a socialist-oriented nation into a postsocialist nation in which a global capitalist system became 
the norm. Neo-liberal policies called for the devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling, trade 
liberalization, elimination of government subsidies, reduction of the state investment in the 
economy, encouragement of private sector and eventually the dismantling of the single party 
state and the introduction of multiparty democracy. This transformation consequently had a 
tremendous effect on the film industry.  
 The government relaxed its hold on the film industry by allowing individuals and 
companies to import and distribute films without needing to take them to TFC. Censorship 
though continued to be the purview of the government, they continued to monitor and survey the 
kinds of foreign images and content Tanzanians were seeing. Foreign films were seen as 
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hindrance to and slowed down the construction of a national culture, thus in need of a watchful 
eye. 
The control of film through censorship was not, however, without questions and debate. 
Government filmmakers questioned the validity of non film expert in censoring film. They 
suggested, and were denied, that they as filmmakers should be given the task of censoring the 
films. Although the government was financially withdrawing from the film industry, but through 
censorship, it maintained control. The financial cutbacks to the film industry brought on by the 
introduction of neo-liberal policies, saw the emergence of co-production as a mode of filmic 
production. Government filmmakers, especially those from the Tanzania Film Company, co-
produced films with international partners and filmmakers. This kind of filmmaking changed the 
content of Tanzanian film. The films produced no longer overtly supported government agendas. 
In fact, filmed co-productions were covertly critical of the government and thus allowed for an 
intelligent criticism of the state to occur. Government agendas were to take a back seat to social 
matters such as in Harusi ya Mariamu (1985) and Mama Tumaini (1987). The tackling of social 
matters was made possible because of the emergence of alternative mode of participation and 
expression in social, economic and political life-the emergence of civil society organizations. 
NGOs in the Mwinyi era used films to stimulate greater citizen involvement in socio-cultural 
activities of the country. Filmmaking those still working for the government or independent 
made NGOs their refuge and a plat form for making films.  
The Mkapa administration (1995-2005) quickly accelerated the neo-liberal policies 
initiated by Mwinyi. Mkapa created legislative policy framework which invited investment from 
the private sector. To initiate the globalization process of open market economy, Mkapa 
aggressively pursued economic recovery programs, structural reforms, and the privatization of 
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state-run institutions but also established cultural policies and institutions that minimized the 
spread of global cultural currents. Major questions in this chapter has been why did the 
government found it imperative to establish a cultural policy document and cultural institutions 
and what impact did these organizations and policies have on cultural industry such as film?  
As technology became available and inexpensive, and the liberalization of trade and the 
open market economy became the driving force of economic development in Tanzania, private 
investment in media outlets started to emerge. Local individuals established media houses such 
as television stations, newsmagazines, and independent film production houses. The 
mushrooming of privately owned companies revolutionized film production, distribution, and 
exhibition in the country. Local entrepreneurs ventured into the filmmaking business, and the 
government was no longer in charge of film production and no longer the sole producer and 
exhibitor of films.  
This lack of control in the film industry and the emergence of diverse views and voices 
that challenged the monolithic view of a national identity, threatened the interest and stability of 
the state. To prevent the spread of an authorized belief system and images, the government 
designed and established policies and institutions that were supposedly to safeguard the identity 
and culture of the nation. But in actual fact, it was one of the mechanism the government 
employed in an attempt to control the cultural behavior of the public, giving itself more leverage 
to continue to control the content of foreign and local cultural products. In order to accomplish 
this, the government set out proscriptive mechanisms that dealt with this control. To combat the 
infiltration of foreign and local cultural products the government worked vigorously to create 
institutions such as the Cultural Trust Fund (1998), a funding organization for individual artists 
and companies that promote the advancement of Tanzanian cultural activities, and the Zanzibar 
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International Film Festival (ZIFF) (1998), a platform to showcase Tanzanian cultural film 
heritage and legislation such as the Cultural Policy (1997) that outlined the mission and 
objectives of Tanzanian culture, value and customs, and the Copyright Law Act (1999) that 
sought to safeguard and protect artistic works. All these institutions and policies, regulated by the 
government, were mechanisms for controlling the influx of foreign as well as local cultural 
products.  
The Cultural policy document established in 1997 became the basis for all cultural 
development in the country. The objective of the cultural policy was to lay out ways the 
government could achieve its cultural construction and at the same time become a participant in 
the global market. Through the cultural policy the government continued to define the cultural 
path that Tanzania was to take. The Copyright law established in 1999 was said to protect the 
works of artists but in actual fact it is designed to regulate culture under the disguise of 
protecting individuals and cultural heritage. The copyright law is regulated by the government 
through the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing and administered by the Copyright 
Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) a government institution within the ministry.  
The Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) established in 1998 as a promoter of 
Tanzanian film heritage has yet to contribute to the development of a local film industry. No 
single video filmmaker can boast of being trained or inspired by the film festival. What ZIFF has 
managed to do is to promote Zanzibar as a tourist destination spot, thereby increasing 
government tourist revenue and thus making the government the main beneficiary of the festival. 
With all the restrictive policies and institutions created by the government, filmmakers 
and other artists have devised alternative strategies in their effort to challenge and question the 
status quo, especially in this globalized, technologically advanced and border-erasing world 
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view. Two mode of filmic production emerged out of this juncture: a diasporic transnational 
filmmaking practice and a national video film practice. The emergence of diasporic filmmaking 
practice is attributed to the permeability of the nation-state and the increase of migration to the 
metropolis. Filmmakers like Martin Mhando and Josiah Kibira have moved from Tanzania and 
settled in Australia and the United State in an effort to make films that speak to a wider 
transnational audience.  
The video film industry born out of the intersection and convergence of the global and 
the local is commercially motivated and has become the driving media, a popular art form that is 
both loved and accessible to its Tanzanian viewers. It has greatly been influence by Nigerian 
video films that dominated television scheduling in the mid and late 1990s and popularity of the 
video films has brought some contesting views between what are called professional filmmakers 
and amateur video filmmakers. Professional filmmakers are categorized as individuals who have 
studied filmmaking, primarily abroad with film projects funded by NGOs and international 
organizations, while video filmmakers are self trained and make commercial video films. 
 Professional filmmakers have lamented about the quality of the video films made by 
video filmmakers, criticizing them for their themes as well as their technical qualities. Video 
filmmakers in retaliation have responded by pointing out the popularity of their films and the 
financial independence they have as opposed to the donor funding that most of the professional 
filmmakers fight for. Currently the video film industry is economically viable, sustainable and 
entertaining and has become the staple diet for most Tanzanian viewers. The proliferation and 
success of the video film movement has been viewed by the government as a threat to Tanzanian 
mores and culture, thus the government has responded by strengthening control of the Film Act 
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and its film censorship board, requiring all filmmakers to register with the film censorship board 
and the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA). . 
By the time the Kikwete administration (2005–present) took office, the film industry had 
already shown signs of becoming a strong economic contender. But instead of relaxing the 
restrictions on film production, and meeting the demands of a new democratic country, the 
government through the new Film Act called for more centralized control, not only of the video 
film industry but also of programs aired on all television stations. The government seemed to 
regress to the stringent hold on the film industry of the 1960s and 70s. In this new Film Act the 
film censor board is empowered to monitor the production, distribution and exhibition of all 
video films and films screened on all television station in the country. Filmmakers and 
distributors are forced to register with the Copyright Society of Tanzania and the National Film 
Censorship Board. This way the administration controlled and monitored the kinds of cultural 
product that are being created by local producers of film.  
Although the Kikwete government created more restrictive film policies, filmmakers and 
distributors found ways to bypass both the policies and the institutions they engendered. While 
filmmakers and distributors did register their works with the copyright society, they refused to 
take their films to the National Film Censorship Board for inspection and continued to make 
films that were consumed by not only Tanzanians but also by diasporic communities in the West.  
This was made possible by five distribution companies; GMC Wasanii Promoters, 
Mwananchi Production, Mtitu Game Quality Production, KAPICO and Steps Entertainment who 
control the production and distribution of video films in Tanzania. These five distributing giants 
produce, via commissioning and or outright purchase of video films from filmmakers and 
distribute the films through their outlets and agents throughout the country. In marketing their 
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films, colorful posters, television ads, banners, film trailers and interviews are made, to generate 
recognition before a film is release into the market. 
Because the video film industry is a profitable venture, piracy has become the number 
one nemeses of the video film industry. Piracy, conducted by dubious individuals, television 
stations and video rentals has been the thorn of many filmmakers and distribution companies. To 
combat piracy filmmakers and distributors have reduced the price of their video films from 5,000 
($5) to 2,000 ($2) shillings to meet the piracy price. This has greatly reduced piracy but it has not 
eradicated it. To find other sources of revenue, distributors and filmmakers have expanded their 
business to countries as far as the United State and Nigeria and as near as Kenya, Uganda and 
Rwanda. This has been achieved by adding English subtitles to the video films and creating 
border crossing themes such as in From China with Love and From Dar to Lagos.  
While government continue to want to control the production of films in Tanzania, 
filmmakers have also been working hard to bypass the government by formulating alternative 
strategies and tools in getting their films to the public. Government insistence on continued 
control of the film industry reinforces the authoritative and undemocratic nature of the state and 
therefore an urgent need to critique and investigate the film industry rather than to accept the 
status quo.  The need to examine the ownership concentration and control of media is critical in 
the hope of highlighting the uneven distribution of power and the role of the state and in the end, 
hoping to create a democratic alternative form of film production, distribution, and exhibition.  
Scholars from North America and Europe (Schiller, Chomsky, McChesney, Mosco, 
Wasko) have concerned themselves predominantly with how Hollywood and Western media 
programs have come to dominate the international film market and how the state becomes 
involved and thus affects the development of a national cinema in other countries, especially in 
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developing nations. Ultimately, this phenomenon is indicative of how the capitalist development 
system has nourished inequalities of power. While Hollywood does have an impact on domestic 
film industries around the world, not all domestic film industries are affected by Hollywood. The 
film industry in Tanzania and countries such as Uganda and Ghana are affected by policies and 
legislation that have been put in place by their own governments. 
This study reveals how different administrations have controlled the cultural/film sector, 
despite the social political and economic shift that has taken place in Tanzania. Each government 
has exercised its power to control the film industry differently but with the same force and 
determination. Although critical political economy of film has centered on how Hollywood has 
affected and marginalized other cinemas, it is important to pay attention to the internal dynamics 
of a local film industry. Hollywood has been at the forefront of investigation by North American 
scholars, ignoring the fact that there are countries whose cinema experience is not confined to 
Hollywood and for whom Hollywood is not the dominant film experience. This study hopes to 
expand the political economy discussion of African film by interrogating the inner working of 
domestic film production and the impact of government policies and legislation on the industry.  
While it is true that the capitalist mode of operation creates and nourishes inequalities, 
this approach of analysis unintentionally suggests that other economic structures and ideologies 
do not create or have fewer inequalities, which is not the case. This study has revealed that 
during the Nyerere administration, characterized by its adoption of the Ujamaa (socialism and 
self-reliance) policy, a full attack on and control of the media was experienced. Individual 
expression was marginalized and banned at the expense of state-sanctioned identities. Therefore, 
in studying the structure of media ownership and control, the ideological or economic makeup of 
a country must come into consideration only when evaluating who owns and controls it and not 
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how power is maintained and reproduced. While in capitalist nations, government-backed 
corporations may control and have power over the media, in postsocialist states such as China, 
Vietnam, and Cuba, governments still own and control the media. Thus, inequality has no 
ideology.  
Third World political economy scholars have, like their North American counterparts, 
examined how the presence of foreign films and foreign media companies has affected the 
development of local programs and the domestic film industry. They have acknowledged the 
negative effect of Western media upon domestic film production and have advocated for a media 
policy that centers on the interests of the public and the need to develop and promote popular 
forms of local media. What has not been brought to the debate is the interests of those in power. 
Are those in power interested in creating a people-centered media policy or promoting a popular 
form of local media? There is a fundamental reason why certain policies are created; they serve 
the interests of their creators. The need to interrogate the workings of and establishment of 
policies and institutions of power needs to be the agenda of critical political economy. As Mosco 
and Wasko remind us, “The political economy of film must challenge the industry and offer a 
sustained critique from a moral evaluative position” (2005: 11).  
The analysis carried out by European and Third World scholars (Mattelart, Murdock, 
Gilllespie, Miege, Hamelink, Boafo, Rugumamu) that evaluates how foreign media threaten the 
cultural development of developing nations sheds light on the influence of foreign cultural 
products upon local and even pinpoints what ought to be done, but rarely does it examine local 
dynamics and their influence on local cultural production. It either assumes that local dynamics 
are subsumed and overpowered by foreign culture and therefore are passive and receptive to 
foreign goods such as film. These states, as this study reveals, take a strong stance when it comes 
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to “defending” their cultural identity or values. All administrations, from Nyerere to Kikwete, 
have fought to control the film industry by demonizing foreign films and restricting their entry to 
the country and by creating policies and institutions that saw to it that only government-approved 
films were produced and exhibited to the public.  
Despite stringent and concentrated control of the media industry by the government, the 
video film industry emerged. Filmmakers have bypassed and circumvented policies and 
institutions that were created to monitor and control them, and have produced popular films for 
the public, who consume them as fast as they hit the market. Popular forms of local media have 
been developed despite government control. By analyzing the workings and influence of 
government policies and institutions upon the film industry, a resistance to the application of the 
policies can be strategized and a truly people-centered local film production can flourish. This 
study has critiqued and interrogated the structure of power of the media industry, and has pointed 
out the prospects and challenges faced by filmmakers. By doing so, it is hoped a restructuring of 
the system will occur whereby people-centered views and aesthetics will replace those that are 
instituted by the government.  
Future Research 
Although the video film industry has put Tanzania on the world map as the second 
leading filmmaking country in Africa, very little documentation on the history or emergence of 
film in Tanzania is available. The history of film distribution and exhibition in Tanzania, 
especially prior to 1961, is nonexistent. Thus the need to study how film originated in Tanzania 
prior to independence and who controlled it will help to connect the past to the present and see if 
there are some comparisons. For example, the first cinema hall was established in Tanzania in 
1906 and was run by a Tanzanian of Indian descent. In subsequent years commercial film 
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distribution and exhibition was the purview of Tanzanians of Indian descent. Was there a 
connection between the former Indian distributors and the present Indian video film distributors? 
Thus the study would be from 1906 to the present and specifically examine the hold on the 
industry by Tanzanians of Indian descent. How did it come to be a domain of the Tanzanian 
Indian, where did they get their films, who was their audience, and what social and political 
maneuvering took place with the colonial administration? A social-historical perspective of 
Tanzanian Indians and film distribution and exhibition in Tanzania will help understanding the 
origin of film in Tanzania and shed some light on its future standing. Another pertinent study is 
the reception of video film. What factors influence the popularity of these video films? Is it the 
themes, genre, or star power? Who are the primary consumers?  
There has always been a contentious relationship between independent film producers, 
video filmmakers, and television stations. Independent producers have blamed television stations 
for the slow development of quality films, while video filmmakers have accused television 
stations of their ties to video film piracy. Regardless of these claims television still plays an 
important role in the promotion of video films and it is thus important to understand the 
workings of television stations and how they relate to the promotion and development of the film 
industry. 
This study has revealed the impact of government policies and legislation on the film 
industry in Tanzania and how with the power to legislate and formulate policy, the governments 
of different administrative eras have continuously, with different mechanisms, controlled the 
cultural/film sector of Tanzania. But despite the tight control, as chapter four and five have 
illustrated, popular resistance emerged and bypassed the mechanisms put forth and created local 
films that spoke to the people and questioned government-sanctioned cultural identities and 
 190 
values. It is hoped governments would see this resistance as a sign of change, a sign that 
restrictive film rules and policies no longer apply and will not be accepted in the new globalized 
Tanzania. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Subjects 
The following is a list of individuals interviewed. I have categorized them into seven groupings, 
although many of them intersect and fit into more than one. 
A. Government Cultural Officials 
Prof. Hermus Mwasoko:  
• Commissioner of Culture, Language and Development at the Ministry of 
Information, Culture and Sports 
• Professor of Kiswahili at the University of Dar es Salaam 
Rashid Masimbi:  
• Executive secretary of the Tanzanian Theatre Center (tzTc) 
• Former Commissioner of Culture, Language, and Development at the Ministry of 
Education and Culture 
• Principal of the Bagamoyo College of Arts 
• Board member of the National Film Censorship 
Dr. John Ndagala:  
• Commissioner of the Cultural Desk at UNESCO 
• Former Commissioner of Culture, Language and Development at the Ministry of 
Education and Culture 
• Designer of the Cultural Policy document 
Gonche Materego:  
• Executive Secretary of the National Arts Council 
• The founder and CEO of Dar Talent Studio (DTS), a media production house 
Robert Kayombo:  
• Executive Director of the National Museum/cultural house 
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Rose Sayore:  
• Executive Secretary of the Cultural Trust Fund 
• Chairperson of the National Film Censorship Board  
• Former employee of National Arts Council 
• The Government Film Unit (GFU) 
• The Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
Philemon Mwansanga:  
• Program Officer of the Cultural Trust Fund 
Egnacious Mkinga:  
• Executive Secretary of the COSOTA 
Lilian Beleko:  
• Executive Secretary of the National Film Censorship Board 
Makaraghe Shekaraghe Nkinda:  
• Film inspector at the National Film Censorship Board 
Peter Msuya:  
• Film inspector at the National Film Censorship Board 
 
B. Government Filmmakers 
Siril Kaunga:  
• Retired government filmmaker employed by: 
• The Government Film Unit (GFU) 
• The Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
• The National Television (TVT) 
Saileni Dickson:  
• Retired government filmmaker employed by: 
• The Government Film Unit (GFU) 
• The Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
• The National Television (TVT) 
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John Mponguliana:  
• Retired government filmmaker employed by: 
• The government Film Unit (GFU) 
• The Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
Dick Kaombwe:  
• Production supervisor at Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) 
• Former employee of the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) 
 
C. Independent Filmmakers 
Martin Mhando:  
• Artistic director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) (2006-present) 
• Film professor at the Murdoch University in Australia 
• An independent filmmaker 
• Former government filmmaker at the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) 
• Director of Yomba Yomba (1985) 
• Co-director of Maangamizi: the Ancient One (2001) 
Ron Mulhivill:  
• An independent filmmaker 
• Co-director of Harusi Ya Mariamu (1986) 
• Co-director of Maangamizi: the Ancient One (2001) 
Imruh Bakar:  
• CEO of Savannah Films production 
• A film producer 
• Former artistic director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF)  
(2001-2006) 
Beatrix Mugishagwe:  
• CEO of Abantu Vision production 
• Film director and producer 
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Pius Mota:  
• Production manager of Abantu vision production  
Maria Sarungi:  
• CEO of Compact media production  
• Film director and producer 
Carrie Matiku:  
• CEO of Afrikan Image production 
• Film director and producer 
 
D. Video Filmmakers 
William Mtitu:  
• Video filmmaker  
• CEO of Five Effects video production company 
George Otieno Tyson:  
• Video filmmaker 
Hemmie Rajab:  
• Video filmmaker 
Mrisho Mpoto:   
• Poet 
• Actor  
• Video filmmaker 
Irene Sanga:  
• Poet 
• Actor  
• Video filmmaker 
Issa Musa Hamisi: 
• Video filmmaker 
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E. Film Distributors 
Solank Delish:  
• Managing Director of, One Step Ahead Entertainment 
Ignatus Kambarage:  
• Marketing Manager of KAPICO Distribution and Production 
 
F. Academicians 
Prof. Penina Mlama:  
• The Executive Director of the Campaign for Female education (Camfed)  
• Playwright  
• Actor  
• Cultural activists 
• Former Executive Director of Forum for African Women Educationalist (FAWE) 
• Former Chief Academic Officer at the University of Dar es Salaam  
• Former theatre professor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the 
University of Dar es Salaam 
Dr. Augustine Hatar: 
• Professor of mass communication at the Mass Media and Journalism School  
• Independent filmmaker 
• Former professor of Television and Radio at the Department of Fine and 
Performing Arts at the University of Dar es Salaam 
Dr. Herbert Makoye:   
• Head of the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar es 
Salaam 
• Board member of National Arts Council 
• Former member of the broadcasting services content committee 
Prof. Elias Jengo:  
• Art professor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of 
Dar es Salaam 
• Former member of the National Film Censorship Board 
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Edwin Semzaba:  
• Professor of theatre at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the 
University of Dar Es Salaam 
• Playwright  
S. Belleghe:  
• Cinematographer 
• Studio Instructor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University 
of Dar Es Salaam 
• Former employee of the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) 
 
G. Non-Governmental Organization 
Ussu Mallya:  
• Executive Secretary of Tanzanian Gender Networking Program (TGNP) 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
CULTURAL POLICY 
(POLICY STATEMENT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Cultural Policy (Sera ya Utamaduni) was inaugurated on the 23rd of August, 1997 in 
Dodoma. The policy document is in Kiswahili, the national language, to make it accessible to 
most Tanzanians. However, it is realized that the implementation of the Policy stands to gain 
from the participation and support of many different parties who may not understand Kiswahili. 
 
 In order to link-up with such parties we are publishing translations of the policy 
statements contained in the Kiswahili publication of the Cultural Policy titled Sera ya 
Utamaduni 
 
 
Ministry of Education and Culture 
September, 1997 
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THE CULTURAL POLICY 
POLICY STATEMENTS 
1. LANGUAGE 
1.1 The National Language 
1.1.1 Kiswahili shall be pronounced the National Language and this 
pronouncement shall be incorporated in the Constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania. 
1.1.2 There shall be incentives to encourage individuals and organization to 
publish and disseminate Kiswahili publications. 
1.1.3 The National Kiswahili Council shall be responsible for research into, and 
the promotion of Kiswahili. 
1.1.4 The National Kiswahili Council and other institutions responsible for the 
promotion of Kiswahili shall be strengthened and adequately resourced in 
order to enable them to discharge their functions. 
1.1.5 Vernacular languages shall continue to be used as resource for the 
development of Kiswahili. 
1.2 Vernacular Languages  
1.2.1 Our people shall continue to use and be proud of their vernacular 
languages. 
1.2.2 Communities, private and public organization shall be encouraged to 
research, write, preserve and translate vernacular languages into other 
languages. 
1.2.3 The writing of vernacular language dictionaries and grammar books shall 
be encouraged. 
1.2.4 Public and private organizations shall be encouraged to publish and 
disseminate vernacular language materials. 
1.3 Foreign Languages 
1.3.1 English shall be a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and 
secondary education levels and shall be encouraged in higher education. In 
addition the teaching of English shall be strengthened. 
1.3.2 The teaching of other foreign languages such as French, Portuguese and 
Russian shall be encouraged. 
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1.4 The Medium of Instruction 
1.4.1 A special programme to enable the use of Kiswahili as a medium of 
instruction in education and training at all levels shall be designed and 
implemented. 
1.4.2 Kiswahili shall be a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and 
secondary education and shall be encouraged in higher education. In 
addition the teaching of Kiswahili shall be strengthened. 
 
2. ARTS AND CRAFTS 
2.1.1 The National Arts Council shall collaborate with and promote artists and the arts. 
Furthermore it shall collect and disseminate information about prices and markets 
of the products of cultural industries to individual artists and organization. 
Moreover the Council shall encourage artists to participate in different festival 
and exhibitions.  
2.1.2 Pre-primary, primary, secondary education and teacher’s college curricula shall 
include art subjects, e.g. Music, fine arts, handicraft and theater arts. Furthermore 
these subjects shall be examinable in continuous assessment and final 
examinations of these levels of education. 
2.1.3 Artists shall be encouraged to form associations for the purpose of promoting and 
safeguarding their interests. 
2.1.4 Government shall establish a mechanism for identifying and honoring renown 
national artists. 
2.1.5 Artists shall be required to advocate the need for protecting the environment 
2.1.6 Artists shall be required to mobilize the public to preserve and safeguard the 
environment. 
2.1.7 Cultural industries shall be identified and encouraged to contribute towards 
national economic development. 
2.1.8 Institutions responsible for the marking of Tanzanian products shall be 
encouraged to recognize and advertise Tanzanian artists and music products 
2.1.9 Government shall insure that a national ultra modern art gallery is constructed. 
The public shall be sensitized to set aside places for exhibitions. 
2.1.10 Government shall continue to set aside and protect places earmarked for 
handicraft, art exhibitions and music performances both in rural and urban areas. 
2.1.11 There shall be incentives to individuals and various organizations to establish and 
manage exhibition halls. 
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3. CULTURAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Civic Responsibilities 
3.1.1 The protection and promotion of our cultural heritage is a civic 
responsibility and shall be supervised by Government. 
3.1.2 Members of the public, plus private and public organizations shall be 
sensitized to cultural heritage. The close links between culture, natural 
resources, the environment and development programmes shall be 
emphasized. 
3.1.3 Cultural heritage sites shall be used as educational resources and tourist 
attractions. 
3.1.4 In providing education and training all curricula shall emphasize the use of 
cultural heritage sites, museums, archives, libraries, natural physical 
formations and vegetation. 
3.1.5 Mechanism shall be established to enable the nation to identify, own and 
preserve national treasures e.g. art objects, natural resources, minerals, as 
well as archaeological, paleontological and botanical remains. 
3.1.6 Cultural heritage sites shall be identified delineated and developed 
including the establishment of site museums. 
3.1.7 Government shall ensure that private and public offices recognize the 
value of records and archival material in their possession and preserve 
them as our nation’s history and culture bearers. 
3.1.8 Records management shall be taught to all administrators, new employees 
and in all office Management Training institutions. 
3.1.9 All leaders at place of work shall be responsible for the management of 
records created in the day to day discharge of their responsibilities. 
3.1.10 Government shall encourage regions, districts, villages, private and public 
institutions to establish and manage museums, libraries and archival 
centers. 
3.1.11 All man-made objects shall become national monuments on attaining the 
age of one hundred years. 
3.2 Cultural Resource Assessment 
3.2.1 All land development shall be preceded by Cultural Resource Impact 
Studies. The cost for undertaking these studies shall be incorporated in the 
budgets of the respective development projects. 
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3.3 Aquatic Cultural Resources 
3.3.1 Underwater Cultural resources such as shipwrecks shall be identified, 
documented and legally protected. 
3.4 Regional and District Books 
3.4.1 The practice of Administrative officers writing and keeping Regional and 
District Books for the purpose of portraying the characteristics of the 
communities of the respective regions and districts shall be revived. 
3.5 Cultural and Environmental Conservation 
3.5.1 Traditional knowledge, skills and technology which are environmentally 
friendly shall be identified and their use encouraged. 
3.5.2 Research on traditions and customs which are supportive of environmental 
conservation shall be encouraged with a view to identifying and 
popularizing their use. 
3.5.3 Research of traditions and customs which lead to environmental 
destruction shall be encouraged with a view of identifying and discarding 
them. 
3.5.4 Various art forms, shall be used to encourage the use of existing 
environmentally friendly traditions and customs and in disseminating the 
research results. 
 
4. RECREATION 
4.1.1 The press i.e., radio, television and newspapers shall encourage the observance of 
our values, traditions, customs and culture. 
4.1.2 Radio and television programmes and times when such programmes are aired 
shall take cognizance of national values, customs and traditions. In addition, such 
stations shall be encouraged to give more air-time to Tanzanian music and arts. 
4.1.3 Open spaces and recreation grounds fro children and elderly persons shall be set 
aside and protected. 
4.1.4 Individuals, the public and various organizations shall be encouraged to establish 
and manage recreation facilities. 
4.1.5 There shall be incentives to local producers of recreation equipment and materials 
so that such equipment becomes easily available and at affordable costs. 
4.1.6 Government shall ensure that available recreational activities do not distort our 
national values and ethics. 
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4.1.7 It shall be ensured that research into traditional recreational activities is 
undertaken and the findings disseminated in order to facilitate the teaching of 
these activities. 
4.1.8 Sportsmen and sportswomen as well as artists shall be sensitized to know their 
rights and obligations. 
4.1.9 Community Centers all over the country shall be used for community 
development and recreational activities. Where such centers do not exist, their 
establishment shall be encouraged. 
4.1.10 Employers, including Government institutions and individuals, shall recognize the 
importance and relevance of recreation at work places in improving productivity 
and fostering the health of their employees. 
4.1.11 Non-Competitive sports and non-competitive artistic activities shall be 
encouraged and promoted so that they become important aspects of recreation. 
4.1.12 The public shall be sensitize to realize that sports are important in building a 
healthy body and mind, and fostering discipline, cooperation and international 
relations. 
4.1.13 Land-use and settlement planning shall take into consideration the need to set 
aside and maintain recreational areas. 
4.1.14 There shall be incentives to individuals and organizations to establish factories for 
local production of various recreational equipment and materials. 
 
5. CULTURE AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
5.1.1 Every citizen must recognize that participation in one’s culture is a basic right. 
5.1.2 Special programmes shall be established to enable women to participate fully in 
cultural activities. 
5.1.3 The public shall be sensitized to participate fully in various cultural activities 
including recreation and sports. 
5.1.4 It shall be ensured that all cultural institutions conduct their affairs in a 
democratic and transparent way, and according to the laws, with a view to 
encouraging wider community participation. 
5.1.5 The public shall be mobilized to form associations for the different aspects of 
culture. 
5.1.6 Sports-for-all programmes and festivals shall be encouraged and promoted. 
5.1.7 The public, private and public companies and corporations shall be required to 
join hands in making sure that there are places, equipment, materials and 
conducive environment to allow the public full participation in cultural activities. 
5.1.8 Special mechanism and programmes shall be established to enable elderly persons 
and the disabled to participate fully in various cultural activities. 
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5.1.9 The public shall remain free to earn a living from cultural activities in accordance 
with the law. 
 
6. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
6.1 Bringing up Children 
6.1.1 The family shall be respected as a basic and important institution in our 
social organization and shall be the basic for fostering ethics, education, 
training and culture. 
6.1.2 The role of religious institutions in fostering value, education, training and 
culture shall be recognized. 
6.1.3 Good customs and traditions shall be identified, enhanced and utilized in 
molding a peaceful, respectable and harmonious nation. 
6.1.4 All programmes relating to child care, education and training shall 
recognize the important role played by women in the promotion of better 
upbringing of children as well as inculcating culture. 
6.1.5 Research on child up-bringing, customs, traditions and the environment 
shall be encouraged and the results of such research shall be used in the 
betterment of education and training. 
6.1.6 A system of documenting, preserving and publishing cultural statistics and 
information shall be established. 
6.1.7 Parents and the society at large shall be encouraged to respect values and 
good traditions and customs of child up-bringing. 
6.1.8 Government and the people shall ensure that the rights of the child are not 
violated. 
6.1.9 Government shall ensure that children of school-going age go to school 
and that school curricula incorporate Tanzanian values including respect 
for human dignity, gender equity, care for property as well as respect for 
good traditions and customs. 
6.1.10 Educational and training institutions shall recognize and utilize good 
customs and traditions in preparing your for responsible parenthood. 
6.1.11 Religious institutions shall be part and parcel of child up-bringing so as to 
emphasize moral values, respect for work, human dignity and the spirit of 
tolerance. 
6.1.12 Mechanisms shall be put in place to enable street children to obtain better 
upbringing, education and skills fro respectable living. 
6.1.13 The public shall be sensitized to realize that patriotism, respect for work, 
cleanliness, and the protection of the environment and natural resources 
are part and parcel of our culture. 
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6.2 Education and Training 
6.2.1 Government shall encourage the establishment of educational and training 
institutions for the teaching of different cultural professions. 
6.2.2 Traditional technology and apprenticeship shall be recognized and 
promoted to become part of vocational education and training. 
6.2.3 Government shall encourage the teaching of museology, archaeology, 
archival and library studies in institutions of higher education and training. 
6.2.4 Government shall strengthen colleges of arts, sports, library and archival 
studies, and shall establish a college for architectural conservation. 
6.2.5 Curricula for primary, secondary and teacher education shall incorporate 
the teaching of art subject such as music, fine art, sculpture and the 
performing arts. Furthermore, these subjects shall be examinable in the 
final examinations of these levels of education. 
6.2.6 All forms of education shall recognize and encourage the use of museums, 
sites, monuments, libraries and archives as teaching and training 
resources. 
6.2.7 Reading, writing, and counting skills shall be recognized as being part of 
our culture and shall be promoted. 
6.2.8 Individuals as well as various organizations shall be allowed to establish, 
own and manage institutions for education and training in the fields of 
culture. Rules and regulations governing the establishment and running of 
these institutions shall be instituted. 
6.2.9 Functionaries of the Cultural Sector shall be required to pursue further 
education and training in their respective specialization in order to 
enhance productivity and efficiency. 
6.2.10 The public shall be sensitize to set own goals in life, accept competition, 
adopt modern technology in production, assess productivity, and keep 
records of daily activities. 
 
7. THE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES 
7. Management 
7.1.1 The Cultural sector shall continue to be part of the Government Structure. 
7.1.2 Government shall have a Cultural Policy and shall supervise its 
implementation. In addition, Government shall review all culture related 
legislation. 
7.1.3 Institutions responsible for culture shall be strengthened by providing 
them with adequate facilities as well as appropriately qualified personnel. 
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7.1.4 There shall be officers responsible for the Cultural Sector at regional and 
district levels. These officers shall be assisted by specialists in the fields of 
Sports, Arts, Languages, Archives and Antiquities. 
7.1.5 Principal cultural managers at national, regional and district levels shall 
have a University degree, professional competence in any field related to 
culture, training in management and administration, and working 
experience. 
7.1.6 Principal cultural managers at national, regional and district levels shall be 
responsible for coordinating and supervising the implementation of the 
Cultural Policy and other activities related to culture in their areas of 
jurisdiction.  
7.1.7 Heads of colleges and institutions providing education and training in the 
fields of culture shall be required to have at least a Masters degree in one 
of the disciplines related to culture. 
7.1.8 Principal cultural managers at national, regional, district and heads of 
education and training institutions shall get training in management and 
administration in order to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently. 
7.1.9 The Ministry responsible for Culture shall establish a system of 
registration and regulation of training in those skills which may be 
misused to threaten people’s lives and property such as wrestling, 
magic/Kung Fu, boxing and other martial arts. 
7.1.10 Government shall establish a mechanism for the registration of cultural 
education and training institutions and professionals in the different 
cultural fields with a view to avoiding a decline in professional standards 
as well as ensuring that the rules and regulations are not breached. 
7.1.11 The National Museums of Tanzania, the National Arts Council of 
Tanzania, the National Sports Council, the National Kiswahili Council of 
Tanzania and the Film Censorship Board shall provide advice on the 
establishment and management of similar institutions at regional, district 
and village levels. 
7.1.12 Existing national laws shall be translated and published in Kiswahili so as 
to enable the majority of the people to read and understand them. 
7.1.13 Stiffer penalties shall be imposed on all those found guilty of violating 
laws and regulations protecting our national values and ethics. 
7.2 National Values and Identity 
7.2.3 Symbols of national identity such as Mount Kilimanjaro, the Giraffe, the 
National Flag, the National Anthem, the Uhuru Torch, the Coast of Arms, 
etc…shall be given legal recognition so that the people can understand, 
respect and protect them in a fitting manner. 
 219 
7.2.4 The basic principles of the Constitution shall be taught to all students at 
primary and secondary school levels along with civic responsibilities. 
7.2.5 The National Anthem shall be taught to all pupils starting from pre-
primary school level. 
7.2.6 The National Anthem shall be sung daily in pre-primary, primary, and 
secondary schools before classes start. 
7.2.7 All people shall be required to stand up and sing the National Anthem 
before the commencement of national and international arts and sports 
events. 
7.2.8 Hoisting of tattered or faded National Flag shall be prohibited. 
Government shall institute regulations and make them public as to when 
and where the national flag may be hoisted or used. 
7.2.9 The Uhuru Torch shall continue to be raced throughout the country and 
Government shall ensure that it is respected. 
7.2.10 There shall be public participation in the selection of area, district, 
regional, and national names and symbols. Physical features and 
indigenous flora and fauna shall be considered when designing or 
selecting new symbols. The existing symbols shall be publicized to enable 
the public to know them and give them due respect. 
7.2.11 Special songs shall be composed and taught to pupils and the public in 
general so that they become part of national identity. 
7.2.12 There shall be designed special costumes that shall become part of our 
national identity. 
7.3 Copyright 
7.3.3 Government shall establish an institution to oversee copyright matters. 
7.3.4 Tanzania shall ratify and join copyright conventions and organizations, 
respectively, such as the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright 
Convention. 
7.3.5 The operationalization and review of existing Copyright-related laws shall 
be expedited in order to update them and accommodate changes in 
technology. 
7.4 Culture and Social Development 
7.4.1 The people shall be mobilized to realize their prime obligations to protect 
and conserve cultural heritage and the environment in their respective 
towns, villages and localities. 
 
 220 
7.4.2 The people shall be sensitized to identify and honour people with special 
talents in the various fields of culture. 
7.4.3 People with special talents in various fields of culture shall be encouraged 
to recognize themselves as such, become self-confident, use their talents to 
earn a living and improve their standard of life as well as educate the 
public and enhance national values. 
7.4.4 People with special skills which may endanger public safety and property 
shall be identified and be required to abide by rules and regulations in 
order to prevent the misuse of their skills. 
7.4.5 People with special skills and talents shall be encouraged to pass on their 
skills to others. 
7.4.6 The Education and Culture Committees of the Local Governments shall be 
mobilized to co-ordinate and enhance cultural activities by, say,  
delineation and protection of areas set aside for recreation, sports, cultural 
heritage and the establishment and management of museums and 
community centers. 
7.5 Financing Cultural Activities 
7.5.1 Government shall mobilize and involve individuals, various organizations, 
and the public at large to contribute towards the financing of cultural 
activities. 
7.5.2 Various cultural groups, clubs and councils shall be encouraged to become 
self financing and self-reliant. 
7.5.3 Institutes and colleges providing education and training in cultural fields 
shall charge fees. These fees shall be used to meet the operational costs of 
the prospective institutions and colleges. 
7.5.4 Cultural institutions shall charge fees for services rendered. These funds 
shall be used to promote specific areas of competence. 
7.5.5 Government shall institute entertainment tax to be used in financing 
cultural development. 
7.5.6 Cultural education and training institutions shall be encouraged to have 
income-generating activities. 
7.5.7 Services and goods that shall be rendered and produced by cultural 
institutions shall be sold at market prices. 
7.5.8 Individual and various organizations shall be encouraged to invest in the 
cultural sector. 
 
 221 
Appendix C 
Video Film Rental and Posters 
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DVD Covers of Video Films 
 
Poster of Video Films 
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Poster of Video Films 
 
The Making of a Video Film 
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The Making of a Video Film 
 
 
 
